Jan 1st, 12:00 AM - 12:00 AM

Perspectivas en Chicano Studies

Reynaldo Flores Macias
University of California - Los Angeles, reynaldo@chavez.ucla.edu

Papers presented at the
Third Annual Meeting
of the NACSS

PERSPECTIVAS EN CHICANO STUDIES

Reynaldo Flores Macias
Editor

Chicano Studies Center Publications - UCLA

PERSPECTIVAS EN CHICANO STUDIES Macias
Chicano Studies Center Publications - UCLA

PERSPECTIVAS EN CHICANO STUDIES I

Papers Presented at the Third Annual Meeting of the National Association of Chicano Social Science, 1975

GENERAL EDITOR

Reynaldo Flores Macías
Sociolinguistics, Georgetown University

To NACCS —
for posterity — 40 yrs
later

Published by
The National Association of Chicano Social Science
with the assistance of
The Chicano Studies Center, UCLA
The National Council of La Raza
Amauta-National Center for Chicano Studies Research

PREFACE

I would like to take this opportunity to thank a few of the many people who contributed to seeing this volume completed. Early in the process Gloria Sánchez provided much help in gathering the papers. Juan Gómez-Quiñones has provided guidance and encouragement throughout. Francisco Hernández, José Limon, Albert Camarillo, Felix Gutiérrez and Mario Barrera have helped, especially through their focos, in coordinating the financial support for the publication of the Proceedings. And, of course, thanks to all those authors who took the time to respond by sending in their papers and making the changes and additions asked of them.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

It has been almost ten years that the rise of campus activism for Chicanos began in earnest. Sparked by the critical mass of students and community activities, organizations like MASA, MASC, UMAS, MAYO, CSO and others, created greater pressure on college and university administrators to admit more students, develop financial aids, hire faculty and staff and institute courses and community programs. The next five years saw many of these "bread and butter" concessions withdrawn by the college and university administrations with the re-entrenchment of conservative forces in the schools after the U.S. loss in the Viet Nam war.

In retrospect we never had much influence or control over these programs, nor a wide vision of the historical events of the day. Many of the Chicano Studies departments, centers and programs still continue. There are an absolute greater number of faculty and students on campus as well. But, only in very few places are these faculty and students "allowed" to engage in the kind of honest intellectual work needed by our communities. The struggles for maintenance of these programs, creation of new ones and the relevance of higher education to our communities continue on a daily basis. The court decisions in Bakke v. U. of California, and the litigation between Defunis and the University of Washington, and other similar cases continue the conservatization of these institutions.

Aside from campus student organizations, there developed in this social ferment several independent organizations. Some, like the National Council of Chicano Studies were still-born because they were being organized from the top down (or is it from the star in the east to the cactus in the west?). Others were built on the modest organizing efforts of committed scholars (students, faculty and lay), working through caucuses in traditional discipline associations and through some Chicano Studies programs. The National Association of Chicano Social Science is one of the independent organizations that is still growing.

The Association is still too young to tell whether it will have much impact on the intellectual work of Mexicanos. These *Proceedings*, however, promise a positive and hopeful beginning. The annual meeting of the NACSS is the only national gathering of Mexicano scholars dedicated to and focussing on the development of intellectual work for the benefit of our communities.

Let us continue to develop NACSS and other broad-based organizations that will allow us to do the work needed to liberate our peoples.

RFM

Perspectivas en Chicano Studies

COLONIAL LABOR AND THEORIES OF INEQUALITY: THE CASE OF INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER

MARIO BARRERA

Political Science and Chicano Studies Program
University of California, San Diego

Racial minorities in the United States occupy a position of inequality in the social structure. Numerous studies have documented the existing inequalities in wealth, political power, schooling opportunity, and other dimensions of social life. Yet, there is little agreement on the fundamental causes of these patterns of inequality, and particularly of their persistence over time. The current study reports on the role of minority labor in one of the U.S.' largest corporations, International Harvester, and interprets the pattern of inequality found there within a framework of colonial theory. In order to clarify the theoretical approach, however, it is first necessary to discuss the various theories of minority inequality currently in use.

THEORIES OF INEQUALITY

There are three major types of theories about minority inequality in the United States today: deficiency theories, bias theories, and colonial theories. While there are no "pure" theories, it is my contention that existing approaches can be categorized as one or the other depending on the types of variables which they stress.

The first, and probably most widely held, type of theory is *deficiency* theory. Deficiency theories trace the conditions of continuing inequality to deficiencies within the affected minority group itself. There are three sub-types of this theoretical approach, each focusing on a particular type of deficiency. The three sub-types can be discussed under the headings of biological, social structural, and cultural.

Theories which conceptualize deficiency in biological terms include the classic racist theories, which still have considerable popular appeal. While they have been in disrepute in academic circles in recent decades, some commentators have noted a resurgence in the last few years. Arthur Jensen's lengthy article, "How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement," is most frequently cited in this regard.[1] Jensen is concerned with differences in the measurement of IQ between Blacks and Whites, and speculates that a substantial part of these differences may be due to biological inheritance. Apparently he feels that if a biologically produced intellectual deficiency could be demonstrated, this would contribute to explaining social inequalities between Blacks and Whites.[2] Jensen, however, is very cautious and tentative in his speculations, and this fact combined with various methodological problems in his work, make it difficult to take his work seriously as an explanation of generalized minority inequality in the U.S.[3] At the present time it seems possible to say that there are no widely acknowledged theories of minority inequality that rely on biological causation.

A much more influential type of deficiency theory emphasizes deficiencies in the social structure of the minority group. One highly controversial work that uses this approach is Daniel Moynihan's report entitled *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*.[4] Briefly, Moynihan argues that historical factors have created a weak family structure among Blacks, and that this weakness creates emotional and attitudinal problems (emotional instability, male role confusion) and a social "tangle of pathology" (drugs, crime, etc.). These in turn result in low schooling achievement and a generalized situation of inequality--poverty, unemployment, low-status jobs. A vicious circle is set up in that economic problems then reinforce the weak family structure in producing inequality. Nathan Glazer works with a very similar type of model.[5] Both of these writers rely heavily on a tradition of writing on the Black family initiated by E. Franklin Frazier.[6] Another work that can be considered as fitting within the same general category is D'Antonio and Form's *Influentials in Two Border Cities*, in which they ascribe Chicano political powerlessness in El Paso to structural deficiencies in that group (lack of political organizations, a "low level of social integration," factionalism).[7]

The third sub-type under deficiency theory consists of those theories which regard culture as being the source of inequality. The emphasis here is on attitudes and values rather than social structure, although the two types of factors are often linked together causally. Perhaps the most notorious although somewhat idiosyncratic proponent of this view today is Edward Banfield. Banfield draws some inspiration from the "culture of poverty" school to argue in *The Unheavenly City* that inequality in the United States is largely attributable to the existence of a "lower class culture," consisting of such traits as a present rather than future orientation, a lack of work discipline,

and so on.[8] Individuals who share this "culture" do poorly in school, and their low schooling attainment creates conditions of poverty and powerlessness, which then serve to perpetuate schooling inequalities. While it is not only racial minorities that participate in the "lower class culture," they are over-represented there because of historical reasons, including past racial discrimination. Prejudice and discrimination are acknowledged to exist today, but they are not stressed in Banfield's model. Perhaps more typical of the cultural approach is Herschel Manuel, who is concerned with explaining schooling non-achievement among Chicano children.[9] Manuel sees schooling problems as stemming most immediately from the following sources: a language barrier; inappropriate values and attitudes (fatalism, present orientation, inferiority feelings, dependency); experiential deprivation stemming from a poor home environment; and material deprivation. Manuel represents a tradition of writing on schooling which deals with culture in a highly stereotyped way and which assumes that students must adjust to the schools rather than the other way around.

The second category of theories of inequality, representing a "liberal" approach, can be labelled *bias* theories. These are theories which focus on prejudice and discrimination as the sources of minority inequality, and thus tend to put the responsibility on the White majority rather than on the minorities. The Kerner Commission's condemnation of "white racism" stands as the most widely publicized effort in this direction in recent years although the report also throws in a hodgepodge of cultural and social deficiency explanations of inequality.[10] The classic work in this area, however, is Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma*, published in 1944. Myrdal is concerned with explaining the unequal status of Blacks, and while he goes into an extended historical analysis of the Black experience he focuses on a small number of contemporary variables. Basically, he sees racial prejudice among Whites as producing discrimination, and discrimination as producing inequality. The disadvantaged condition of Blacks then reinforces the prejudice of Whites by confirming their low opinion of Blacks, so that a strong vicious circle is set up.[11] Kenneth Clark presents a more recent variation on this type of theory.[12] He also focuses on racial prejudice and discrimination, but he includes a deficiency component consisting of a set of ghetto "pathologies" reminiscent of Moynihan. The "pathologies" and the inequalities, both products of discrimination, are then pictured as mutually reinforcing.

The third major category of theories of racial inequality consists of *colonial* theories. While most of the theories in this category are relatively new and still in the process of being developed, it is becoming increasingly clear that they do represent a distinctive approach to this question. These theories share with bias theories an emphasis on discrimination, but they are different in two significant respects. Colonial

theories emphasize the *interests* that are served by discrimination and racial subordination, and thus imply some degree of rational purpose in these practices and arrangements. Bias theories, on the other hand, see discrimination as the product of prejudice, which is generally treated as an irrational psychological or cultural factor. The other major difference is that colonial theories stress the *structural or institutional nature* of race relations, rather than dealing with things on the basis of one-to-one relationships. Thus, whereas bias theories would tend to deal with occupational discrimination in terms of the individual acts of individual employers, colonial theories would stress such factors as the existence of dual labor markets or the effects of structural characteristics of the schooling system (segregation, tracking, etc.). Prejudice enters into colonial theories, but more as an intervening than as an independent variable (e.g. as a factor manipulated to further class interests).

The person whose writings have been most influential in applying colonial theory to the situation of U.S. minorities has been the sociologist Robert Blauner. He has used the concept of "internal colonialism" to describe race relations in the United States and to help explain a wide variety of phenomena, including urban uprisings, cultural nationalism, and social mobility patterns.[13] As with most of the other theorists described here, Blauner does not present his theoretical approach in a formal manner, so that it must be largely pieced together through an examination of his various essays.

Other writers have tried to extend the colonial perspective in various directions. Tomás Almaguer, for example, attempts in a historical sketch to integrate the experience of the Chicano into the broader history of Western colonial expansion since the 15th Century.[14] Guillermo Flores has applied the concept of colonialism in a theoretical manner to the cultural experience of Chicanos.[15] Robert Allen has analyzed the various aspects of the Black political movement from a colonial perspective.[16] While colonialism can thus be seen as a broad structural category for describing race relations, my interest in this essay is limited to colonialism as a theory of minority inequality.

One of the ambiguities that has plagued colonial theory has been the omission in these various works of a formal definition of colonialism. The advantage of such a definition is that it helps prevent the term from being used in a vague or diffuse manner. As a first stab at this, I offer the following definition:

> Colonialism is a structured relationship of domination and subordination among groups which are defined along ethnic and/or racial lines, where that relationship is established or maintained to serve the interests of all or part of the dominant group.

This is intended as a broad definition in order to cover all cases of colonialism as that term is currently employed. It is important to recognize that there are many varieties of colonialism: direct and indirect, classic and "neo," external and internal, etc. U.S. race relations should be seen as one variety of colonialism, rather than representing a loose "analogy" with colonialism, as some writers have maintained.

I have used the designation of "ethnic and/or racial" group because the exact basis of definition is often a combination of factors. Thus, Chicanos are a group which is, in part, racially distinct from the Anglo majority. But, they are also an ethnic group, in that a substantial part of their identification depends on such cultural factors as language. The same is true in other countries, as with Indian groups in México.

The interests to which I refer can be of several types. Generally economic interests are paramount in colonial situations, as in the expropriation of lands or natural resources, or in gaining control of the labor of the colonized group. It can also be political, as in the use of a colonized territory for a military base. In the case of the European invasion of the "Américas," the initial motivation was the gaining of land and natural resources. With U.S. slavery, which can be seen as a type of colonialism, the interest was in labor power. With the Chicanos, a colonial situation was established in order to gain control over Chicano labor.

With the above characterization and definition of colonialism, it is easier to identify those writers who fall within the category of colonial theory. Harold Baron, for example, does not use the terminology of colonialism in his work. Yet his analysis of the history of Black labor in the U.S. should be considered as colonial theory, since he puts that history in the context of a structured subordinate relationship, and describes the interests that have been served by that relationship, particularly those of the employers of Black labor.[17] The same is true of various other writers.

Within the category of colonial theory there appear to be two important sub-types. These I have called "left" and "right" colonial theory, and the distinction is based on the nature of the interests that the theorist sees as being served by colonialism. "Right" colonial theory characterizes colonialism as a state of affairs that benefits all of the non-colonized population, in the case of the United States, all Whites or all Anglos. Carmichael and Hamilton, in their book *Black Power*, provide us with a good example of this variety of colonial theory.[18] "Left" colonial theorists characterize the interests served by colonialism as those of the dominant class within the non-colonized populations. Flores, Almaguer, and Allen have increasingly tended to see U.S. capitalists as the group benefitting from the colonization of U.S. minorities, as opposed to all Whites or all Anglos. The implications of this type of approach will become more evident below, in the examination of

colonial labor. Some writers are difficult to characterize as either "left" or "right." Blauner,[19] for example, appears to be ambiguous on this question, as is William Tabb.[20]

Before going on to the case study, I would like to clarify the relationship between colonial theory and various Marxist interpretations of U.S. race relations. One school of U.S. Marxist thought argues that U.S. capitalism no longer has any compelling need to perpetuate racial divisions. Eugene Genovese's writings is one example. Genovese argues that there is a strong historical connection between the subordination of Blacks and the development of U.S. capitalism, especially during the nineteenth century. But he feels that since the First World War, the relationship between capitalism and racism has become less clear.

> With the decline of sharecropping and tenancy in the South, with urbanization, and with substantial structural changes in the economy, American capitalism no longer needs or generates in the old way racial discrimination as an organized form of class rule. Since the blacks *(sic)* today are prepared to exact a high price for the conditions to which they are subjected, there is good reason to believe that the capitalists as a class and capitalism as a system would purge themselves of racism if they could. Racism, however, is so deeply rooted in American society that it cannot be torn up without fundamental changes in capitalism itself.[21]

Baran and Sweezy likewise believe that the U.S. ruling class see it as being in their interest to eliminate racial inequality, but their view is somewhat more complex than that of Genovese. They pose the problem very clearly:

> the conclusion seems inescapable that since moving to the cities, Negroes have been prevented from improving their socio-economic position: they have not been able to follow earlier immigrant groups up the occupational ladder and out of the ghetto. . . . What social forces and institutional mechanisms have forced Negroes to play the part of permanent immigrants, entering the urban economy at the bottom and remaining there decade after decade?[22]

Their answer is that there are three sets of factors responsible. The first is a number of private interests, including employers who benefit from divisions among their workers, ghetto landlords, marginal businesses that need cheap labor to survive, and white workers, who are protected from Black competition for jobs. The second is race prejudice, which is of historical origin but is reinforced in the contemporary world by the need of whites to have a subordinate group on whom they can vent the frustrations and hostilities generated by class

society. The third is the economy's declining need for unskilled and semiskilled labor.[23] The position of the large capitalists who constitute the ruling class, however, is that any benefits they may derive from racial subordination are outweighed by the growing revolutionary threat posed by Blacks in the context of a world-wide anti-imperialist trend. Thus, while this class has endeavored to further racial equality, they have been able to achieve relatively little because of their limited control of the system(!).[24]

A substantially different position is put forth in Oliver Cox's ambitious work, *Caste, Class & Race,* published in 1948. Cox develops the theme that modern race relations have their origin in the colonial systems developed by Europeans after the 15th century. Racism achieved prominence as a justification for these systems, and came to be used by the capitalist "to keep his labor and other resources freely exploitable."[25] He observes that

> in the United States the race problem developed out of the need of the planter class, the ruling class, to keep the freed Negro exploitable. To do this, the ruling class had to do what every ruling class must do; that is, develop mass support for its policy. Race prejudice was and is the convenient vehicle.[26]

While the needs of the Southern agricultural capitalist were the most pressing, in Cox's view, racial subordination serves the interests of capitalists as a whole in two ways: by providing a sector of workers (the minority workers) who are more tractable and manipulable, and by keeping workers as a whole divided among themselves.[27] Eventually, race prejudice became part of the "social heritage" and was passed on to others who are often not aware of its origin and "fundamental motivation."[28] Nevertheless, this motivation remains the key element in understanding the direction that U.S. race relations have taken.

> It should be borne in mind that race prejudice is not simply dislike for the physical appearance or the attitudes of one person by another; it rests basically upon a calculated and concerted determination of a white ruling class to keep some people or peoples of color and their resources exploitable. If we think of race prejudice as merely an expression of dislike by whites for some people of color, our conception of the attitude will be voided of its substance.[29]

Cox's position, that it is the capitalist class that benefits from the existence of subordinate racial groups, is supported in a widely cited article by Michael Reich.[30] Reich argues that racial divisions in the society are carried over into the work force, and that divisions among workers sap their

bargaining strength and thus keep both Black and white wages down, thus widening the gap between workers' income and capitalists' income. He attempts to test this proposition by developing a measure of racism (the ratio of Black median family income to white median family income) and correlating it at the level of the metropolitan area with measures of inequality among whites (for example, the per cent share of all white income received by the top 1% of white families). The correlations which result from this procedure support his argument, even with controls for various other factors.[31]

In another work, Reich, Gordon, and Edwards approach the question of the role of minorities in the economy from another angle.[32] They present the theme that in the latter part of the 19th century there were important trends in the United States that signalled a danger to the hegemony of the capitalist system. The labor force was becoming more homogeneous with the development of the factory system, and the growing proletarianization of the work force was producing labor conflicts that were increasingly taking on a class character and raising broader and more militant demands. Partly as a defense against these trends, capitalists devised an elaborate system of job stratification that involved the proliferation of job categories and the ranking of those jobs in a status hierarchy. The intent was to divide the work force and thus prevent class solidarity from coming about. Associated with this process was the creation of a segmented labor market, in which various segments or submarkets emerged, each with its own set of rules, working conditions, wages, and opportunities. Thus, the authors, drawing on the work of other researchers, identify a primary sector in which wages are high and promotional opportunities are good, and in which stable working habits are required, and a secondary sector, in which the opposite conditions prevail. Minorities and other relatively vulnerable groups (women, youth) were and are concentrated in the secondary sector and in less desirable jobs generally. David Gordon develops this theme in greater detail in another work.[33] He feels that employers deliberately filled the worst jobs with those people who were the least likely to establish solidarity with better-off workers.

> Gradually, as the composition of the American labor force changed, it became relatively easy for employers to reserve the most "secondary" jobs for teens, women and minority group workers with quite confident expectations that they would not identify with the more advantaged workers and develop a common consciousness about the disadvantages of their jobs.[34]

As can be seen from these various summaries, there are great disparities in the works of different Marxist theorists, and there is certainly nothing that can be seen as "the" Marxist theory of minority inequality or race relations generally. In

terms of the categories I have used in this paper, some of the views expressed by Marxists (e.g. Genovese) are quite similar to bias theory, in that the perpetuation of racial inequality today is attributed primarily to a diffuse racism. On the other hand, the works of Cox, Reich, Gordon, and Edwards are entirely or largely consistent with left colonial theory, in that they stress institutionalization, rational calculation, and the benefits derived by capitalists from discrimination. At the same time, it is not at all clear that their conclusions derive in any very direct way from a body of general Marxist theory, but rather from their own ideas and investigations. In any case, it seems clear that U.S. Marxist theory is underdeveloped in the area of race relations, and much in need of being more systematically extended into this area. With the further development of colonial theory, it may be that left colonial theory will increasingly be seen as such an extension.

There is one article that, perhaps, deserves separate mention, since it is presented as a critique of and an alternative to colonial theory. Donald Harris's critique is based entirely on the writings of Tabb, whom he criticizes for his vague and metaphorical use of the term "colonialism."[35] Harris argues that this concept can be applied to the situation of U.S. Blacks only if it can be clearly defined in terms of exploitation and if Blacks can be shown to be "super-exploited." Exploitation, explains Harris, "consists in an excess of the value that the worker receives plus the costs of raw materials and replacement of depreciated equipment. The ratio of this surplus to the value of wages constitutes the rate of exploitation."[36] He goes on to say:

> one way of putting the idea of an internal colony would be to argue that the rate of exploitation is higher for black labor than for white or that, in other words, there is "super-exploitation" of black labor. . . . The question to be asked is whether there is a systematic pattern of underpayment of black labor relatively to whites *for the same task, same level of skill and same level of productivity.*[37] (emphasis in the original)

Harris believes that such super-exploitation is probably prevalent at the level of the small capitalist, but not at the level of the largest and most powerful, who have the greatest voice in structuring the economic and social system.

Harris goes on to present his alternative formulation. He begins with the premise that there is a chronic over-supply of labor in the U.S. economy as presently constituted, and that the surplus labor acts as a "reserve army" of the unemployed. This "reserve army" is functional from the standpoint of the employers since it can be drawn upon as needed, and because it undercuts the bargaining power of the workers and exerts a downward pressure on wages.[38] Blacks are over-represented in

the "reserve army" because discrimination is used as a rationing device to allocate the available jobs among the population.

Harris adds that discrimination also weakens the position of the working class by creating a structural division in that class, but this is mentioned in passing and is not integrated into the rest of the discussion.[39]

Harris's critique is flawed by several factors. One is that he takes into account the work of only one writer, Tabb. More importantly, Harris insists on defining the concept of colonialism only in relation to exploitation, which he defines narrowly. In doing this, he ignores other possible motivations for establishing or perpetuating a colonial structure, such as those listed in the next section of this paper. In addition, his "alternative formulation" can easily be incorporated into a broader definition of colonialism, especially left colonialism, as I in fact do below. However, one difficulty with his formulation is that although discrimination plays a key role, he leaves unanswered the question of the causes of discrimination, other than a vague reference to "specific historical conditions."[40] The basic difficulty with Harris's article would seem to be a very limited conception of what colonial theory represents as applied to U.S. minorities.

COLONIAL LABOR

In this paper I am examining one particular aspect of racial inequality in the contemporary United States, that of inequality in the labor force. My contention is that minority workers represent a distinct structural element in the labor force, and that these workers are treated differently from other workers in several ways which are described below. The fundamental reason that this happens is that it serves the interests of employers to make use of minority workers in this way. To the extent that this situation prevails, it represents a type of colonial labor. In order to investigate the existence of colonial labor empirically, it is necessary to specify more concretely the particular ways in which minority labor is used. At this time it is possible to identify five relatively distinct ways in which minority labor is used in a colonial manner. These are listed below, along with some quotes from various writers who have described that particular condition.

(1) *Minority workers can be restricted to or concentrated in the lower status jobs and industries.* Basically, this is doing the dirty work for the society. "When working, (minority workers) tend to be concentrated in jobs that are insecure, dirty, unskilled, and at the bottom of the hierarchy of authority where there is little possibility for advancement."[41]

> In all the developed Western capitalist states, there exists a group of workers to fill the jobs that the more politically established sectors of the working class shun.

> These marginal workers generally are set apart in some way so that they lack the social or the political means of defending their interests. In Western Europe usually they are non-citizens coming from either Southern Europe or Northern Africa. In England they are colored peoples coming from various parts of the Empire. In the urban centers of the United States race serves to mark black *(sic)* and brown *(sic)* workers for filling in the undesirable slots.[42]

One way in which this practice is maintained is through the tacit establishment of "job ceilings," which limit how high minority workers can rise in the occupational structure. The discussion of segmented labor markets is also relevant here.

The relegation of certain types of work to colonized labor serves the interests of employers by lowering the basis for dissatisfaction among the non-minority workers. It also serves the interests of the non-minority workers, at least in the short run, by sparing them from that work. The argument has been made that this practice harms employers by keeping talented minority workers in jobs that do not fully utilize their talents, but this would not seem to be a major drawback under conditions of a labor surplus.

(2) *Wage differentials can be established for the minority workers.* This means that a minority worker will receive less pay for doing the same work.

> This special exploitation of the black labor force also leads to direct economic gains for the various employers. Methodologically it is very difficult to measure exactly the extra surplus extracted due to wage discrimination, although in Chicago it has been estimated that unskilled black *(sic)* workers earn about 17% less on similar jobs than unskilled white workers of comparable quality.[43]

The existence of wage differentials serves the interests of employers in keeping their labor costs as low as possible.

(3) *Colonized workers serve as economic buffers or "shock absorbers," cushioning the impact of economic dislocations on non-minority workers.* "Any social or economic crisis that this society produces is generally felt most strongly and 'absorbed' by Third World people within the United States."[44] Thus in periods of high unemployment, minority workers can be laid off disproportionately to non-minorities. Periods of economic recession invariably hit the minority communities harder than other communities.

Maintaining a colonial buffer serves the interests of employers in that it lowers the basis for dissatisfaction among the potentially more dangerous majority workers. It also

benefits the majority workers, in that they are spared the full impact of the dislocations.

(4) *Minority workers can serve as a special "industrial reserve army."* This minority industrial reserve army consists of workers who are often unemployed or underemployed, and who can be incorporated into the labor force in times of economic expansion. They provide elasticity to the labor force, allowing employers to expand their work force without having to raise wages through competing for non-minority workers.

> The dual labor market operates to create an urban-based industrial labor reserve that provides a ready supply of workers in a period of labor shortage and can be politically isolated in times of relatively high unemployment. In a tight labor market the undesirable jobs that whites leave are filled out of this labor reserve so that in time more job categories are added to the black *(sic)* sector of the labor market. . . . The welfare and police costs of maintaining this labor reserve are high, but they are borne by the State as a whole and therefore do not enter into the profit calculations of individual firms.[45]

> Unemployment is intimately related to the process of capital accumulation and the associated pattern of technical change. On average, the overall rate of accumulation and the rate of growth of productivity due to technical change is such that not enough employment is being created to take up the existing slack plus the labor that is displaced by the new techniques that are being introduced. Thus, a certain amount of unemployment is continuously being reproduced as the system as a whole expands. Such unemployed labor constitutes a "reserve army" upon which the system can draw when the rate of accumulation rises above average. It is replenished when the rate of accumulation falls. The system is furthermore dependent upon the continued existence of such a reserve army. This is for the reason that it weakens the bargaining power of the workers and thereby prevents rising wages from eating into profits.[46]

The existence of the minority industrial reserve army serves the interests of employers in the ways outlined above. However, it is contrary to the interests of non-minority workers in that it weakens their bargaining power and acts as a brake on wages.

(5) *The existence of a colonized work force serves to divide the workers among themselves and to prevent them from pursuing a unified class interest.* Such division has been actively fostered in the past by employers who have used Black and Chicano workers as strikebreakers against non-minority workers.

> Colonization as a process can be seen as a method of class subjugation in which part of the working class--black (*sic*) Americans, and indeed Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans and others are separated out as a distinct group from the rest of the working class to serve the function of a pariah group creating division in the working class and perpetuating division within the working class.[47]

This division among the workers serves the interest of employers as a class and acts against the interests of workers as a class.

A review of these five aspects of colonial labor establishes that while they operate consistently in the interest of employers of labor, they benefit non-minority workers only in a limited sense, and operate in the long run against their interests as workers.

If it can be established that colonial labor has existed and continues to exist in the United States, this will represent support for the colonial theory of minority inequality, and weaken the base of the deficiency and bias theories. Such a revision in our theoretical conceptions would have important implications for our understanding of what it would take to overcome the unequal status of U.S. minorities.

The procedure I have chosen to explore this theme is that of a case study. In the following pages I present some historical material on one of the most important U.S. industrial corporations, International Harvester, which employs both Chicano and Black labor. My concern has been to determine whether colonial labor has characterized International Harvester's employment practices, and if so which elements of colonial labor have been or are the most important.

INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER

The origins of International Harvester can be traced to western Virginia, where in 1831, Cyrus Hall McCormick developed a horse-drawn reaper. In 1847, McCormick moved to Chicago and built his own factory. This factory, known as the McCormick Works, was to remain for many years the sole manufacturing plant of the McCormick farm equipment company. By 1902, this plant was producing over a third of the United States' harvesting machinery. In that year, the McCormick company merged with the next four largest farm equipment companies to form International Harvester. This giant trust then produced 85% of the country's harvesting machinery. In 1914, legal action was brought against the company under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and it was eventually forced to break up. International Harvester Company remained in existence, and although reduced in scope it has continued as the largest company in the farm equipment industry. In recent years it has ranked among the top twenty-five corporations in the United States in volume of

sales, which in 1973 amounted to over $4 billion. Throughout its history, the McCormick family has maintained a central position in management, and the current president is a McCormick. The mainstay of the company is in its lines of farm equipment and trucks, but it also operates its own steel plant (Wisconsin Steel Division) and manufactures industrial gas turbines (Solar Division). Its main plants are in the Midwest, with some in the South. The Solar Division is located in San Diego. Starting with 23 workers in 1847, McCormick employed 1400 in 1884. In 1950 International Harvester had over 90,000 workers in all its divisions, and in 1970 over 100,000. Within the farm equipment industry generally, approximately two thirds of the employees are bluecollar workers, with operatives, or semi-skilled workers, comprising the single largest category.[48]

Trade unionism has had a long and turbulent history at McCormick Works and International Harvester. The earliest unions, based on crafts, appeared in the 1860's. In the late 1880's, the Knights of Labor were strongly represented at McCormick. In 1886, striking McCormick workers were involved in conflicts with other workers and the police. These conflicts led directly to the famous Haymarket Square bombing and the subsequent wave of anti-union repression. Union activity at McCormick and International Harvester rose and fell, as it did in industry generally, with changes in economic and political conditions. McCormick management was virulently anti-union, and they succeeded time and again in smashing the emerging unions. The tactics used were a skillful blend of coercion and cooptation. On the coercive side there was ample use made of blacklists, police repression, and the firing of union activists. But the company also resorted to the shrewd use of bonuses, intra-company welfare programs, and company unions as the occasion demanded. After World War I, International Harvester was one of the members of the Special Conference Committee, a secret organization of ten of the largest corporations in the United States. It included Dupont, General Electric, General Motors, Standard Oil, U.S. Rubber, Bethlehem Steel, and later, AT&T and U.S. Steel. The purpose of this organization was to deal with the threat of unionism and related labor matters. In this, as in other ways, International Harvester proved itself to be a highly class-conscious corporation.[49]

International Harvester was successful in delaying the recognition of unions until 1941, several years after most of the U.S.' large industrial concerns. After the war there was a struggle for union dominance between the left-influenced Farm Equipment Workers and the United Automobile Workers, with the initially stronger Farm Equipment Workers losing out during the McCarthy era in the early 1950's. Since that time the UAW has been the largest union among International Harvester workers.

International Harvester and McCormick also have a long history of ethnic diversity in their work force. During the 19th and early 20th centuries the succession of ethnic workers included Irish, Scandinavians, Germans, and Poles. World War I, however, signalled the end of large-scale European migration, and the entrance of Black and Chicano workers in significant numbers into the International Harvester labor force. This trend was reinforced by the stringest post-war restrictions on immigration. Whereas Blacks had established a presence in Chicago industry earlier in the century, World War I marked a sharp rise in their level of industrial employment. For Chicanos, World War I marks their entry into the Chicago labor market.

It is important to keep in mind that even before this period the management of large industrial concerns was highly conscious of the ethnicity of their workers. During the 19th century, International Harvester had pursued a deliberate policy of encouraging ethnic diversity in their workers as a means of keeping them weak and divided. According to Robert Ozanne, "Harvester experience showed that the cohesiveness of nationality groups worked against the company in strike situations."[50] In 1916, labor strife prompted President McCormick to write to his directors: "One of the advantages of building a new foundry organization will be that we will not have such a large percentage of Poles. It does not have a good effect to have so large percentage of one class of men."[51] After World War I, the Industrial Relations Department of International Harvester compiled regular reports on the nationality and race of their employees.[52]

The policy pursued by International Harvester during this period was to leave racial hiring policies to the superintendents of the different plants. However, the central management carefully monitored the proportion of Black workers in the plants, and cautioned the superintendents if the level of Black employment reached a certain level. The various plants of International Harvester followed one of two patterns. Some excluded Blacks altogether. The others adopted a quota system, generally at about the 20% level.[53] The quota system appears to have been the product of two considerations. One was the desire to tap this pool of labor in a tight labor market. The other was the fear of ethnic solidarity.

One of the impacts of the post-war labor shortage was to put pressure on the exclusionary and the quota systems. The only alternatives to reduced output were to bid up the price of labor in the hopes of attracting white workers from other industries, or to hire minorities. In this situation, International Harvester management reluctantly decided to increase the hiring of minorities rather than raising their labor costs by competing with other manufacturers for labor.[54] By 1923, the level of Black labor at the central McCormick Works stood at 18%, and at the McCormick Twine Mill at 20%.[55] By 1929, it had risen to

over 27%, at the Twine Mill. Some plants, however, continued to employ no Blacks.

The Wisconsin Steel plant of International Harvester provided an interesting variation on this situation. The policy of Wisconsin Steel was to hire no Blacks at all. Confronted with the labor shortage, their solution was to hire Chicanos or Mexicans. In pursuit of this effort they recruited Chicano labor from as far away as Kansas City and Texas.[56] The figures for Mexican employment at Wisconsin Steel during the 1920's are as follows:

Table 1

Mexican Employment as Percentage of Total Labor Force at the Wisconsin Steel Plant of International Harvester

Year	% Mexican
1921	.3
1922	.6
1923	14.2
1924	14.8
1925	19.7
1926	21.8
1927	21.0
1928	19.5

Source: Paul Taylor, *Mexican Labor in the United States: Chicago and the Calumet Region*. Berkeley: University of California, 1932, Table 3.

The Depression of the 1930's, and its labor shortage produced a sharp turn-around in the trend of hiring more minority labor. Minority workers were laid off at a greater rate than white workers, and the percentages of minority workers declined. At the McCormick Works, the proportion of Black workers dropped from 18% in 1923 to 10.3% in 1940. At the Tractor Works it declined from 9% in 1923 to 6.5% in 1940. The McCormick Twine Mill saw a drop from 27.5% in 1929 to 18.0% in 1940.[57]

With the labor shortages of World War II, the situation was turned around once again. Federal anti-discriminatory and fair employment practices legislation combined with the labor shortage to end the complete exclusion of Black workers that still existed at many International Harvester plants. In 1940, Blacks constituted 4.5% of all the workers employed in International Harvester plants. By 1944, the number had risen to 11.6%. In 1950, it was 12.8%; in 1960, 9.3%; and in 1970, 11%.[58] In 1974, it was 11.3%.[59] Thus, it would appear that there has been little

change in the overall level of Black employment since the end of the Second World War. One factor that has contributed to the stagnation of the level of Black employment has been the recent trend of closing plants in the large urban centers such as Chicago and opening others in suburban and outlying areas.

There has continued to exist considerable variation in the levels of Black employment at the different plants. The highest levels were reached at the McCormick Twine Mill before its closing in 1953. This plant, traditionally operated by female labor, reached a peak of 75.6% Black employment in 1951. The McCormick Works, which closed in 1961, employed 28.7% Black employees in 1960.[60]

One of the most striking aspects of Black employment at International Harvester has been its relative concentration in certain types of work and certain occupational levels. The two work sectors in which Black employment was initially concentrated were the foundries, or metalcasting shops, and the twine mills. The foundries were the places with the most arduous working conditions. The twine mills were areas of low-wage employment, almost entirely female. In 1924, for example, Black employment at the Tractor Works foundry was 35%, and in the McCormick foundry, 29%. In the twine mills it was 24%.[61]

The typical minority employee was hired at the level of laborer, or unskilled worker, and there seems to have been a definite conception on the part of management as to what type of work minorities were suitable for. A special report on minority employment was initiated by President McCormick in 1925. Some of the representative quotes are: "In some instances the Negro is held to be suitable for semi-skilled work . . . Steel mills are more satisfied with Mexicans for common and semi-skilled labor . . . The Mexicans at the steel mills are developing into semi-skilled tradesmen but none are employed in mechanical or electrical trades."[62] Taylor presents figures for two large steel plants in the Chicago area in 1928, and while the figures are not specifically for International Harvester, they are probably indicative of the general pattern in the steel plants of the area (see Table 2).

Of interest in this data is not only the sharp difference between minority occupational patterns and overall patterns, but the very similar patterns for Chicano and Black workers.

A more recent study of the farm equipment and construction machinery industries in the U.S. indicates that these patterns persist in modified form today. According to Ozanne,

> In plants visited by the author or by other Industrial Research Unit personnel (and these were larger companies), it was found generally that Negro craftsmen tended to be concentrated in the foundries in such crafts as molders and coremakers, rather than being broadly distributed throughout the plant.[63]

Table 2

Total, Mexican and Black Workers by Blue Collar, Occupational Category at the Gary Works and South Works Plants of the Illinois Steel Company, 1928

	All Employees		Mexican Employees		Colored Employees	
	Number	%	Number	% of All Mexican Employees	Number	% of all Colored Employees
Skilled	8,101	36.7	38	1.8	128	4.7
Semi-skilled	5,704	25.9	297	19.1	438	16.2
Unskilled	8,256	37.4	1,646	79.1	2,150	79.2
Total	22,061	100.0	2,081	100.0	2,716	100.0

Source: Adapted from Paul Taylor, *Mexican Labor in the United States: Chicago and the Calumet Region* (Berkeley: University of California, 1932), p. 157. Data for Gary Works and South Works, Illinois Steel Company.

A review of occupational statistics presented in the Ozanne study reveals the following patterns for five large companies (not specified by name) in the farm equipment and construction machinery industries. In 1970, 35.5% of these companies' employees were classified as white collar (all non-blue collar categories), although only 8.9% of their Black employees fell into this classification. Of the 8.9%, the overwhelming majority were located in the lowest white collar category, that of office and clerical workers. At the highest level, that of officials and managers, only .9% of the Black employees could be found, compared to 8.2% of all employees. Some 11.5% of the Black employees were classified as craftsmen (skilled workers), 60% as operatives (semi-skilled), 14.4% as laborers, and 5.2% as service workers. Black employees were over-represented in proportion to their overall numbers in the bottom three categories, and under-represented in all of the higher categories.[64] Several factors are also noted in the study that make these figures even bleaker. Thus, Ozanne states "the designation 'craftsmen' covers such a broad category of jobs that it conceals the fact that the Negro penetration into truly skilled trades has been almost negligible. Furthermore, the future for this category is not bright because of the almost universal failure to enroll a sufficient number of Negroes in the apprenticeships."[65] Furthermore, "within the operatives

classification, we observed a definite tendency for blacks (*sic*) to be overconcentrated at the lower ranges."[66]

At the white collar level, the same study notes that Blacks have been almost completely excluded from sales positions, and that

> in the offices Negro employment is generally only tokenism. Firms in communities of high Negro population have failed to do much better in the proportion of Negroes hired for their offices than firms in communities of low Negro population. This probably indicates that until recently the main offices actually have been neglected in the firms' equal opportunity policy.[67]

In 1974, according to International Harvester's figures, Blacks were represented in the various occupational categories in the following manner:[68]

Table 3

Percentage of Black Workers by Occupational Category at International Harvester, 1974

Occupational Category	%
Officials and managers	2.3
Professionals	1.3
Technicians	1.8
Sales workers	.9
Office and clerical	6.0
Craftsmen	8.3
Operatives	16.3
Laborers	29.3
Service workers	21.3

Source: 1974 EEO-1 Report, International Harvester.

In evaluating these figures and the marginal improvement they seem to represent over earlier periods, particularly in the craftsmen category, Ozanne's comments cited above should be kept in mind. The changing nature of the occupational structure is also relevant in this connection:

> The statistics constitute snapshot pictures of an occupational structure in a continual state of change. The pattern of change is one in which, generally speaking, new and expanding job categories appear at the higher status, more desirable end of the occupational spectrum

> pushing the older, stable, or declining categories downward toward lower status, less desirable positions in the hierarchy. At the same time, the least desirable occupations become obsolete and disappear. Traditionally, this change in the job structure has been accompanied by the movement of whites into the expanding categories leaving the older, stable, and declining jobs vacant for blacks (*sic*). Thus, blacks are always gaining access to new jobs, but their long-run position *relative* to whites does not change.[69]

On the matter of differential pay rates (different pay for the same work), there appears to be little evidence. From the information presented by Taylor for Mexican workers in the Chicago of the 1920's, it seems that such practices existed but do not appear to have been a major factor in the employment of minority labor.[70]

Another aspect of minority employment in the Chicago of the 1920's is touched upon in a comment by an employer from a large foundry: "We now have a good labor market, so we can replace the Mexicans with more desirable labor."[71]

Up to now the discussion has been concerned with the main International Harvester plants in the Midwest. Harvester's plants in the South deserve special comment. The three plants that have been studied are the Louisville Works, producer of tractors since 1946; the Memphis Works, where mechanical cotton-pickers and other farm implements have been made since 1948; and the Evansville Works, which has manufactured refrigerators since 1946. The Louisville plant began with 4.2% Black workers, employed 14.1% in 1950, reached a peak of 20.9% in 1955, and declined to 11.9% in 1960, the last year for which published figures are available.[72] The Evansville plant had 4.4% Black workers in 1946 and 8.2% in 1950.[73] The Memphis plant started with 12.2% Black workers in 1947 and had reached a level of 23.2% in 1949.[74] In 1968, their percentage of Black employees was still at essentially that same level.[75]

A study of these three companies covering the late 1940's and early 1950's showed a sharp pattern of Black concentration at certain occupational levels and in certain types of work. The basic pattern was that Blacks were greatly over-concentrated in unskilled labor and greatly underrepresented in skilled and white collar occupations. At the Louisville Works, for example, in 1951 Black daywork production workers consisted of 54.8% unskilled and 2.8% skilled workers. Whites in the same category were 25.9% unskilled workers and 29.5% skilled.[76] The same author divided the production process into three stages, and found that Blacks were concentrated in the first stage, consisting of primary fabrication of parts from raw materials. Whites were more evenly distributed throughout the three stages, with the second stage being the finishing and assembling of parts and the third stage the inspection, packing and shipping.[77]

Blacks were almost totally excluded from clerical, technical, and managerial employment.[78] The author concluded on the basis of his study that International Harvester's officially stated policy of equal employment opportunity would soon produce significant occupational advancement for Blacks. Yet, a study based on 1969 data described the situation in the Memphis plant in the following terms:

> . . . the plant is still characterized by lily-white and overwhelmingly black (*sic*) departments. Of the roughly 300 men in the truly skilled trades, there was but one Negro, an electrician who was on layoff in January 1969 because he had only 50 days' seniority in the electrical department. In welding, in 1969, there were roughly 3 Negroes out of 100, none of them with substantial seniority. In the machine department there were only 6 Negro machine operators out of 75 operators and inspectors, the most senior Negro having only six months' seniority. Among 279 foremen, 3 were Negro, 2 of them appointed in 1967, and the first in 1965. There were no Negro apprentices. Of 450 workers in the foundry, approximately 325 were Negroes, concentrated as usual in the hottest places, the forge shop and pouring the molten metal.[79]

John Hope's study gives us some insight into the origins of this situation in the 1940's and early 1950's. Hope stresses the opposition of white labor to the advancement of Blacks, and he repeatedly states that management pursued an equal opportunity policy. However, management's role in this regard consisted primarily of placing some Black workers in semi-skilled positions. During the first few years of existence of the Southern plants there was no union representation and management had a relatively free hand in its placement policies. According to Hope, Harvester management made no effort to place Blacks in skilled positions, and, as we have seen, there was virtually no Black representation at the white collar level.[80] Hope also mentions that there was a universally recognized taboo against appointing Blacks to positions where they would be supervising white workers.[81] It was equally forbidden for Blacks to "bump" or displace a white worker from a job, regardless of seniority or qualifications.[82] Any Black tempted to file a grievance on the basis of discrimination was brought under intense pressure from union and company officials as well as fellow workers on the basis that it would be detrimental to good race relations.[83]

One of the most interesting aspects of the Southern International Harvester plants was the use made of the public school system to maintain the pattern of Black concentration. Vocational courses were made available to white students which would prepare them to enter the skilled trades at Harvester and other

industrial plants. Vocational courses available to Black students did not prepare them to enter such trades. In addition, the schools conducted an adult evening Apprenticeship Training Program. These programs were run by the schools together with Joint Apprenticeship Committees composed of an equal number of representatives from the unions and from the major employers. The program was coordinated by a representative of the U.S. Bureau of Apprenticeship Training.[84] The result was an arrangement where the companies, the unions, the local schools, and the federal government combined to insure that Black workers were excluded from the training which could gain them entry to skilled occupations.

There is little evidence of the role of minority labor in cushioning white unemployment in the Southern plants. Ozanne, however, notes that:

> When layoffs came in 1960 there were more in the assembly and foundry than in the tool room and maintenance. Thus, black *(sic)* layoffs were proportionately greater than white. This occurred at Memphis and Louisville even though the blacks *(sic)* had equal seniority with the whites. In certain older Harvester plants which had been lily-white before World War II the disproportionate decline of black employment was caused by the lesser seniority of blacks.[85]

Another setting in which we can examine the uses of minority labor at International Harvester is provided by the company's Solar Division, located in San Diego. While time-series data for minority employment is not available here, an examination of Solar can provide us with a look at the contemporary situation in one Harvester plant.

Solar began as an aircraft company during the 1920's, and became part of International Harvester in 1960. Since the 1960's its main product has been industrial gas turbines, a line which is currently prospering. Solar employs some 3000 workers in two San Diego plants, and has gross sales of over $100,000,000. In 1973 minority workers were 13.2% of the Solar work force. In the San Diego area as a whole minorities represented 17.8% of the labor force, with approximately 12% being Chicano, 4% Black, and 2% other minorities.

As in other Harvester plants, the most obvious minority work pattern is that of concentration in some occupational categories and underrepresentation in others. In 1973, minorities at Solar were represented in the broad occupational categories used by the census as shown in Table 4.[86]

In line with Ozanne's comments cited above, we find that minority workers are concentrated at the bottom within each of the categories as well. Thus if the service component is divided into its two constituents, we find that only 4 of the 21 guards are minorities, while fully 19 of the 21 custodians

Table 4

Minority Worker Percentage by Occupational Category at Solar Plant of International Harvester, 1973

Occupational Category	%
Officials and managers	2.8
Professionals	4.3
Technicians	8.5
Office and clerical	12.6
Craftsmen	11.1
Operatives	23.0
Laborers	46.5
Service workers	54.8

Source: Documents in the author's possession.

are minority workers. Likewise, 5 of the 8 minority workers listed as officials and managers are foremen. Looking only at the overall pattern, however, it is clear that the Solar minority work force is overrepresented in those occupations listed below the skilled workers, and substantially underrepresented at occupational levels above office and clerical. Of all the occupational categories, the two largest by far were those of operatives and professionals. There was a relatively small number of laborers.

Judging from a variety of evidence, Solar management attaches little importance to changing this pattern of concentration and underrepresentation. For example, in 1966 Solar was visited by employment specialists from the Department of the Navy to audit Solar's compliance with equal opportunity employment laws and decrees (Solar has important military contracts). The Navy inspectors made a series of recommendations, which were listed along with suggestions by the Solar EEO (Equal Employment Opportunity) Coordinator, at that time a regular member of the management team. This document reads, in part:

> RECOMMENDATION: Explore the possibility of setting up a "field employment office" in some minority populated areas ("poverty pockets") of town, to be staffed one or two days a week by an employment representative with authority to hire in the field.
>
> SUGGESTED ACTION: Do not implement. Any benefit to the company is questionable and the expense would probably not be justified . . .

> RECOMMENDATION: Organize a training program or series of meetings for front-line supervisors and their employees to instill EEO principles firmly in them. Also, make it clear that any individual who does not firmly support EEO should seek employment elsewhere.
>
> SUGGESTED ACTION: Do not implement. A training program would be far too expensive and difficult to organize, and we feel this is hardly an appropriate subject for a formalized training program . . .[87]

Solar had also been under pressure to develop a Minority Skills Inventory in order to identify promotable minority workers. In 1970, the Director of Industrial Relations wrote a memo indicating that he felt such a Skills Inventory should be developed, and suggesting a procedure. He went on to say:

> Recognizing that this Skills Inventory will not be too useful, disclosure of its existence should be kept to a minimum, on a need to know basis. Expense should also be kept to a minimum. Since we are talking about 472 presently employed minorities plus all the new minority employees this will be a long tedious process. I believe that once a format and official guidelines are developed the O.F.C.C. (Office of Federal Contract Compliance) will be satisfied as long as we press forward. We should, however, all sing the same tune and have several examples of use and success for the Skills Inventory . . .[88]

Solar, along with all companies which are contractors with the Federal government, is required to file an Affirmative Action Plan. This Affirmative Action Plan must describe patterns of minority employment within the company, identify any "underutilization" of minorities, locate barriers to fuller utilization within the company, and propose goals and mechanisms for eliminating any existing patterns of discrimination and underutilization. While Solar's Affirmative Action Plans have been approved every year by the federal agency charged with review of the plans, an examination of the plans for 1973 and 1974 shows that they are woefully inadequate. Solar's plans make no attempt to locate barriers to equal opportunity within the company, and they set no long-range goals for overcoming existing underutilization. Their analysis of underutilization, the most basic element of the plans, is full of inaccuracies and misleading use of statistics. Short-range (one year) goals are the only ones that are set, contrary to the provisions of federal law, and these are so lacking in ambition as to call into serious question the company's desire to correct the existing patterns of concentration and underrepresentation. As an example, the goals in the 1973 plan call for adding one minority employee in the category of officials

and managers, three minority professionals, and one minority technician. These three categories of employment combined totaled over 1200 employees at Solar in 1973. Yet even these insignificant goals were not achieved. In 1974 Solar had the same number of minorities in these three categories as it had in 1973. The 1974 plan made no mention of the fact that the 1973 goals had not been achieved, and proceeded blithely to set other goals.

The responsibility for enforcing equal opportunity and affirmative action within a company is supposed to rest upon a high-level official expressly appointed to that function. In 1973 Solar hired a young Black employee and designated him their E.E.O. Coordinator, a position which carried little power. The E.E.O. Coordinator took his position seriously and began to try to revive the Minority Skills Inventory and implement other aspects of the Affirmative Action Plan. Within a couple of months he had been fired. The reason given for his termination was that he had refused to supply his superiors in the Industrial Relations Department with the names of minority employees who had raised complaints about the company in private meetings held at employees' homes during non-working hours.

The responsibility for reviewing Solar's Affirmative Action Plans and for general monitoring of their minority employment patterns is delegated by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) to the Department of Defense. The failure of the government to take action in this case to correct obvious patterns of unequal opportunity are only a reflection of a virtually universal pattern. As Ozanne states in his review of Black employment in the farm equipment industry:

> In spite of the efforts of OFCC to establish concrete standards for employment integration, the judgment of "in compliance" or "non-compliance" is, to a great extent, a subjective one. The decision is made especially difficult because of the possible dire consequences of the only overt response provided for a ruling of "non-compliance," i.e., the denial or cancellation of a government contract which may put a plant out of business and/or prevent or hinder the government from obtaining necessary armaments or other materials.[89]

Thus, it appears that there will be little remedial action forthcoming from the government to change the patterns of minority employment that are so deeply entrenched at Solar and other branches of International Harvester.

CONCLUSION

From this review of minority employment practices, what can we conclude about the existence of colonial labor at International Harvester?

On the first aspect, that of concentration, there is strong and convincing evidence. It is clear that in the present as in the past, minority workers have in fact disproportionately filled the least desirable jobs in the industry. It is also clear that in many if not in all instances this has been a matter of conscious policy. Management has had definite ideas about what type of work was "suitable" for minorities, and it has consciously excluded them from other types of work. In the case of the South, we noted the manipulation of the schooling system for the purpose of maintaining this state of affairs. While there is variation regionally and over time, the patterns remain strong everywhere. Furthermore, the lack of commitment to affirmative action can lead only to the assumption that management today is satisfied with the present arrangements. In this connection, it is well to note that International Harvester has often been lauded as a leader and a "pioneer" in developing equal employment opportunities.[90] In general then, we can say that the pattern of occupational concentration and exclusion or underrepresentation is an important aspect of colonial labor, at least in this particular company.

On the aspect of wage differentials there is little direct evidence. Wage differentials appear to have had some significance, but not to have been a primary factor. One study of a Southern plant argues for the existence of wage differentials, but it fails to separate out the effect of occupational concentration.[91] Interviews with Solar minority employees have failed to turn up wage discrimination as a complaint. It appears that unionization has largely eliminated racial wage differentials as a significant element in large and modern industrial plants. This is not necessarily the case for other types of industries.

Some evidence does exist for the use of minority labor as a buffer group. As noted above, severe labor surpluses such as that of the 1930's, resulted in the disproportionate laying-off of minority workers. Ozanne, cited above, describes how layoffs in some Harvester plants in 1960 disproportionately affected Blacks, but he sees this as a side-effect of their concentration in certain types of jobs and of having lower seniority. In the same study Ozanne presents data for five large firms (unspecified) in the farm equipment and construction machinery industries during a period of layoffs from 1968 to 1970. According to him, in three of these five firms Black blue collar workers (but not white collar workers) suffered substantially more job losses than Whites, and did better in only one case. Here again he attributes the pattern to lack of seniority among the Black workers.[92] In the case of Solar, a mild decline in employment in 1973 did not result in minority workers being laid off disproportionately. What would happen in the case of more severe dislocations remains to be seen.

The use of minority labor as an industrial reserve army is the fourth aspect of colonial labor. There is no question that minorities have been used as a pool of labor to be drawn upon

in times of labor shortage. Minorities performed this function during the 1920's, when minority hiring was clearly seen as an alternative to bidding up the price of labor. The Second World War provides a second clear example of a minority reserve force being put to use. While it is not difficult to cite historical examples of minority labor being used in this manner, it is more difficult to determine whether management simply took advantage of an existing situation or whether it has consciously contributed to its perpetuation. The existence of a pool of available surplus labor, of course, is something that cannot be determined by the managers of a single company. It is, in large part, a consequence of the overall level of employment, which is in turn affected by federal government policies and the general state of the economy. While the corporations can have their effect on this through their influence on government policy, this would require a different type of study to determine. However, corporate management can have a direct effect on the existence of a *minority* industrial reserve army through the adoption of a buffer-type policy. The disproportionate laying-off of minority workers in times of labor constriction would help insure a pool of such workers to be drawn upon when next needed. It also reduces the seniority of minority workers and makes them more vulnerable to layoffs. Excluding minorities from non-blue collar and higher status jobs would also have this effect in that it would increase the number of minority unemployed and also concentrate minorities in those jobs which are most subject to layoffs. Thus, there is an interaction among the various aspects of colonial labor that may well result in the perpetuation of a minority industrial reserve army.

The final aspect of colonial labor has to do with the use of minority labor to divide the workers, and there is good evidence on this point as well. International Harvester has been shown to be a highly ethnicity-conscious employer going back to the 19th century. While there is no recent direct evidence on this, it is difficult to think of a reason for International Harvester to abandon a practice which it has learned from over a century of labor-management relations. In this connection, we can note that the very process of concentrating minority workers in certain types of occupations effectively produces divisions in the working class, in that it gives non-minority workers a seeming stake in perpetuating the colonial framework. This motivation could, in fact, be plausibly argued as an explanation for the early pattern followed in Harvester's Southern plants of hiring Black workers into semi-skilled positions. The explanation advanced by Hope is that management was committed to the advancement of the Black worker. The alternative, less benign, explanation would be that Harvester management wished to make use of Black labor, but to do so in a way that would perpetuate the pattern of concentration in lower-status jobs and at the same time build in tension between the white

and Black workers. Such an explanation would be consistent with the adherence of Harvester managers to the principle of colonial labor that has been documented in other instances.

Thus, there appears to be substantial evidence for the existence of a colonial labor pattern at International Harvester. The subordinate position of minorities is institutionalized and historically persistent, there are important interests that are involved, and a considerable amount of conscious effort appears to have been exerted to create and maintain this situation. The degree of rationality and deliberateness is important here, as it is a factor which is generally underestimated even by radical theorists. As Reich, Gordon and Edwards put it with regard to labor market segmentation: "These efforts were 'conscious' in the following sense. Capitalists faced immediate problems and events and devised strategies to meet them. Successful strategies survived and were copied."93 In addition, such groupings as the Special Conference Committee, cited above, must provide useful forums for the exchange of information on labor policies for America's large, class-conscious firms.

While there have been modifications in the overall pattern under the impact of unionization and wartime labor shortages, there have also been important continuities. The pattern at International Harvester is probably fairly typical of large industrial firms, but considerable research is needed before a clear picture emerges of the uses of minority labor in the U.S. economy as a whole. Such an understanding will provide a vital element for our conception of the sources of minority inequality in the United States today.

NOTES

I would like to acknowledge the invaluable research assistance of Art Luján, and to thank Carlos Muñoz and Tomás Almaguer for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

1. Arthur Jensen, "How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement," *Harvard Educational Review* (Winter 1969), pp. 1-123.

2. Ibid., p. 79.

3. One frequently cited problem is that he makes use of a social rather than biological definition of race (i.e., Blacks are those whom the society identifies as Blacks). Jensen also relies heavily on the IQ test while recognizing that it is a very imperfect measure of what might be called general intelligence. In addition, he takes no notice of other factors which might account for social inequalities. For one critique of Jensen, see N. Block and G. Dworkin, "IQ, Heritability and Inequality," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (Summer and Fall 1974).

4. Daniel Moynihan, *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* (March 1965). Reprinted in Lee Rainwater and William Yancey, *The Moynihan Report and the Politics of*

Controversy (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1967). A number of critiques are included in this volume. See also William Ryan, *Blaming the Victim* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971).

5. In Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963).

6. E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in the United States*, revised edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948).

7. William D'Antonio and William Form, *Influentials in Two Border Cities* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965).

8. Edward Banfield, *The Unheavenly City* (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1968). For a critique of Banfield, see Raymond Franklin and Solomon Resnik, *The Political Economy of Racism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963). For a general critique of the "Culture of Poverty" argument see Charles Valentine, *Culture and Poverty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

9. Herschel Manuel, *Spanish-Speakirg Children of the Southwest* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965).

10. *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (published by Bantam Books, 1968). (The Kerner Commission Report).

11. Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper & Row, 1944).

12. Kenneth Clark, *Dark Ghetto* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965).

13. Various essays of his are collected in Robert Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

14. Tomás Almaguer, "Historical Notes on Chicano Oppression: The Dialectics of Racial and Class Domination in North America," *Aztlán* (Spring and Fall 1974), pp. 27-56.

15. Guillermo Flores, "Race and Culture in the Internal Colony: Keeping the Chicano in His Place," in *Structures of Dependency*, Frank Bonilla and Robert Girling, eds. (Stanford Institute of Political Studies, 1973), pp. 189-223.

16. Robert Allen, *Black Awakening in Capitalist America* (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970).

17. Harold Baron, "The Demand for Black Labor: Historical Notes on the Political Economy of Racism," *Radical America* (March-April 1971), pp. 1-46.

18. Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, *Black Power* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967).

19. Notwithstanding Prager's "right" interpretation of Blauner. See Jeffrey Prager, "White Racial Privilege and Social Change: An Examination of Theories of Racism," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* (1972-1973), p. 130. A third theoretical category would consist of colonial theories which saw only the Anglo working class as benefitting from colonialism. However, I know of no such theories.

20. William Tabb, *The Political Economy of the Black Ghetto* (New York: Norton, 1970).
21. Eugene Genovese, "Class and Nationality in Black America," *In Red and Black* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 59-60.
22. Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital* (New York: Modern Reader, 1966), p. 263.
23. Ibid., pp. 263-69.
24. Ibid., pp. 270-71.
25. Oliver Cox, *Caste, Class and Race* (New York: Modern Reader, 1948), p. 333.
26. Ibid., p. 475.
27. Ibid., p. 487.
28. Ibid., pp. 333n, 345n.
29. Ibid., p. 349n.
30. Michael Reich, "The Economics of Racism," in *The Capitalist System*, Richard Edwards, Michael Reich, and Thomas Weisskopf, eds. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 313-321.
31. Of course the limitations of this kind of correlational test should be kept in mind. It could be argued that all that Reich has shown is that there is a relationship between Black-white inequality and white-white inequality. Correlations fail to show any direction of causation or even establish causation, since the demonstrated relationship could be a product of another factor not controlled for.
32. Michael Reich, David Gordon and Richard Edwards, "A Theory of Labor Market Segmentation," *The American Economic Review* (May 1963), pp. 359-365.
33. David Gordon, *Theories of Poverty and Underemployment* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1972).
34. Ibid., p. 74.
35. Donald Harris, "The Black Ghetto as 'Internal Colony': A Theoretical Critique and Alternative Formulation," *The Review of Black Political Economy* (Summer 1972), pp. 3-33.
36. Ibid., p. 10.
37. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
38. Ibid., pp. 26-27.
39. Ibid., p. 27.
40. Ibid., p. 26.
41. Blauner, op. cit., p. 23.
42. Baron, op. cit., p. 34.
43. Ibid., p. 36.
44. Almaguer, op. cit., p. 41. Almaguer, in turn, draws upon an unpublished lecture given by Robert Allen.
45. Baron, op. cit., p. 36.
46. Donald Harris, op. cit., pp. 26-27.
47. William Tabb, "Capitalism, Colonialism, and Racism," *The Review of Radical Political Economics* (Summer 1971), p. 99.

48. Robert Ozanne, *The Negro in the Farm Equipment and Construction Machinery Industries. (The Racial Policies of American Industry, Report No. 26)* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1972), p. 13.

49. Robert Ozanne, *A Century of Labor-Management Relations at McCormick and International Harvester* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1967), p. 157ff.

50. Ibid., p. 184.

51. Ozanne, *A Century of Labor-Management Relations*, op. cit., p. 107.

52. Ibid., p. 184.

53. Ibid.

54. Robert Ozanne, *Wages in Practice and Theory: McCormick and International Harvester, 1860-1960* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1968).

55. Robert Ozanne, *The Negro in the Farm Equipment and Construction Machinery Industries*, op. cit., p. 22, and *A Century of Labor-Management Relations*, op. cit., p. 185.

56. Paul Taylor, *Mexican Labor in the United States: Chicago and the Calumet Region* (Berkeley: University of California, 1932), p. 37; Ozanne, *A Century of Labor-Management Relations*, op. cit., p. 185.

57. Robert Ozanne, *The Negro in the Farm Equipment and Construction Machinery Industries*, op. cit., p. 22, and *A Century of Labor-Management Relations*, op. cit., pp. 185 and 192.

58. Robert Ozanne, *A Century of Labor-Management Relations*, op. cit., p. 192 and *The Negro in the Farm Equipment and Construction Machinery Industries*, op. cit., p. 84.

59. 1974 EEO-1 Report for International Harvester, filed with the office of Federal Contract Compliance, U.S. Department of Labor.

60. Robert Ozanne, *A Century of Labor-Management Relations*, op. cit., p. 192.

61. Ibid., p. 185.

62. Ibid., p. 187.

63. Robert Ozanne, *The Negro in the Farm Equipment and Construction Machinery Industries*, op. cit., p. 62.

64. Ibid., p. 52.

65. Ibid., p. 53.

66. Ibid., p. 64.

67. Ibid., p. 60.

68. 1974 EEO-1 Report, International Harvester.

69. Peter Doeringer and Michael Piore, "Equal Employment Opportunity in Boston," *Industrial Relations* (May 1970), p. 329.

70. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 78-79.

71. Ibid., p. 92.

72. Robert Ozanne, *A Century of Labor-Management Relations*, op. cit., p. 192.

73. John Hope, "Negro Employment in 3 Southern Plants of International Harvester Company," in *Selected Studies of Negro*

Employment in the South, NPA Committee of the South (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1955), p. 35.

74. Robert Ozanne, *A Century of Labor-Management Relations,* op. cit., p. 192.

75. Robert Ozanne, *The Negro in the Farm Equipment and Construction Machinery Industries,* op. cit., p. 84.

76. Hope, op. cit., p. 43.

77. Ibid., p. 47.

78. Ibid., p. 132.

79. Robert Ozanne, *The Negro in the Farm Equipment and Construction Machinery Industries,* op. cit., pp. 84-85.

80. Hope, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

81. Ibid., p. 110.

82. Ibid., p. 113.

83. Ibid., p. 124.

84. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

85. Robert Ozanne, *The Negro in the Farm Equipment and Construction Machinery Industries,* op. cit., p. 36.

86. This and other information for Solar is from sources in the author's possession.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Robert Ozanne, *The Negro in the Farm Equipment and Construction Machinery Industries,* op. cit., p. 106.

90. Ibid., pp. 36-37.

91. Robert Weintraub, "Employment Integration and Racial Wage Differences in a Southern Plant," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* (January 1959), pp. 214-26.

92. Robert Ozanne, *The Negro in the Farm Equipment and Construction Machinery Industries,* op. cit., pp. 92-93.

93. Reich, Gordon, and Edwards, op. cit., p. 361n.

CASIMIRO BARELA: A CASE STUDY OF CHICANO POLITICAL HISTORY IN COLORADO

RAY BURROLA

Chicano Studies,
Colorado State University, Fort Collins

> Al tratarse de mi raza,
> especialmente si se trata de discriminar,
> abdico de mis ideas politicas y me dedico a su
> defensa en todo tiempo y lugar.
> --Casimiro Barela

Chicano social scientists for the past several years have started to uncover segments of Chicano history that have been previously overlooked and/or just simply neglected by previous academicians. One major area that remains a "well kept secret" is the political history of Chicanos, especially from 1836 through 1900.[1] Arthur F. Corwin states in his article, "Mexican American History: An Assessment," that, with the exception of a couple of authors, "There are virtually no political histories of Spanish-surnamed peoples in the modern Southwest."[2] Corwin suggests that there are twentieth century topics that could be researched for recent Chicano political history, such as the LULACS, Alonso Perales, George I. Sánchez, and Dennis Chávez. However, Corwin's superficial view also fails to recognize the political development and activities of Chicanos during the nineteenth century. Several Chicanos, during the mid-nineteenth century, became actively involved in pursuing the protection of Raza rights in the Southwest.[3] The protection mechanism developed immediately after 1848 following the conquest of the Southwest. From the conquest, Chicanos became subjected to newly implanted economic, social and political institutions. From these particular institutions emerged the

framework of colonial relations and patterns which have historically oppressed Chicanos and kept them powerless.[4] Here is where considerable research and analysis should be directed in efforts to develop new paradigms for positive action against colonialism. However, before a working analysis is formulated to adequately deal with colonialism, a historical perspective must be first achieved to provide the necessary foundation to build upon. Such is the purpose in this study of Casimiro Barela, "the perpetual Senator of Colorado." In addition, I hope the study will contribute to the growing body of Chicano historical knowledge, and in particular Chicano political history of the nineteenth century. I hope, also, the study will encourage other Chicanos to unravel the threads of the past and to "perhaps contribute to a structural analysis for positive action on behalf of the Chicano community."[5]

Casimiro Barela successfully managed to effectively infiltrate, and to a degree control, the political institution at the state level for approximately forty years (1872-1912). During this period, Casimiro directly defended and protected the rights of Chicanos in Colorado. Furthermore, he tried to protect the rights of Chicanos throughout the Southwest by insisting that the rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo be upheld. In Colorado, Casimiro was specifically responsible for having the Constitution of the state and its laws printed in the Spanish language, advocating bilingual-bicultural schooling, maximizing political pressure on the national government to guarantee the rights of Chicanos in the territory of Nuevo México and defending land grants in southern Colorado. As Casimiro often said, "Al tratarse de me raza, especialmente si se trata de discriminar, abdico de mis ideas politicas y me dedico a su defensa en todo tiempo y lugar."[6]

Casimiro, eldest son of José María and María Abeyta de Barela, was born March 4, 1847, in the small village of Embudo (Dixon) Nuevo México.[7] The name Casimiro was taken from his great, great paternal grandfatner Casimiro Varela (V and B were used interchangeably).[8] The elder Casimiro arrived in México from España. He later, with his family, traveled to California with the earliest colonization parties. The elder Casimiro and his son, Juan, accompanied Lieutenant José Moraga and others in establishing San Francisco on February 2, 1777.[9] From San Francisco, members of the family migrated to Los Angeles and to northern Nuevo México.[10]

Casimiro's schooling was more than most individuals acquired during the mid-nineteenth century. He received primary instruction from Antonio de Jesús Cruz consisting of oral religious recall; from Severiano Martínez, Casimiro learned to read.[11] After the family left Embudo and returned to Mora, general instruction was first provided by Juana Suazo de Simpson and by 1859 was under the direction of Padre Juan B. Salapointe (later Archbishop of Santa Fe).[12] In return for his schooling, Casimiro performed various house and church duties for his instructors.

The Barela family remained in Mora until December of 1866 when they migrated to Southern Colorado. In January 1867, the Barela family arrived at El Rito de San Francisco which is presently located twenty miles east of Trinidad, Colorado.[13] There the family engaged in livestock and merchandizing. Two years after the arrival of the Barela family in Colorado, Casimiro entered the political arena. In 1869, Casimiro was elected Justice of the Peace by his community, and in 1870, was elected County Assessor for Las Animas County.[14] In both offices, Casimiro proved to be quite competent, and, more importantly, slowly began acquiring the support of Chicanos in southern Colorado.[15]

In 1871, Casimiro was elected to represent Las Animas County in the territorial legislature, and was re-elected in 1873.[16] In 1875, Casimiro was selected as a delegate to attend the Constitutional Convention held in Denver, and subsequently in 1876 was elected Senator of the First General Assembly of the State of Colorado.[17] Further indication of strong support by Chicanos becomes evident as Casimiro was consecutively re-elected Senator until his resignation in December of 1912.

In both the 1871 and 1873 territorial legislatures, Casimiro's crucial concern was to insure that all laws be clearly understood by all residents for their own protection.[18] What had strongly influenced this position were racist hostilities encountered by New Mexicans (Chicanos and Indios) after the subjugation of Nuevo México on August 18, 1846, by the United States government.[19] Casimiro related to his biographer that on January 19, 1847, his family was forced to leave Mora, due to severe Anglo persecution against natives, and seek refuge in Embudo.[20] Hostilities against the native populace of Nuevo México became so severe that the populace finally revolted against the oppressive forces. The revolt began in Taos, Nuevo México on January 19, 1847 (the same day the Barelas left for Embudo) with the killing of both Anglos and Anglo sympathizers.[21] From the killings in Taos, the movement spread and became known as the Taos Revolt. Due to these overt hostilities, Casimiro wanted to insure that the incidents that had taken place in Nuevo México would not reoccur in Colorado. In the territorial legislature Casimiro strongly advocated to have the publication of laws also printed in Spanish since the majority of Chicanos in the territory understood only the Spanish language.[22] His desire did not become a reality in the territorial legislature. However, Casimiro was not to be denied and he pursued his ambition with even greater diligence in the Constitutional Convention.

As a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Casimiro and two other Chicanos (José María García and Agapito Vigil) immediately began political maneuvers to have the constitution and its laws published in the native language of the Chicano populace. Finally, after considerable debate the following

resolution was adopted in the Constitution of the State (Article XVIII, section 8):

> The General Assembly shall be provided for the publication of the laws passed at each session thereof; and until the year 1900 they shall cause to be published in Spanish and German a sufficient number of copies of said laws to supply that portion of the inhabitants of the state who speak those languages and who may be unable to read and understand the English language.[23]

Another critical issue that came before the Constitutional Convention was the question of suffrage. There had developed some support to have schooling and language qualifications for electors.[24] Casimiro quickly challenged this, as he related to his biographer, by stating "that no citizen of the state can be deprived of suffrage due to reason or cause of insufficient education nor due to inability of individuals to speak the English language."[25] Casimiro requested that if schooling and language requirements were to be prescribed by law, twenty-five years be allowed before the enforcement of such a law.[26] Casimiro argued that a twenty-five-year grace period would allow the younger generation the time necessary to receive an education and learn the English language. The resolution was passed and became part of the Constitution, however, with only a fifteen-year grace period (Article VII, section 3):

> The General Assembly may prescribe, by law, an educational qualification for electors, but no such law shall take effect prior to the year of our Lord one-thousand eight-hundred and ninety (1890), and no qualified elector shall be thereby disqualified.[27]

During the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, Casimiro had several times threatened to lead a movement composed of Chicanos against the constitution and subsequently delay statehood if his resolutions were not seriously considered. As the Constitutional Convention approached its conclusion, Casimiro emerged as the leading figure in Colorado dedicated to protecting and enforcing the rights of Chicanos.

Colorado's constitution was accepted by the populace and Colorado was admitted into the Union in 1876. With state elections pending, Casimiro was nominated by the Democratic Party as a candidate for the State Senate, and was successful due to Chicano support. In 1884, Casimiro proposed a project that would better educate Chicanos in the southern part of the state.[28] He believed that schooling institutions, especially at the elementary level, should first instruct Chicanitos in their native language and then slowly integrate the English language.[29] Through the bilingual process, Chicanitos would not only learn English, but at the same time, Chicanos would

be able to conserve and cultivate their own language, culture and identity. However, Casimiro's concept was too advanced for his time and unfortunately the project was not implemented. Even so, in 1893 Casimiro was able to appropriate $25,000 for schools in Trinidad (southern Colorado) in order to provide a better schooling for Chicanos.[30]

During the 1880's, Casimiro became increasingly concerned for the native residents of the neighboring territory of Nuevo México. Nuevo México had not yet been incorporated into the Union. Furthermore, native Nuevo Mexicanos were being exploited, their lands were being systematically encroached upon and the Treaty of Guadalupe was not being enforced. In February 1889, Casimiro requested that Colorado support the territory of Nuevo México in its bid for statehood.[31] In the Senate, Casimiro raised the issue that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo promised admission for the conquered territories. He further pointed out that the Treaty specifically required that, as a condition for statehood, the populace be a certain number and not that it be anglo.[32] On February 28, 1889, the state of Colorado sent a strong letter of support to the President of the United States and to Congress requesting that Nuevo México be incorporated into the Union to protect the civil rights of its citizens. The letter was signed by the Governor, J. A. Cooper; President of the House, H. H. Eddy; and President Pro Tem of the Senate, W. G. Smith.[33] However, Nuevo Mexico did not become a state until 1912.

Casimiro, as a Senator, advocated the protection of land grants in southern Colorado.[34] He claimed that the government was negligent in protecting Chicano lands. In addition, he felt that the government was responsible for loss of land due to its failure to enforce the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Colorado in 1891 established a land court in order to protect against the loss of land.[35] But the action for most Chicanos was too late, and Chicanos in Colorado lost valuable land.

Casimiro Barela, for a span of forty years (1872-1912), was successful, at the state level, in infiltrating the political institution. During this period, Casimiro protected the rights of Chicanos in Colorado and advocated the protection of rights for Chicanos throughout the Southwest. The *Trinidad Daily News* of November 7, 1884, referred to Casimiro as the principal representative for Chicanos throughout the Southwest. In retrospect, Casimiro's accomplishments would not have been possible if political support by Chicanos had not been present. In the final analysis, Casimiro, due to his political activities, was successful in disrupting colonialism during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

NOTES

1. Carlos Muñoz, "Toward a Chicano Perspective of Political Analysis," *Aztlán--Chicano Journal of the Social Sciences and*

the Arts (Fall 1970), p. 18, states that "political science is perhaps the only discipline that has almost totally ignored the Chicano."

2. Arthur F. Corwin, "Mexican American History: An Assessment," *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 42, 1973, p. 296.

3. The protection mechanisms were manifested by both internal (within public offices) and external (social banditry) political activities in the Southwest.

4. However, Tomás Almaguer, "Toward the Study of Chicano Colonialism," *Aztlán* (Spring 1971) states that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo became the document of formal colonization for Chicanos in the Southwest.

5. Juan Gómez-Quiñones, "Toward a Perspective on Chicano History," *Aztlán* (Fall 1971), p. 1.

6. In *Cuarenta Años de Legislador, Biografía del Senador Casimiro Barela*, José Emilio Fernández, ed. (Trinidad: NP, 1911), p. xvi.

7. Ibid., p. 1.

8. Ibid., p. 3.

9. Herbert Howe Bancroft, *History of California 1542-1800*, Vol. I (San Francisco: The History Co., 1886), pp. 297-743; Bancroft, *History of California, 1846-1848*, Vol. V (San Francisco: The History Co., 1886), p. 760.

10. Fernández, *Cuarenta Años*, op. cit., p. 7.

11. Ibid., pp. 3,4.

12. Ibid.

13. Josefa Ortiz, *Biografía de D. José Ma. Barela* (NP, 1878-1883?). The author, first wife of Casimiro, published the pamphlet on her father-in-law sometime between his death (October 10, 1878) and her death (February 7, 1883). The rare document is housed with the Colorado Historical Society, Denver.

14. Thomas B. Corbett, *The Legislative Manual of the State of Colorado* (Denver: Denver Times Publishing House and Bindery, 1877), p. 331.

15. During this period, the vast majority of the populace and voters of both Las Animas County and southern Colorado were Chicanos originally from northern Nuevo México.

16. Corbett, *Legislative Manual*, op. cit., pp. 222, 224.

17. Ibid., pp. 228, 229.

18. Fernández, *Cuarenta Años*, op. cit., p. 25.

19. Nuevo México, between 1846-1851, was neither a territory nor a state. Subsequently the only laws in operation were the laws imposed by the occupation force. Mexican laws had been abolished. Consequently, the native populace did not have laws by which to protect themselves.

20. Fernández, *Cuarenta Años*, op. cit., pp. 4, 5.

21. Warren A. Beck, *New Mexico: A History of Four Centuries* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962), p. 136.

22. Fernández, *Cuarenta Años*, op. cit., pp. 25, 56.

23. *Proceedings of the Constitution Convention, 1875-76* (Denver: The Smith-Brooks Press, 1907), p. 702.

24. Fernández, *Cuarenta Años*, op. cit., p. 61.
25. Ibid., p. xx.
26. Ibid., p. 58.
27. *Constitutional Convention*, op. cit., p. 683.
28. Fernández, *Cuarenta Años*, op. cit., p. 92.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. 93.
31. Ibid., p. 97.
32. Ibid., pp. 101, 102.
33. Ibid., pp. 98, 99.
34. Ibid., p. 128.
35. Ibid.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHICANO WORKING CLASS IN SANTA BARBARA, CALIFORNIA, 1860-1897

ALBERT CAMARILLO

History
Stanford University
Palo Alto, California

Occupational opportunities and the general occupational structure for Chicanos in Santa Bárbara, California, during the first third of the twentieth century were determined by the developments of the late nineteenth century.[1] The origins of the Chicano working class, as a component of an Anglo economic system, dates back to the initial decline of the pastoral economy and concomitant disruption of traditional occupations during the 1860's. The rise of the Anglo tourist-agricultural society pushed the Chicano worker further from the center of economic significance. During the next two decades Chicanos became peripheral workers in the overall occupational structure of Santa Bárbara.

Responding to the worsening economic conditions in post-boom Santa Bárbara, the Chicano work force experienced dramatic change. Traditional familial work roles were altered and patterns of employment which characterized future generations of Chicanos emerged during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Throughout the period from 1860 to the 1890's the Chicano work force was drawn further away from occupations which utilized their pastoral skills. By the turn of the century the Chicano working class was an impoverished unskilled/semiskilled, manual laboring work force. The Chicano workers of the late nineteenth century were the precursors of the modern Chicano working class as it developed during the twentieth century in Santa Bárbara.

 This paper is the first draft version of Chapter Four of the author's doctoral dissertation. For a revised version of this chapter and a corresponding bibliography see "The Making of a Chicano Community: A History of the Chicanos in Santa Bárbara, California, 1850-1930," UCLA, Dept. of History, 1975 (available through University Microfilms, Dissertation Copies, P.O. Box 1764, Ann Arbor, Mich., 48106; order no. 76-8289).

Although the native-Chicanos were not occupationally dependent upon the growing Anglo economy in 1870, their destiny was inextricably tied to the tourist-agricultural economic system of Santa Bárbara.[2] Since most native-Chicanos prior to 1880 were still fixed to the dying pastoral occupations, when the tourist economy of the city and agriculture in the hinterlands developed, they made the Spanish-surname worker a non-functional component of the burgeoning Anglo economy. The tourist boom in the city did the most to submerge the Chicano worker and to replace traditional occupations. By 1875 the business of tourism was " . . . by far the greatest and richest revenue of Santa Barbara." Visitors represented dollar signs to the leading Anglo commercial interests in the city. During the peak winter tourist season an estimated one thousand visitors added an estimated $90,000 of specie circulation in Santa Bárbara per month.[3] The tourist boom spurred local businessmen to capitalize on the increased traffic by building more accommodations and expanding existing commercial establishments. The construction of buildings attracted a corps of skilled Anglo workmen. The local paper advertised for carpenters and masons, who were badly needed in the growing construction trades, at wages of $3.50 to $5.00 per day. By 1880, the expanding pool of Anglo skilled workmen created the first mutual benefit labor organization in Santa Bárbara. Thus, whereas the Chicano pastoral-related worker was predominant in the pueblo prior to 1870, by 1880 he was replaced by the Anglo skilled workman and other non-Chicanos who became integral parts of the tourist economy.[4]

The boom of the early 1870's initiated Santa Bárbara as a health-tourist resort, but the Boom of 1886 established its fame as the premier location on the coast. The subsequent building boom far outstretched the previous building activity during the first boom. Real estate development companies sprang up and "new business enterprises largely devoted to construction supply were organized." Prior to 1886, 750,000 feet of lumber supplied the city's building needs for six months; by 1888, 15,000,000 board feet were unloaded on the wharf each year.[5] Anglo workers from every region in the United States were coming to Santa Bárbara and southern California--the Chicanos were further removed as an important workforce.

The rapid growth of the tourist-related industries in the city was equalled by the steadier growth of agricultural production in the hinterlands. The last of the free-roaming range cattle herds were outlawed when the California Legislature passed the "No Fence Law" or the "Trespass Act" in 1873.[6] This law marked the ascendancy of the agricultural interests throughout southern California. In less than sixteen years, the number of range cattle had been reduced from 300,000 head in 1862 to merely 8,000 head in 1878. Where the cattle once roamed, the Anglo farmer began to settle. During the late 1870's the value

of fruit crops was reaching parity with the established grain crops. As early as 1878 there were nearly 59,000 assorted fruit trees and 144,000 almond and walnut trees planted in the districts near the city of Santa Bárbara; by 1880 the perishable fruit industry was equal in importance to grains.[7]

Throughout the 1880's the agricultural industries of Santa Bárbara County experienced substantial growth. For example, in 1878 there were 60,180 acres of enclosed land and 60,292 acres of cultivated lands. Five years later there were 518,000 acres of enclosed lands and 95,350 acres under cultivation.[8] The only pastoral industry that survived the proliferation of agriculture was the sheep industry; but it was confined to the isolated valleys of the county and to the Santa Bárbara Channel Islands.[9] It remained the last traditional source of employment for many native-Chicanos.

Together the growth of the agricultural and tourist economy of the area created the "final step in the breakup of the ranchos" and "completed the transition from rangeland to agricultural economy."[10]

RACIAL PREJUDICE--THE CHINESE

Chicano workers were further removed from the economic mainstream when the Chinese were recruited to perform the menial labor associated with both sectors of the economy. The formation of a distinct "Chinatown" in Santa Bárbara coincided with the advent of the tourist rush. The Asians were residents within the city as early as 1861, but even by 1870 there were only 82 Chinese. By the time of the first tourist-real estate boom, however, the Chinese population numbered almost 400. Due to both a desire to reside together as a group and an Anglo society which fostered the segregation of non-Anglo peoples, the Chinese--like the Chicanos--were forced to confine themselves to a geographically and residentially segregated section of town. Chinatown was established within the peripheral boundaries (on Cañon Perdido Street between State and Anacapa streets) of Pueblo Viejo. The Chinese inhabited the abandoned adobes of the native-Chicanos as the former occupants either left the area or moved closer to the core of the barrio.[11] Thus, by 1875 the two major ethnic groups in Santa Bárbara--the Chinese and the Chicanos--lived in contiguous enclaves distinctly separate from Anglo society.

The expansion of the tourist industry in Santa Bárbara attracted the Chinese worker. In the city the overwhelming percentage of Chinese were employed in three main areas of work. They monopolized the menial labor of the Chinese laundries and domestic services. They also monopolized the small-scale commercial growth and sale of vegetables in the city. In the hinterlands, the Chinese became the earliest source of farm labor, and were also the employees of the approaching railroads during the 1880's.[12]

Even if the Chicanos would have been inclined to enter the labor market of the tourist-service industry in Santa Bárbara, they could not have competed with the cheaper source of "Coolie" labor. Chinese vegetable peddlers would sell "one pound of tomatoes, three cucumbers, two bushels of onions, one head of lettuce" and more for only five cents.[13] Chicanos engaged only in subsistence agriculture. The Chinese laundries were strictly Chinese operations--no outside labor was utilized. The domestic services did not attract any workers other than the Chinese who "would work like mules for wages on which a white man would starve to death."[14] With no other alternative employment available for Chicanos during the 1870's, most adhered to the decreasing supply of work associated with the declining pastoral economy. Moreover, realizing the social distance between Anglos and Chicanos and the lingering mutual antipathy, one could speculate that Chicanos would have continued to shun any contact with Anglos, employment no exception.

The growing economy of Santa Bárbara was dependent upon a pool of cheap labor which the Chinese community furnished.[15] However, by 1876, the Chinese of Santa Bárbara became the local target in the statewide anti-Chinese movement which led to a sizable Chinese out-migration from the area. The Chinese had suffered malicious harassment from various sectors of Anglo society, which considered them "a foul blotch on our fair city," prior to the concerted movement to oust them. Anti-Chinese sentiments were institutionalized in Santa Bárbara after a demonstration was held that called for the termination of Chinese immigration and a boycott of businesses which employed Chinese workers. Following the rally, the *Daily Press* reported:

> Chinese labor was denounced at the meeting last night, but no substitute proposed for it. Many of the labors of the Chinamen the white man won't perform.[16]

The washhouses became the first in a series of industries that employed Chinese that came under attack by authorities; many were forced to relocate on the outskirts of town. The formation of the Order of Caucasians in 1877, continued the pressure to rid the community of the Chinese. In 1879, the establishment of a local chapter of Kearney's Workingmen's Party and subsequent election of many W.P. candidates to local office placed the Chinese in a precarious situation. The local newspaper reported in 1879 that "Chinamen are leaving here nearly everyday" and that "there is not more than half the Chinamen in Santa Barbara that there were a year ago."[17] Further suppression of the Chinese enterprises (e.g., laundries, abalone fishing, small scale agriculture, etc.) and of the cultural life styles of the people drove more Chinese workers from Santa Barbara. A prestigious local editor recalled the treatment of the Chinese businesses during his youth claiming that it was his "first

introduction to the controversial application of interference with the economic rights of an individual."[18]

The racial and economic drive to remove the "Chinese menace" was partly successful. By 1880, only 227 Chinese lived in the County of Santa Bárbara. They numbered probably less than 150 in the city. In 1890 the Chinese population, due to a lessening of racist activity against them, increased to a total of 285 in the city. Their numbers steadily declined each decade thereafter. Anglos resigned themselves to the presence of those Chinese who remained in Santa Bárbara, but only after many of them embraced the missionary efforts of various Protestant sects.[19]

CHICANOS: FORMATION OF THE WORKING CLASS 1860-1870

By the mid-1880's, Anglos who used "reason" instead of "passion and prejudice" realized that the expanding economy required a source of cheap manual labor in the city and on the farms. The declining Chinese work force could no longer fill the needs.[20] The gap hastened the entrance of the Chicano family into a functional role in the new economy. The anti-Chinese drive by Anglos in Santa Bárbara during the 1870's and 1880's also affected the Chicano community in another important way. The Anglos' preoccupation with the "Chinese question" subordinated, for the first time, the racial conflict between Chicano and Anglo which had existed for over a quarter century. During this time period the non-interference by Anglos allowed the Chicanos to withdraw to the barrio and reestablish their community according to the new circumstances confronting them. Contact with Anglos at the socio-economic level was minimal. But due to the worsening economic conditions of the late 1870's and early 1880's, out of necessity the Chicano family responded to the increasing labor needs of Anglo society. The emergence of the Chicano working class originates during this time period, but developments during the two previous decades foreshadowed their transition to workers in an Anglo society.

By 1860, the pastoral economy, although in a depressed status, was still able to maintain traditional employment for Chicanos. The occupational structure in Santa Bárbara for the Spanish-surname population in 1860, was characteristic of the same employment distribution which existed for probably over twenty years in the area; no major changes had evolved, at least up to 1860. Throughout the decade, however, the pastoral economy and, as a result, the occupational structure, was drastically altered (see Table 1).[21]

The natural disasters of the early 1860's and the subsequent growth of the incipient Anglo tourist-agricultural economy ushered in a period of occupational change for Chicanos. The notable changes affected the farmer-ranchero and unskilled labor categories. At the lower level, there was an out-migration of over two-thirds of the Mexicano laborers by 1870. The migration

Table 1

Spanish-surname Occupational Structure in Santa Bárbara for 1860 and 1870

		Number of Workers			Percent of Work Force		
		1860		1870	1860		1870	
I.	Pastoral/Agric.							
	A. Ranchero	27	71	5	9.1%	24.1%	2.5%	6.4%
	B. Farmer	44		8	15.0		3.9	
II.	Professional	9		4	3.1		2.0	
III.	Proprietorial	4		7	1.4		3.4	
IV.	Skilled	36		29	12.2		14.3	
V.	Unskilled							
	A. Laborer	140	157	130	47.6	53.4	64.0	66.5
	B. Other	17		5	5.8		2.5	
VI.	Occupation unlisted	17		15	5.8		7.4	
		N=294		N=203				

Source: 1860 and 1870 Federal Manuscript Census Schedules for the city of Santa Bárbara.

of Mexicano unskilled laborers from Santa Bárbara was accompanied by a much smaller out-migration of former Mexicano rancheros, farmers and skilled artisans. The void left by the transient Mexican-born laborers was filled by the downwardly mobile California-born. The group of Spanish-surname workers who remained in the pueblo between the census decades poignantly illustrate the downward occupational trend that was evident by 1870 (see Table 2).

The small farmer class was devastated by the economic turn of events. Most who remained in the pueblo were reduced to the status of propertyless, unskilled laborers. To a lesser extent, the California-born ranchero witnessed an occupational decline. The unskilled laborer remained stationary, despite the rapid constriction of his economic livelihood and sources of traditional employment. Moreover, economic conditions initiated a trend of high non-persistence or transiency among the Spanish-surname--most notably, the Mexican-born--who sought employment throughout the region.[22] Thus, by 1870, the Spanish-surname workforce was steadily becoming an unskilled, impecunious working class.

The downward occupationally mobile Chicano workforce was submerged by Anglos who outnumbered them two to one by 1870. The non-Spanish surname occupational structure reflected the

Table 2

Occupational Distribution of Persistent Spanish-Surnamed Workers in Santa Bárbara for 1860 through 1870

	Occupation in 1870							
	I Past./Agri. A. Ran.	I Past./Agri. B. Farm.	II Prof.	III Prop.	IV Skilled	V Unskilled A. Lab.	V Unskilled B. Other	Total N
Occupation in 1860								
I. Pastoral/Agric.								
A. Ranchero	2	2	1	-	-	1	-	6
B. Farmer	-	-	1	-	1	12	-	14
II. Professional	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
III. Proprietorial	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
IV. Skilled	-	1	-	-	2	2	-	5
V. Unskilled								
A. Laborer	-	-	-	-	1	18	-	19
B. Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total N	2	3	2	1	4	33		45

Source: 1860 and 1870 Federal Manuscript Census Schedules for the city of Santa Bárbara.

growing dominance of the agricultural and commercial economy of Anglo Santa Bárbara (see Table 3).

Anglo workers increased considerably in the farmer, professional, proprietorial, skilled and new semiskilled categories between 1860 and 1870. The number of Anglo unskilled laborers, as a percentage of the total work force, was the only category to experience a significant decline. In addition, the accumulation of property as an index of wealth also indicates the economic superiority of Anglos by 1870 (see Table 4). In 1860, Anglos were successful in accumulating wealth equal to, and in many cases greater than, the Spanish-surname workforce. By 1870, Anglos clearly controlled the greater amount of wealth and property in the City of Santa Bárbara. Correspondingly, Spanish-surname individuals, especially in the lower occupational categories, suffered substantial property loss between 1860 and 1870.

1870-1897

The downward economic spiral for Chicanos which began during the decade of the 1860's continued throughout the 1870's. As the initial tourist boom intensified, the pastoral occupations that paisanos once occupied steadily became obsolete in the growing urban environment of Santa Bárbara. The process

Table 3

Non-Spanish-surname Occupational Structure
for 1860 and 1870†

	Number of Workers		Percent of Workforce	
	1860	1870*	1860	1870*
I. Pastoral/Agric.				
A. Ranchero	9 } 31	4 } 15	5.6% } 19.2%	3.9% } 14.6%
B. Farmer	22	11	13.6	10.7%
II. Professional	20	12	12.4	11.7
III. Proprietorial	26	15	16.1	14.5
IV. Skilled	40	34	24.9	33.0
V. Semiskilled				
A. Non-manual	-	5 } 11	-	4.8% } 10.6%
B. Manual	-	6	-	5.8
VI. Unskilled				
A. Laborer	24 } 34	9 } 13	15.0% } 21.2%	8.7% } 12.6%
B. Other	10	4	6.2	3.9
VII. Occupation unlisted	10	3	6.2	2.9
	N=161	N=103		

†Excluding Chinese workers.
*Twenty-five percent sample.

Source: 1860 and 1870 Federal Manuscript Census Schedules for the city of Santa Bárbara.

Table 4
Spanish and Non-Spanish-surname Property Structure
for 1860 and 1870

	Percent Who Possess Property				Mean Value of Real and Personal Property			
	Spanish-surname		Non-Spanish-surname		Spanish-surname		Non-Spanish-surname	
	1860	1870	1860	1870	1860	1870	1860	1870
I. Pastoral/Agric.								
A. Ranchero	100%	100%	100%	75.0%	$35,721	$6,110	$68,661	$20,550
B. Farmer	95.0	87.5	95.5	81.8	3,945	3,266	3,349	8,607
II. Professional	77.7	75.0	100	83.3	6,178	8,526	14,875	14,652
III. Proprietorial	100	85.7	100	100	775	3,475	10,777	9,079
IV. Skilled	77.7	51.7	92.5	82.3	683	925	1,670	2,009
V. Semiskilled								
A. Non-manual	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	740
B. Manual	-	-	-	50.0	-	-	-	1,433
VI. Unskilled								
A. Laborer	72.8	49.2	41.6	44.4	456	835	620	1,050
B. Other	-	40.0	50.0	100	-	643	920	830

Source: 1860 and 1870 Federal Manuscript Census Schedules for the city of Santa Bárbara.

of "occupational erosion" increased. Carey McWilliams once speculated that a process of job displacement of Chicanos in southern California occurred during the 1870's:

> From the local annals, one can detect at least the outlines of the process by which, through a kind of occupational erosion, the Hispanos steadily declined in influence and power. One after another, the economic functions for which they had been trained were taken from them.[23]

The worsening occupational situation during the early 1870's was compounded by a post-boom economic recession followed by a drought-flood cycle. The real estate-tourist boom was brought to a standstill by the belated effects of the Panic of 1873. General economic conditions did not become critical, however, until the "dry year" of 1876-77. The lack of adequate rainfall dealt a sharp blow to the sheep industry and also caused extensive crop failures. The dry year was followed by a severe storm in 1878 which destroyed additional property. Santa Bárbara did not recover from these "hard times" until the beginning of the next boom period in the mid-1880's.[24]

Those most seriously affected by the developments of the late 1870's were the Chicanos. The drought and flood further reduced the number of local jobs they could secure using their pastoral occupational skills. Their subsistence gardening was also diminished as a means of family survival.

> . . . Santa Barbara holds fearfully definite memories of the melancholy, deepening into tragedy, of dry years in the past. . . . We realize the gravity of a dry year to the country, by the reticence of old Californians on this subject . . . Only by much questioning, by chance expressions, by a look of sudden pain upon the bronzed faces of the pioneers do we conjure up some conception of that hopeless world, California in a dry year.[25]

The growing plight of the Chicano community, however, did not prevent Anglos from using them as scapegoats. For example, editor Harrison Gray Otis of the *Press* "began blaming the lazy ways of the natives for the town's economic stagnation."[26]

As local employment became increasingly more difficult to obtain, the Chicano workforce began a pattern which has characterized various sectors of the Chicano working class to the present day--part-time, seasonal, migratory work. It was reported in the *Weekly Press* (July 21, 1877) that the "dull times have sent them away to seek employment as vaqueros, herders, teamsters, or what not." It was estimated that at least 200 Chicanos left Santa Bárbara County to seek work elsewhere. Acknowledging the unavailability of pastoral-related employment in the local area, an article in the *Daily Press* suggested that Chicanos seek menial jobs such as cleaning outhouses, collecting

garbage, whitewashing fences, pulling weeds, trimming trees, etc. The article further mentioned that "the employing classes" will hire "if the help can be procured cheap enough to justify it" and that Chicanos should "work at anything honorable at any price." The article concluded:

> That there are a great many people in our midst, particularly among the native Californians, who are very destitute, there is no reason to doubt. Now that the rain has come, there are none who are able and willing who cannot get something to do at some price.[27]

Chicanos during the 1870's, however, would not perform the menial tasks apparently available to them. Instead, they continued to support their families by finding occasional work, local and migratory, that utilized their traditional skills. Some caballeros hired on as drovers to escort horse herds headed as far northeast as Utah and Montana. Others remained within the county to work as vaqueros at the annual rodeos on the rancho circuit. A typical rodeo during the late 1870's would employ thirty to forty vaqueros who branded and slaughtered small herds of about 1500 cattle. There were some who caught wild horses or purchased them for $20 and after horse-breaking them would sell the animals for $75. The more steady type of temporary employment in the county was sheep shearing. After the drought of 1876-77, and the resultant destruction of large flocks, the sheep industry was relocated on the always temperate Santa Bárbara Channel Islands; there the sheep proliferated and the industry became a profitable venture for the next fifty years. During the spring and fall, thirty to forty trasquiladores, besides the resident vaqueros on the islands, were employed for about three months out of the year.[28]

The occasional temporary work of Chicanos in traditional lines of employment was scarcely enough to maintain the subsistence level of the family. What one historian alluded to concerning the status of the Chicano working class by 1880, became evident in Santa Barbara by the decennial census:

> As the years passed and their familiar jobs disappeared some of the mestizo ranch hands drifted into the growing cities and towns to join the colonies of their own cultural group and, too often, there to deteriorate in unaccustomed idleness. Others sought continued employment at the tasks they knew best.[29]

The census of 1880, profiles the Chicano working class as a chronically unemployed, impoverished and unskilled laboring population. Although unemployment also affected the Anglo worker, Chicanos who were unemployed within the year of the census enumeration accounted for 74.8% of the Chicano workforce as compared to 49.5% for Anglos.[30] The occupational structure

of Chicanos had reached a new low by 1880 (see Table 5).

Table 5

Spanish-surname Occupational Structure for 1880 for Santa Bárbara

		Number of Workers		Percent of Work Force	
I.	Pastoral/Agric.				
	A. Ranchero	6		4.7%	4.7%
	B. Farmer	0		0	
II.	Professional	2		1.6	
III.	Proprietorial	3		2.3	
IV.	Skilled	8		6.2	
V.	Semiskilled				
	A. Non-manual	0		0	1.6%
	B. Manual	2		1.6	
VI.	Unskilled				
	A. Laborer	102	103	79.7	80.5%
	B. Other	1		0.8	
VII.	Unknown/occupation unlisted	4		3.1	
	Total N	128			

Source: 1880 Federal Manuscript Census Schedules for the city of Santa Bárbara.

The percentage of unskilled workers rose to 80.5%--a considerable increase from 66.5% in 1870. The farmer class was now non-existent. Likewise, the percentage and number of skilled workmen was greatly reduced. By 1880, the Mexican-born worker had virtually disappeared from Santa Bárbara. Only five of 128 workers listed in the manuscript census were born in México; the sons of the Mexicanos also departed from the area. Over 95% of the Chicano workforce was born in California. Moreover, due to the migratory nature of work, the Chicano workforce continued to exhibit a high rate of non-persistence; only 30.5% of the male family heads of household persisted since 1870.[31]

In comparison, as the Chicano working class was still experiencing a general downward occupational trend, the non-Spanish-surname population remained static (see Table 6). Anglos maintained their dominance of the non-manual semiskilled, skilled and upper occupational classifications.

Although the Anglo occupational structure remained much the same between 1870 and 1880, the Anglo community was steadily

Table 6

Non-Spanish-surname Occupational Structure for 1880
(20% Sample Excluding Chinese Workers)

		Number of Workers		Percent of Workforce	
I.	Pastoral/Agric.				
	A. Ranchero	1	12	1.0%	12.3%
	B. Farmer	11		11.3	
II.	Professional	13		13.4	
III.	Proprietorial	9		9.3	
IV.	Skilled	27		27.8	
V.	Semiskilled				
	A. Non-manual	9	13	9.3%	13.4%
	B. Manual	4		4.1	
VI.	Unskilled				
	A. Laborer	6	13	6.2%	13.4%
	B. Other	7		7.2	
VII.	Unknown/Occupation unlisted	10		10.3	
	Total N	97			

Source: 1880 Federal Manuscript Census Schedules for the city of Santa Bárbara.

increasing its wealth in the form of property. By 1875, the non-Spanish surname population possessed the vast majority of valuable lands within and outside the City of Santa Bárbara (see Tables 7 and 8).[32] The majority of Chicanos (65.0%) continue to own a single town lot and personal property not in excess of $1000. On the other hand, a minority (38.8%) of Anglos own property valued under $1000; most possess property in the higher assessed categories. In addition, Anglos dominate the classification of individuals who own large amounts of valuable property outside of the city.

The Chicano family response to its dire economic situation during the 1880's had the effect of altering traditional patterns of employment and familial work responsibilities. The most dramatic change in the family occupational structure was the entrance of the Chicana and her children as co-principal contributors to the family's economic survival. As male heads of household faced persistent local unemployment, migrations to secure seasonal work in the other areas of the county or region became more frequent. In these instances the Chicana assumed the role of family head of household. No longer able to subsist solely on the income of the husband, the Chicana and her

children were forced to enter the unskilled labor market of Anglo Santa Bárbara. The work they performed involved the areas of domestic services and agricultural-related employment.

Table 7

Spanish and Non-Spanish-surname Property Owners in the City of Santa Bárbara for 1874-1875*

Total Assessed Value of Real and Personal Property	Spanish-surname		Non-Spanish-surname	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
$0-499	32	31.0%	80	19.8%
500-999	35	34.0	77	19.0
1,000-4,999	32	31.0	190	46.9
5,000-over	4	3.9	58	14.3
	N=103		N=405	

*Owners of city property only.

Source: Santa Bárbara County Assessment Roll for 1874-1875.

Table 8

Spanish and Non-Spanish-surname Property Owners (including Non-city Property) in the City of Santa Bárbara for 1874-1875*

Total Assessed Value of Real and Personal Property	Spanish-surname		Non-Spanish-surname	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
$0-1,499	1	11.0%	4	7.4%
1,500-3,999	0	0	3	5.5
4,000-9,999	1	11.0	20	37.0
10,000-over	7	77.7	27	50.0
	N=9		N=54	

*Owners of city property and of property outside the city.

Source: Santa Bárbara County Assessment Rolls for 1874-1875.

Prior to the late 1870's, women and children adhered to their traditional roles which centered mainly in the home. By 1880, financial circumstances dictated a break from tradition. For over a decade Anglo women had decried the scarcity of domestic help available in their homes. Besides the small corps of Chinese servants, no other source of labor was available; Chicanas did not consider work outside their own home, much less as a live-in servant in an Anglo abode.[33] By 1880, however, younger Chicanas began to partially fill the labor needs of the Anglo elite. The 1880 census listed twenty Spanish-surname females who were heads of household or who were employed, but living outside their nuclear family (see occupational breakdown below).

Table 9

Chicana Occupational Structure

Job Description		N
Skilled:	dressmaker	1
Unskilled:	domestics	
	live-in (Anglo homes)	16
	live-out	1
	laundress	2
Total		20

Source: 1880 Federal Manuscript Census Schedules.

No doubt many other Chicanas took in part-time work which was not disclosed in the census. For instance, during the proposed shutdown of several Chinese laundries in 1882, Chicanas solicited their work of washing and ironing clothes. The trend of Chicanas working in the domestic-related services continued throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[34]

Agriculture and related industries were the main employers of Chicanas and children. The ubiquitous Charles E. Huse wrote in 1874:

> There is a good deal of labor that might be usefully employed in a mill; boys and girls growing up in idleness and many of them in ignorance. If we do not build mills, by-and-by we will have to build almhouses to keep these people, or jails to incarcerate them for crimes committed, perhaps, under pressure of poverty.[35]

Huse's hopes for the construction of a wool processing plant never materialized, but the growth of agriculture in Santa Bárbara attracted Chicano children and women as the chief source of labor. The first fruit cannery established in the County of Santa Bárbara in 1880, was located near Pueblo Viejo. By 1882, the leading businessmen of the city made the cannery a successful joint-stock operation. During the peak harvest and canning season from 100 to 150 women and girls, and a few men or boys, were employed in the cannery. In 1883, the *Daily Press* reported that "about 40 Spanish girls are at work preparing the fruit for canning and drying."[36] They also worked as packers and labelers. The cannery remained in operation until 1886, when fruit crop failures in Santa Bárbara and in other areas of southern California forced its closure. A cannery was not established again in the city until 1897, when the Johnston Fruit Company opened its fruit packing plant. Interestingly, Chicanas and Chicanos returned as the main laborers in the packing house after an absence of over a decade.[37]

Chicanas and their children were also employed as seasonal agricultural workers on the developing fruit and nut ranches of the area. Prior to the 1880's, the economic function of children to the family welfare was limited to grubbing wild acorns and other edibles. From these natural sources mothers would improvise by making acorn coffee and acorn meal substitutes for family consumption.[38] But by 1880, mother and child entered the seasonal harvests in order to supplement the family income. The first agricultural sector to entice Chicanas and Chicanitos to the fields was the almond industry; they began to replace the departed Chinese at the nearby Hollister ranch. Colonel Hollister contracted with a city merchant to hire fifty women and children as shellers at four cents per pound.[39] The almond shelling season was followed by the longer olive harvest season at the Ellwood Cooper ranch during the winter. Chicano children who worked in both harvests were usually absent from school until February. In 1884, the school census taker reported that about fifty children would return to school after the Cooper ranch harvests:

> Those dilatory in coming to school are mostly Spanish children, who are now out picking olives.[40]

The olive harvests became an institutionalized annual employment for women, boys and girls. By the late 1890's, the harvesters would pick a quarter million pounds of olives every season.[41]

The time of year that women and children worked in the cannery, almond groves and olive harvests coincided with the seasons when the men were most likely engaged in seasonal migratory employment. There were seasons, however, especially in the early summer, when the entire family migrated from the city to pick fruit. This type of family seasonal harvest was evident in Santa Bárbara by the 1890's. As walnuts replaced

almonds and as the fruit industry expanded, Chicano family labor was essential. The Santa Bárbara Walnut Growers' Association claimed that it could realize a very large profit since the cost of labor involved in harvesting and handling was only 1% of the sales. The Chicano family walnut harvests continued through the first three decades of the twentieth century.[42] Families would often leave home base for several weeks while camping out in the fields where they worked. Goleta and other northern Santa Bárbara County locales became the destination for large groups of families departing together. The local newspaper reported in 1897, that "a number of Barbareños" were preparing to spend the summer picking fruit. Shortly after this notice a columnist, surprised at the number of people leaving, reported:

> . . . the exodus of men, women, and children from the towns to the orchards is something unusual.[43]

The "process on a typical ranch" during harvest season required about sixty people who were recruited from neighboring localities; women and girls performed much of the work after the men and boys picked the fruit.[44] Thus, within the last two decades of the nineteenth century Chicanos, but especially women and children, originated a pattern of employment which continued to characterize future generations of the Chicano working class in Santa Bárbara.

The participation of the Chicano male head of household in the seasonal family harvests, by 1890, marked his first exposure to non-pastoral employment. But the male's initial response to the deteriorating economic status of the family during the 1880's, was to persist in seeking employment that required his occupational skills--pastoral-related jobs. A few Chicanos were employed as leather workers in a local mail order house and other similar shops. The Anglo proprietors of these establishments advertised "Mexican goods made by old Mexicans now living in and around Santa Bárbara" from which a "typical tourist delights to secure mementos."[45] Some worked as vaqueros in the decreasing number of rodeos and local cattle drives. Young men, some only 15 years old, would leave their family homes in Santa Bárbara for the opportunity of becoming resident shepherds on county ranches. Others had to adapt their skills to new working situations. For example, by 1880, a lucrative trade in the capture of Channel Island sea lions for distant museums necessitated the skills of vaqueros. It was reported that only "the Mexicans and Californians who are exceedingly expert with the lasso" could accomplish the task without maiming the sea lions.[46] These types of jobs were, however, usually occasional and could not sustain a large workforce.

There was only one historic pastoral-related occupation that many Chicanos followed several decades after 1880. Sheep-shearing remained as the last vestige of pastoral Santa Bárbara until the industry began to decline circa World War I. As early

as 1881, the wool slip was valued at $250,000. By the late 1890's, the Santa Cruz Island Company grazed from 40,000 to 50,000 head of sheep and employed forty resident shepherds supplemented by fifty to sixty trasquiladores during the fall and spring. The other islands contained an additional 30,000 head.[47] The trasquiladores would usually make the sheep shearing rounds on the small flocks throughout the county before leaving for the islands. Importantly, sheep shearing was the only occupation in which Chicanos were guaranteed annual employment; the same group of men, relatives and friends, would migrate together each year. The daughter of an Anglo Santa Bárbara rancher recalled the annual return of the trasquiladores at her family's ranch in the late 1880's:

> Among the shearers were many who had come yearly to the ranch with the crew for as long as my family could remember.

She remembered the sheep shearers at work stating that,

> . . . the young and vigorous, conscious of their dark good looks, accentuated by the red bandannas tied across their foreheads . . . suddenly began to joke together as they sang.[48]

Sheep shearing to the trasquiladores became as important a cultural attachment as it was a source of income. The older men would regularly take their young sons to learn the trade. Often times when off-season unskilled manual labor in the city became scarce, or was undesirable, many trasquiladores would migrate to distant sheep shearing camps. During the 1890's, several Santa Barbareños would join together with compañeros from Ventura County and follow a sheep-shearing circuit through several western states. Groups as large as 125 men traveled by train to the shearing camps located in Golconda and Elko, Nevada, in Utah and in Wyoming; some went as far as central Canada.[49] Trasquiladores stuck tenaciously to an occupation which their ancestors had passed down; but, unfortunately, sheep-shearing did not provide employment for more than a few months out of the year. The part-time trasquiladores and other Chicano workers by the late 1880's were forced to accept non-traditional types of unskilled manual labor.

Prior to 1868, the building trade in Santa Bárbara was largely dependent upon Chicano masons and other workers who were experienced in adobe construction. Even as late as 1872 adobe structures were considered a less expensive alternative to brick and wood construction. It was suggested that native-Barbareños could build adobe dwellings or farm houses for $20 a month labor, thereby "saving the price of lumber, skilled labor and transportation."[50] However, by 1872, adobe construction was obsolete in the expanding Anglo construction trades

industry. For two decades Chicano workers remained outside the construction trades until they began to fill the unskilled manual labor positions during the early 1890's. Throughout the 1870's and 1880's the building trades personnel consisted primarily of Anglo skilled workers and Chinese unskilled laborers. The Chinese continued as the main source of imported day laborers in street paving, railroad, railway and construction site work.[51]

During the post boom periods the stagnate construction and building trades industry in Santa Bárbara failed to attract the Chicano worker. Moreover, the low wages paid to day laborers caused Chicanos to pursue part-time employment in familiar types of work where they could earn better wages. "Intelligent laborers" generally received $1.50 per day while "other" day laborers, such as Chicanos, received $1; the Chinese worked for less. In comparison, carpenters earned $1.75 to $2.50 per day, painters $2.50, masons or plasters $4.00 and mechanics $2.00 to $3.00.[52] Thus, during the seasons in which most Chicanos were not employed in pastoral-related jobs they sought miscellaneous work which sufficed until the next seasonal migration. For example, some families and individuals would make and sell home-made Mexican foods. A family in "Las Islitas," a portion of Pueblo Viejo which was surrounded each winter by the rising waters of the estero, sold tamales in the barrio. Lino Ortiz and W. B. Gonzáles, the "tamale men," catered to the Anglo population from their stands on State Street near the barrio. There were other Chicanos who supported themselves by selling nopales and tunas to other Chicanos and a growing Chinese clientele. There were part-time occupations like the bootblack stand operated by Nick Domínguez, and Nick Ruiz and others who were hack drivers during the height of the tourist season. These types of miscellaneous jobs supplemented the income earned from their other seasonal employment.[53]

By the 1890's, the decreasing seasonal employment in pastoral-related jobs and the meager income from miscellaneous employment forced the male head of household into the manual labor market of the construction-building trades. Previously, building contractors imported the needed labor for private and city contracts. By the early 1890's contractors began to rely solely on local labor. Chicanos, during the first half of the decade, were increasingly identified as the street graders, ditch diggers and general manual laborers at construction sites.[54] As recurrent high unemployment prevailed in Santa Bárbara during the mid-1890's, Chicano workers increasingly filled the manual laboring positions once occupied by transient non-Chicano workers. From then on, Chicanos supplied the primary source of manual day labor. The mayor reported in 1895:

> We have at present time a great many idle men (not tramps) in our City, men who are residents and have families to care for, many of whom have difficulty in supplying the

> actual necessities of life, because of lack of employment.[55]

A program to hire residents for local street work marked the institutionalization of the Chicano worker as the chief source of manual labor. Prior to the 1890's few Spanish-surnames were recorded as the laborers who worked in the local district of Santa Bárbara County's road crews; after 1897, Spanish-surnames represent the majority of road workers.[56] The pattern for Chicanos as manual laborers in all building and related trades increased throughout the twentieth century.

During the 1890's, the Chicano also increased his dependence upon seasonal agricultural employment. Large groups of men headed by local Chicanos began to migrate outside Santa Bárbara County for harvests. Even as early as 1889, a certain Alex López left with a crew of twenty-four men to harvest corn in Hueneme, Ventura County. As the sugar beet industry took growth in Ventura County and in northern Santa Bárbara County during the late 1890's, Chicano labor was recruited. The Santa María Sugar Beet Company advertised for labor in Santa Bárbara city newspapers calling for 500 men, women and children for three months of harvesting. The American Beet Sugar Company in Oxnard attracted a work force of Chicanos and Japanese who created a "49'er mining camp" atmosphere in the town.[57] Chicano individuals and entire families became regulars in the agricultural harvests of the area. This trend was also expanded after 1900.

The Chicano working class by the late 1890's in Santa Bárbara had established a pattern of employment that continued to characterize Spanish-surname people throughout the first three decades of the next century and after. But the native-Chicano workers were to be rejoined by a group that had departed thirty years earlier--the Mexicanos. The advance guard of the large twentieth century Mexicano migration to Santa Bárbara came into the community as railroad section gang workers before the turn of the century. The first Mexicano section crew was established in Santa Bárbara as the *Morning Press* (June 8, 1894) reported that the "Chinamen section hands on this branch of the Southern Pacific to Ventura have given place to a gang of Mexicans." Their numbers were soon augmented. The *Morning Press* reprinted an article from the *Yuma Times:*

> Two carloads of cholos were attached to Monday's westbound express, destined for railroad work at Tecachipi [*sic*] and Santa Bárbara, Cal. These cattle are worse than any sort of emigrants that come into the country, and some time the people along the S.P. road will rise up and deport every one of them from the county.[58]

By the late 1890's, the coastal railroad connection between San Francisco and Los Angeles needed more labor for its

scheduled completion; more Mexicanos were imported. It was reported that "several Mexicans arrived on the noon train yesterday and were taken out to the railroad camp."[59] Thus, the native-Chicano working class was expanded by the corps of Mexicano railroad workers. The seeds of the Mexicano barrio on the lower east-side of Santa Bárbara were planted by 1900.

By the late 1890's, the Spanish-surname occupational structure had stabilized since its radical transition indicated in the 1880 census. The Chicano workers in Anglo Santa Bárbara society were fixed into occupational classifications in which they remained for several decades. Table 10 reveals that the Chicano or Spanish-surname working class was primarily an unskilled and semiskilled manual laboring group (58.6%) in 1897.[60]

Table 10

Spanish-surname Occupational Structure in 1897 for Santa Bárbara

		Number of Workers		Percent of Workforce	
I.	Pastoral/Agric.				
	A. Ranchero	2	6	0.7%	2.1%
	B. Farmer	4		1.4	
II.	Professional	6		2.1	
III.	Proprietorial	13		4.6	
IV.	Skilled	48		17.7	
V.	Semiskilled				
	A. Non-manual	11	38	3.9%	13.4%
	B. Manual	27		9.5%	
VI.	Unskilled				
	A. Laborer	131	139	46.3%	49.1%
	B. Other	8		2.8	
VII.	Unknown/ nondescriptive	33		11.7	
	Total	283			

Source: 1897 Santa Bárbara City Directory.

Over 60% of the entire workforce was located in the two lowest occupational levels; only 25.8% were in the categories of skilled or above (11.7% unknown).[61] The development of tourism on a year-round basis during the 1890's and the subsequent need for a larger semiskilled worker group gave rise to the expansion of the semiskilled manual Chicano employee. This group consisted of hack drivers, delivery personnel, teamsters, gardeners and others. The semiskilled manual labor group of workers was not,

however, economically differentiated from the large group of unskilled manual laborers. The skilled category also experienced a small increase over 1880. In relation to the overall occupational hierarchy of the city, however, Chicanos, Chicanas and their children remained at the bottom of the occupational structure.[62]

The non-Spanish surname occupational structure highlights the continuing disparity which existed between the Chicano and Anglo populations (see Table 11).[63]

Table 11

Non-Spanish-surname Occupational Structure for 1895-1896
(25% Sample excluding Italian and Chinese Workers)

		Number of Workers		Percent of Workforce	
I.	Pastoral/Agric.				
	A. Ranchero	2	10	0.7%	3.4%
	B. Farmer	8		2.7	
II.	Professional	39		13.4	
III.	Proprietorial	34	37	11.6%	12.6%
	A. Managerial	3		1.0	
IV.	Skilled	74		25.3	
V.	Semiskilled				
	A. Non-manual	28	50	9.6%	17.1%
	B. Manual	22		7.5	
VI.	Unskilled				
	A. Laborer	29	33	9.9%	11.3%
	B. Other	4		1.4	
VII.	Unknown/ nondescriptive	49		16.8	
	Total	292			

Source: 1895-1896 Santa Bárbara City Directory.

In comparison to the Chicano working class, Anglo semiskilled and unskilled manual workers constituted only 18.8% of the Anglo workforce. Conversely, 54.7% of the workforce was located in the higher occupational categories. Even the occupational breakdown of the city's second largest ethnic group, the Italians, illustrates the low status of the Chicano working population (see Table 12). Italian-surname workers are more evenly distributed in the intermediate and lower job categories than other non-Spanish surname individuals, but their percentages as proprietors (28.8%) and skilled workers (28.8%) far exceed the Chicano in both categories. Thus, when compared to

the non-Spanish-surname population, including the largest European immigrant group in Santa Bárbara, Chicanos occupied the lowest economic-occupational levels in the community.

Table 12

Italian-surname Occupational Structure for 1895-1896

		Number of Workers	Percent of Workforce
I.	Pastoral/Agric.		
	A. Ranchero	0 } 3	0 } 5.8%
	B. Farmer	3	5.8%
II.	Professional	0	0
III.	Proprietorial	15	28.8
IV.	Skilled	15	28.8
V.	Semiskilled		
	A. Non-manual	1 } 1	1.9% } 1.9%
	B. Manual	0	0
VI.	Unskilled		
	A. Laborer	3 } 14	5.8% } 26.9%
	B. Other	11	21.1
VII.	Unknown/ nondescriptive	4	7.7
	Total	52	

Source: 1895-1896 Santa Bárbara City Directory.

SUMMARY

Within the time span of one generation Chicano workers were removed from their functional role in the pastoral economy of Santa Bárbara and placed in a subservient socio-economic status in Anglo society. Developments which occurred during this time period marked the emergence of the Chicano working class by the turn of the century. Aspects which characterized the Chicano working class, at least up to the Great Depression, had their origins in the nineteenth century. The Chicana and her children as integral parts of the family occupational structure began in the 1880's; they were essential contributors to the economic survival of the family. The male head of household clung tenaciously to the decreasing part-time employment in pastoral-related occupations. But by the late 1880's financial circumstances dictated his entrance into the Anglo economic-occupational structure. By the late 1890's the large majority of Chicano workers were cemented into the job

classification of unskilled/semiskilled manual labor. They were also largely dependent upon seasonal migratory employment. During the same decade the native-Chicanos were joined by the first contingent of Mexicano migrants to reach Santa Bárbara; together they formed the laboring class in the construction-building trades industry and agricultural sector of the economy.

The social and economic positions of the Chicanos in late nineteenth century Santa Bárbara forged the structure of the twentieth century Chicano community. The social isolation of Chicanos in Pueblo Viejo and their low occupational status determined the position of the younger generation of native-born and the large number of incoming Mexicanos. Although the internal dynamics of the Chicano community changed from 1900 to 1930, the economic-occupational structure remained basically the same.

NOTES

1. The term Chicano will from hereafter refer to all native-born, Mexican-born and the children of the Mexican-born people in Santa Bárbara.

2. The native-born Spanish-surname people of native-born parents in Santa Bárbara will herein be referred to as native-Chicano.

3. *Weekly Press*, September 18, 1875.

4. *Daily Press*, July 1, 1874; *Weekly Press*, September, 1875 (undated, Vol. 7, No. 11, special issue); *Daily Press*, April 6, 1876 and June 3, 1880.

5. Dumke, op. cit., 163; Hill and Parks, op. cit., 96. See also *Daily Press*, October 11, 1886, April 20, 1887, July 20, 1886, February 25, 1888 and May 18, 1887.

6. Frank Sands, *A Pastoral Prince--The History and Reminiscences of J. W. Cooper*, 158.

7. *Daily Press*, September 7, 1875, April 5, 6, 1877 and April 20, 1881; Report of the County Assessor for 1878, see the *Daily Press*, July 1, 1878.

8. Reports of the County Assessor for 1878 and 1883, see the *Daily Press*, July 1, 1878 and July 7, 1883. See also Reverend A. W. Jackson, *Barbariana*, 35.

9. Ibid. See also Joseph Perkins, *A Businessman's Estimate of Santa Barbara County, California*, 22-23.

10. Dumke, op. cit., 9.

11. Edward S. Spaulding, *A Brief Story of Santa Barbara*, 60-61; Spaulding, *Adobe Days Along the Channel*, 118-119; United States, Ninth Census: 1870, *Population of the United States*, Vol. I, 92; Storke, *California Editor*, 44-47; O'Neill, *History of Santa Barbara County*, 261.

12. Spaulding, *A Brief Story of Santa Barbara*, 61; Storke, op. cit., 44-46; O'Neill, op. cit., 260; Wills, *A Winter in*

California, 53-54; McChesney, *Under the Shadow of the Mission*, 62-64. See also *Daily Press*, April 29, 1876, February 25, 1884, September 19, 1878; *Weekly Press*, August 3, 1878; *Morning Press*, April 30, 1887; Phillips, *History of Santa Barbara County*, 185. For a good discussion of the early Chinese community in southern California see McWilliams, *Southern California Country*, 84-95.

13. *Daily Press*, July 12, 1878.

14. Storke, op. cit., 43.

15. *Index*, April 30, 1874. See also Kroll, *Memories of Rancho Santa Rosa and Santa Barbara*, 4; *Daily Press*, October 11, 1873, December 26, 1874, December 8, 1875.

16. May 16, 1876. See also *Weekly Press*, May 20, 27, 1876.

17. *Weekly Press*, July 5, July 26, September 6, 1879. See also *Daily Press*, June 19, September 13, September 25, 1876; *Weekly Press*, September 29, October 1, 1877; May 24, 1879.

18. Storke, op. cit., 45-46. For pressure exerted against remaining laundries see *Daily Press*, September 12, 19, 1882, August 25, 1884. For police harassment of the Chinese social activities see *Daily Press*, August 25, 29, 1883; *Morning Press*, February 11, 1890; January 30, 1894. For abolition of Chinese abalone trade see *Morning Press*, April 21, 1889, October 4, 6, 1898, February 17, 1900.

19. United States, Tenth Census: 1880, *Population of the United States*, 382; Eleventh Census: 1890, *Report on Population of the United States*, Part I, 452. For missionary endeavors see *Press*, March 21, 1874; *Weekly Press*, October 3, 1874; *Daily Press*, February 17, 24, 1874; *Morning Press*, February 16, 1896.

20. *Daily Press*, February 5, 1886, July 31, 1885.

21. The enumeration of individuals in the 1860 census created a problem for comparisons with the 1870 occupational analysis for Spanish-surname workers. The 1860 census did not specify exact location of residents within the Township of Santa Bárbara and, therefore, individuals residing in the immediate locales surrounding the pueblo were included in the general enumeration. The town of Santa Bárbara and Montecito were, however, the two principal colonies of Spanish-surnames in the township at this time. The 1870 census did specifically state the area from which all individuals resided. The analysis of occupation in this study for 1870 and 1880 is limited to the city of Santa Bárbara. However, the omission of Montecito Spanish-surname workers (39 in 1870) did not appreciably affect the percentages in the occupational structure of the city of Santa Bárbara.

22. Due to the discrepancies in the enumeration listing of the 1860 census cited in the preceding footnote, a precise analysis of persistency and non-persistency of the Spanish-surname population between 1860 and 1870 cannot be ascertained. The only possible method to estimate the persistence rate was

to list those persons who were found in the 1860 census for the entire township and who were listed as residents in the city of Santa Bárbara in 1870. Using this method, only 23% or 45 of the 195 family male heads of household present in 1870 persisted since 1860, 77% of whom were California-born.

23. *Southern California Country*, 65. The step by step occupational changes which McWilliams outlines, however, does not accurately reflect the changing Chicano occupational situation from 1870 to the 1890's in Santa Bárbara.

24. O'Neill, op. cit., 267-268; Gidney, et al., *History of Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo and Ventura Counties, California*, Vol. I, 108; *Daily Press*, June 14, 1877, July 13, 1877, October 23, 1878; *Weekly Press*, July 14, 1877, April 13, 1878.

25. McChesney, *Under The Shadow of the Mission--A Memory of Santa Barbara*, 44-45.

26. Tompkins, "Santa Barbara Journalists 1855-1973," 5.

27. December 18, 1877.

28. For occupations as caballeros and vaqueros see the *Index*, April 16, 1874; *Daily Press*, May 18, 1878, July 10, 1878; *Weekly Press*, October 9, 1875. For reference to sheep shearers see the *Daily Press*, June 5, 1877, March 25, 1878, April 16, 22, 1874, and September 29, 1879. Pitt, op. cit., 254, also mentions sheep shearing activities in other areas of southern California during the 1870's.

29. Paul, "The Spanish-Americans in the Southwest, 1848-1900," 45-47.

30. The 1880 Federal Manuscript Census Schedules listed information concerning unemployment of heads of household. The enumerator was diligent in consistently listing those unemployed, part of the census for both Spanish-surname and non-Spanish-surname individuals.

31. Only 128 male Spanish-surname heads of household and employed residents were listed in the 1880 census. Judging from the seasonal-migratory nature of their work it is possible that the enumerator may have discounted a sizable number of workers and families who were not present at the time of the enumeration. One can only guess, however, how many Chicano workers might have been omitted. But in July, when the census information was collected, many Chicano families were working in the hinterlands.

32. The lands assessed in the County Assessment Roll for 1874-75 indicate inflated values due to the real estate boom which was at its height at the time the assessment was taken.

33. *Daily Press*, December 3, 1874, November 7, 16, 1883.

34. *Federal Manuscript Census*, 1880. See also the *Daily Press*, September 19, 1882. The mother of an interviewee also received part-time, and later full-time, employment as a home-based laundress beginning in the 1890's; interview with Veronica Medina. See also *Daily Press*, December 17, 1880. Most domestics during this period were paid from $8 to $20 per month depending upon age and capacity.

35. Quoted in Mason, op. cit., 175.

36. August 20, 1883. See also the *Daily Press*, September 22, 1883, July 31, 1882; *Weekly Press*, April 24, 1880.

37. *Daily Press*, May 24, 1884; *Morning Press*, July 26, 1890, March 5, 1897.

38. *Daily Press*, November 29, 1879.

39. *Santa Barbara Independent*, November 11, 1880; *Daily Press*, November 11, 1880.

40. *Daily Press*, January 10, 1884.

41. Throughout the 1880's the school census of the city continued to record the largest absence of school-age children from the Chicano Third Ward district, see *Morning Press*, May 29, 1887. The Chicanitos of Santa Bárbara were, no doubt, joined by their compañeros from Montecito for the seasonal harvests, see *Morning Press*, November 16, 1889. For volume of olive harvests see *Morning Press*, February 20, 1898.

42. *Morning Press*, November 12, 13, 22, 1896. Nearly every individual that was interviewed who was born and raised in Santa Bárbara either participated in the walnut harvests or knew families that did. It was considered an annual affair by most.

43. *Morning Press*, June 25, July 25, 1897.

44. *Morning Press*, December 23, 1896.

45. W. H. Hoffman, *Catalogue of Natural History Goods* (Santa Bárbara: Independent Book and Job Printing House, 1886), preface, 7. For other Chicano leather workers see the *Morning Press*, January 28, 1894 and October 28, 1889.

46. For the sea lion trade see the *Daily Press*, March 16, 1880; *Morning Press*, May 14, 21, 23, 1891, July 13, 1897, February 15, 1899. For references to vaqueros and shepherds see Francis C. Kroll, *Memories of Rancho Santa Rosa and Santa Barbara*, 48-49; *Daily Press*, February 5, 1881, February 7, 1884.

47. *Daily Press*, August 23, November 23, 1881; September 22, 1882; *Morning Press*, September 6, 1887, August 23, 1895, April 26, May 5, September 14, 1892, March 26, 1893.

48. Kroll, op. cit., 60, 70. Also interviews with Leo Cordero and Walter Cordero. Leo's father, Walter's grandfather, was the mayordomo on many county shearing circuits during the 1890's and early 1900's.

49. Interviews with Miguel García and Russell A. Ruíz. Mr. García is most likely the last surviving trasquilador in Santa Bárbara. Mr. Ruíz's relatives participated in the western states migration.

50. E. N. Wood, *Guide to Santa Barbara Town and Country* (Santa Bárbara: Wood Sefton, 1872), 61. See also *Prospectus of the Santa Barbara Hot Sulphur Springs Company* (San Francisco: Frank Eastman, Printer, 1867), 13, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

51. *Daily Press*, September 6, 1875; *Morning Press*, August 30, 1877, January 28 and 31, 1888.

52. *Daily Press*, December 17, 1880, July 5, 12, 1882.

53. For tamal and nopal vendors see Francis Cooper Kroll, op. cit., 24; *Morning Press*, September 9 and November 3, 1891, April 2, 1892; *Daily Press*, August 20, 1885. For bootblacks and hacks see *Daily Press*, April 20, 1880; *Morning Press*, September 16, 1892, May 12, 1893.

54. The earliest record of a Chicano street worker was in 1885, see *Daily Press*, May 18, 1885. See also *Morning Press*, December 19, 1893, November 13, 1895, March 31, 1893, October 13, 1895.

55. *An Outline of Historical Research with Excerpts from the Minutes of the Common Council of the City of Santa Barbara;* also reported in the *Morning Press*, January 27, 30, 1895.

56. *Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors, Minutes,* Books G and H, April, 1897 and January, 1900, Santa Barbara County Clerk of the Board of Supervisors, County Administration Building. For earlier periods, see Books C through F (1880, 1885, 1886 and 1891). See also *Morning Press*, December 20, 1898.

57. *Morning Press*, October 1, 1889, April 13, 1899, August 17, 20, 1899.

58. July 29, 1894.

59. *Morning Press*, August 26, 1899.

60. The city directories published for Santa Bárbara previous to 1897 (1875, 1888 and 1895-96) grossly under-represented the Chicano population. When the Spanish-surname population was compared with the non-Spanish surname, the former group's percentage was extremely below all population estimates made for each period. For example, the city directory for 1895-96 listed only 178 Spanish-surname heads of household. The 1897 directory listed 283 which represents a more realistic representation of Spanish-surnames; no large Mexicano migration was evident during this year which may have distorted the latter figure. However, even the 1897 City Directory is suspect; the accuracy of any city directory can only be measured if there is some other comparative source.

61. The 11.7% unknown percentage included many jobs which were non-descriptive--usually the employer or name of a business concern was listed. However, one is led to suspect that a great majority of the unknown occupations are unskilled and semiskilled manual positions judging from the establishment listed; most employed manual laborers.

62. The Chicana occupational structure in 1897 showed a larger number of skilled and semiskilled female workers. But, here again as before, only women that maintained full-time employment were listed; seasonal agricultural and part-time domestic working women were not listed in the directory. The 1897 distribution of Chicanas listed in the directory is as follows: total 25; Skilled: dressmaker, 4; milliner, 2; nurse, 2; music teacher, 1. Semiskilled: seamstress, 2. Unskilled: servant, 12; laundress, 2. Unknown: 1. For reference to Santa Bárbara as a year-round resort, see the *Morning Press*, March 4, 26, 1892, May 2, 1896; Baur, *The Health Seekers of Southern California*, 69-71.

63. Samples of the non-Spanish surname population were extracted from the 1895-96 city directory. The Spanish-surname samples were originally taken in 1971 together with samples from all later directory periods; the non-Spanish surname samples were taken in 1974. However, the 1897 city directory was subsequently lost and, therefore, the Anglo sample was taken from the closest period to 1897 which was the previous year's directory.

RAZA MENTAL HEALTH: PERSPECTIVAS FEMENILES

CARMEN CARRILLO-BERON

Clinical Coordinator
Centro de Salúd Mental
Oakland, California

The socio-economic conditions of Raża in the United States have physical, emotional, and interpersonal consequences. The psychological literature on the relationship between socio-economic status and diagnosis, treatment and prognosis attests to a significant, discriminatory pattern. In relationship to diagnosis, the process is that the lower the socio-economic status of the patient the more severe the diagnosis assigned. Intrinsically related to diagnosis is the treatment modality decided upon by the therapist for a given patient. Patients with more severe diagnoses are generally regarded to be worse candidates for the expensive "talking cure," psychotherapy. These patients are assigned to the less expensive and more dehumanizing therapies: chemotherapy, electroshock therapy (EST), and psychosurgery. More often than not Chicanos are the victims of more severe diagnoses, and the recipients of drugs, EST, and the surgical knife as therapy.

Prognosis, defacto regarded as poor, is ensured to be poor as patients develop temporary, and often times permanent, effects of dependency, powerlessness, despair, and bitterness concerning their condition. Thus, a Chicano's place on the social and economic spectrum of the society determines his/her status as recipient of mental health services.

A related issue that needs to be examined critically and differentially is the locus of a problem in relation to defining possible solutions to the problem. Traditional social scientists whose focus of interest is mental health generally

ignore a socio-economic and political understanding of Chicano issues in mental health, and implicitly condone the discriminatory practices in diagnosis, prognosis and treatment discussed above. Additionally, some writers make a persuasive argument for "health" in the Chicano population with the following rationale:

(1) Chicanos are "tougher" than other people, and are, therefore, more resistant to mental illness. This view is usually phrased more diplomatically and gently to read: the Chicano people are more adaptive than others, and are, therefore, more resistant to stressful environments.
(2) Chicanos are more ignorant of psychological health than others, and thus are more tolerant of deviant and self-destructive behavior. This component of the rationale for health is a modern version of the "happy savage" rationalization for discrimination and its concomitant oppressive policies.
(3) Chicanos utilize mental health services less than other ethnic groups, and this in itself indicates that as a group Chicanos need mental health services less than other ethnic groups.

Chicano social scientists reject the victim hypothesis which places responsibility for a transgression or subjective pain on the shoulders of the individual. Instead, the locus of responsibility is shifted to the capitalist system which breeds social ills and individual misery. Shifting the locus of the problem, however, does not avail the Chicano population of immediate solutions to the issues at hand. In fact, blaming "the system" becomes a simplistic answer to pain, and indirectly sows counter-revolutionary sentiment within Chicanos. The fact of the matter is, that a differentiated Marxian analysis of the Chicano experience, alternative hypotheses concerning the national question and the fate of Aztlán, or changing the composition of the city council, are methods which do not deal effectively or immediately with the alcoholism of Señora Panchita, la ulcera y migraine headache del Señor González, the sexual molestation of thirteen-year-old Angelita, or the tecatismo of José.

It is imperative for Chicano professionals to reject both a racist, oppressive formulation of the Chicano experience, and a simplistic, utopiate analysis. Mainstream social science utilizes its arguments to justify and rationalize institutionally racist policies which translate into programmatic decisions affecting utilization of services. In the case of the Chicano population, this means underutilization of such social services as mental and physical health clinics, legal assistance, and post-secondary schooling. Conversely, Chicanos overutilize other types of social services such as the criminal justice

system, emergency rooms in hospitals, and in some areas, unemployment and welfare benefits. On the other hand, "blame the system" sloganeering has zero effects on the alleviation of the present conditions of Chicanos. Thus, a comprehensive programmatic, and theoretically sound view of Chicano reality needs implementation and articulation within Chicano social services.

THE IMPORTANCE OF NEED ASSESSMENT

The Chicano Movement of the past decade, with its overall thrust of incorporating significant members of Chicanos into the schooling system, has implicitly recognized the need of securing training in the professions for Chicanos. Additionally, a concern exists that those Chicanos attaining professional status reenter the community. Thus, in addition to the struggle against the heretofore closed doors of the professions, a major concern of the Movimiento has been to train its people in order to recycle them so that the provision of needed services can begin to occur. As a Movimiento outgrowth, specialized support organizations have emerged. In the health area NCHO and BARCH are designed to serve a recruitment and support function. In law, MALDEF has served a parallel function.

The trend discussed above de facto rejects both a utopiate and a racist analysis of the needs within the Chicano community. In practice, the utopiate view would imply concentration on training in those skill areas basic to the making of a revolution. The racist view would mean acceptance of the status quo in terms of whither to channel the energies of Chicano youth.

Yet, in spite of the limited nature of the gains made in the past few years, it is observable that a new type of Raza professional is emerging from the decadent halls of ivy. The emerging Chicano professional is faced with a complex dilemma. On the one hand she/he faces the possible rejection and attack by Chicano activists who dismiss professional efforts as band-aid solutions which do not grapple with the fundamental structures of society. On the other hand, the Chicano professional is under pressure to adapt to the existing norms of her/his field. There are both ideological and practical forms in which these pressures are exerted.

Ideologically, there is a perennial and persuasive humanitarian argument that aims to convince the Chicano that services must be rendered to all, regardless of race, color, or creed. Why do you intend to work primarily with Chicanos? Bodies are bodies, teeth are teeth, suffering is suffering. There are universals of human experience, and if your concern is not for all humanity, perhaps you should reconsider whether membership in "the club" is for you. A second ideological pressure point is the push to accept the normative behavior of others in the field, as in diagnosis and treatment. Thus, the same Chicano psychologist who is sought after as a lecturer on the cultural

biases of assessment techniques is also referring monolingual Spanish-speakers or bilingual patients for testing.

Practically, the Chicano professional undergoes a crisis of identity. This crisis is experienced first in confronting the reality of her/his separation from the community of origin, and second in the social identification with other professionals, Chicano or not. Additionally she/he may at this point get in touch with the economic responsibilities of schooling, debts and family expenses. Thus, the issues of professional security, adequate salary schedule, and R&R time begin to take on importance.

The consequence of the dilemma of the Chicano professional can be costly to the Chicano community. Without adequate support he/she may become alienated from the people he/she serves. When this happens, the victim no longer understands the needs of the community, is no longer able to listen, and begins to develop an elitist attitude which gives him/her the license to decide what the people need. This phenomenon can be observed, for example, in the implementation of sex education programs in conservative Chicano communities, or in the unethical involvement of the professional with her/his clients. Another possible consequence is frustration with work in the community setting. The Chicano professional is also a person, and when there seem to be no sources of narcissistic gratification in one area, he/she will seek them elsewhere. Thus, if he/she feels attacked and unappreciated, in addition to being underpaid (enough frustration), he/she will take flight to the suburbs. Another type of consequence is the stagnation of the professional who then begins to deliver services in terms of traditional models of service delivery, neglecting the socioecopolitical issues that inspired him/her in the first place.

Recognition of these problems has led the staff at Centro de Salud Mental (Oakland, Calif.) to appreciate the necessity of going to the people to ask how they conceptualize their problems, and how they themselves perceive potential solutions. Thus, need assessment specifically, and applied research generally, have become central to the philosophy of Centro de Salud Mental.

METHOD

A Chicana administrator and health educator with the American Cancer Society organized a conference for Chicanas in Oakland, California. The theme of the conference was "Mujeres de Hoy." Seventy-six (76) Chicanas attended the conference, which was educational in nature and consisted of panels and presentations on various health issues. A mental health needs assessment and attitude survey abbreviated from a more comprehensive schedule developed by the author was administered to participants.[1] Six (6) women completed the questionnaire omitting the

self-report descriptive questions which yielded the demographic characteristics of the sample. Fifty-five (55) (80%) of the women completed the questionnaire in total.[2]

A. The Subjects. Overall, it was a young sample, with 69% of the women describing themselves as under thirty-five years of age. Slightly more than half of the women were married, with the remainder distributed as follows: 27% single, 13% divorced, 3% separated, and 3% widows. As a brief aside, it is interesting to note that by combining the thirty married and seven divorced women to determine the divorce rate in this sample, we arrive at an unexpectedly high figure: 19%. Although this figure must be interpreted with caution, it does tell us that of the marriages contracted by this group of Chicanas, one out of five terminated.

Table 1

Age Distribution of Respondents
(N=55)

Age (years)	Number	% of Total
18-23	13	24
24-35	25	45
36-45	11	20
46-55	6	11
Total	55	100%

Table 2

Marital Status of Respondents
(N=55)

Marital Status	Number	% of Total
Married	30	54
Single	15	27
Divorced	7	13
Separated	2	3
Widow	2	3
Total	56	100%

Table 3

Distribution of Respondents by
Number of Children
(N=55)

Number of Children	Number of Respondents	% of Total
None	23	42
1-3	18	33
4-6	11	20
6-8	2	3
9+	1	2
Total	55	100%

Table 4

Respondent's Number of Years in the Workforce
(N=55)

Number of Years in Workforce	Number of Respondents	% of Total
None	6	11
Under 1 year	5	9
1-5	18	33
6-10	17	31
11-15	5	9
16-20	2	3.5
21+	2	3.5
Total	55	100.0

A large percentage of the women reported having borne no children. Further research is indicated to elucidate whether this is reflective of changing attitudes towards child bearing among Chicanas. Among the mothers in the sample the trend is towards small families. If the number distribution on Table 3 is plotted, a positively skewed curve will emerge. The bulk of the sample (64%) reported being in the work force from one to ten years. Only 11% reported no experience in the workforce,

and 7% reported more than sixteen years. Thus, a composite picture of the typical conference participant may be thus collated: she is a young woman in her early thirties, married, with two children, and five years work experience.

B. The Technique. The assessment technique used was an abbreviated version of the Mental Health Attitude assessment portion of a Post-Therapy Interview Schedule developed by the author. The technique was designed to be brief in order to encourage subject participation. Those attending the conference were there primarily for didactic purposes and not to contribute to social science research. Facilitating and simplifying the assessment instrument was intended to eliminate resistance to cumbersome undertakings. The instrument itself consists of a combination of open-ended questions and forced choice items. Responses to open-ended questions were coded to facilitate manipulation of the data.

RESULTS

Following is a summary of the results obtained.

A. Attitudes Toward Mental Health. A large percentage of the women, twenty-one percent (21%), did not respond to the item or expressed no opinion. Thirty-six percent (36%) or the bulk of the women, associate mental health with the stereotyped notions of "locura" or "craziness." Organic diseases or illnesses were singled out by twelve percent (12%) of the sample as constituting the area of mental health. Another twelve percent (12%) saw problems of mental health as resulting from rejection by family or community, while eleven percent (11%) responded to the concept as an intrusion of the family's privacy by a white agency. Eight percent (8%) were ashamed or offended by the mere mention of the concept (see Table 5).

B. Factors Affecting Psychological Health. The majority of mujeres, sixty-seven percent (67%), identified all problems listed as affecting mental health. Twenty-two percent (22%) focused on environmental concerns and economic issues as affecting mental health. Thirteen percent (13%) related family and marital problems to the state of one's psychological health, and no one listed physical illnesses as related (see Table 6).

C. Referring Others. An overwhelming majority of the women in the sample, ninety percent (90%) reported that they would refer a Raza person to a mental health center. Smaller percentages said that they would not refer, or withheld opinion (see Table 7).

D. County or Raza Community Mental Health Center. Only a small proportion of the sample would prefer to refer someone to

Table 5

Q. #1--What do you believe most Raza think about mental health?

Category Response	Number Responding	% of Total
1. Organic disease, disorder or illness	9	12
2. Stigmatic stereotype of "locura" or "craziness"	27	36
3. Result of being outcast or rejected by family or community	9	12
4. Intrusion of family's privacy by white agency	8	11
5. Shamed or offended by mere suggestion of mental health	6	8
6. No opinion due to limited knowledge about mental health	8	10.5
7. No response	8	10.5
Total	75	100.0%

Table 6

Q. #2--Which problems in living and stress affect one's mental health?*

Category Response	Number Responding	% of Total
1. All problems listed below identified	47	67
2. Family/marital related problems	9	13
3. School related problems	1	1
4. Community deviances: delinquency, drugs, alcohol	8	11
5. Economic/environmental related problems	8	11
6. Physical illnesses	0	0
7. No Response	3	4
Total	76	107.0%

*The following problems were identified: marital problems such as divorce, desertion, sexual problems, and others. These were coded into the above categories.

Table 7

Q. #3--Would you refer a Raza person to a mental health center?

Response	Number	% of Total
Yes	63	90
No	4	5.7
No opinion	5	7
Total	72	102.7%

Table 8

Q. #3(b)--Would you prefer to make a referral to a county mental health center or a Raza community mental health center?

Response	Number	% of Total
County mental health center	1	1
Raza community mental health center with bilingual/bicultural workers	57	81
No opinion	3	4
Total	61	86%

a county mental health center. A vast majority of the women stated preference for a Raza community mental health center for referrals (see Table 8).

E. Referring Self. Seventy-seven percent (77%) of the sample stated a commitment to self-referral given the same problems in living referred to earlier. Those who would not consider seeking services amounted to fourteen percent (14%). Eight percent (8%) had no opinion (see Table 9).

F. Impact of Mental Health Center. Overall, the women agreed that a mental health center would have a major impact on the community's health. Seventy-seven percent (77%) so stated. Fifteen percent (15%) did not believe that such a center would have a significant impact. No opinion was expressed by seven percent (7%) (see Table 10).

Table 9

Q. #7--Given the same problems in living would you personally consider going to a mental health center or seeking services?

Response	Number Responding	% of Total
Yes	54	77
No	10	14
No opinion	6	8
Total	70	99%

Table 10

Q. #5--Do you believe that a mental health center or services based on your community's needs would have a major impact on the community's overall mental health?

Response	Number Responding	% of Total
Yes	54	77
No	11	15
No opinion	5	7
Total	70	99%

DISCUSSION

That the study was conducted at a conference entitled "Mujer de Hoy" alerts us to cautious interpretations of the results. The self-selection of women attending the conference and electing to participate in the study resulted in a non-random sample of subjects. It is known that participants were generally from the Oakland/Berkeley area, and included women who travelled from San José, San Francisco, Richmond, and other locations in the area. Yet, two questions must be posed, How typical of Chicanas were the participants? How applicable are the results?

A. Contradictory Findings. The open-ended questions tapped notions related to the medical model of mental health/illness, and stereotyped ideas concerning locura or craziness. A large group of respondents also expressed attitudes of alienation and mistrust in viewing mental health services as intrinsic and threatening "white agencies." Checklist responses, on the other hand, conceptualized issues in mental health/illness as "problems in living," identifying socioeconomic and cultural variables as affecting mental health. Lack of clarity among respondents on philosophical implications of the two frameworks may be a reason for the inconsistent ideological commitment to the medical model and functional identification of "problems in living," as describing issues in mental health/illness. An alternative explanation is that the nature of the conference, educational and progressive, may have pulled for responses including a contemporary view of health as enmeshed in sociopolitical reality, while stereotyped notions of locura continue to exist.

B. Utilization of Mental Health Services. Another attitudinal discrepancy is that although most of the women in the sample (90%) would refer someone to a mental health center only little more than three-fourths of the same (77%) would themselves utilize the service. Perhaps this dual standard can be related to the aforementioned notion of mental and emotional problems as falling within the sphere of locura or mental illness, with the concomittant stigma attached.

C. Bilingual-Bicultural Services. Preference for referral to a bilingual-bicultural center was expressed by most of the sample (81%). Additionally, over three-fourths of the women stated that a bilingual-bicultural mental health center would make a significant impact on Chicano communities (77%). These findings are of prime significance for those concerned with the planning, implementation, or evaluation of mental health delivery systems for the Chicano population.

D. Some Implications of the Study. In spite of some of the contradictory findings mentioned above, it is important to recognize the progressive positions taken by the women participants with regards to mental health. There was the identification of economic hardships as catalysts of stress and poor health. A demand for culturally sensitive services was clearly made. Although lacking some clarity, the medical model found challenge among the sample. Perhaps most important of all was the fact that Chicanos had the opportunity to voice their opinions and wrestle with some of the questions posing great controversy in the field of mental health.

Chicano professionals can easily fall into the limbo of working in a vacuum. Whether the vacuum is the ivy halls of academia or the daily demands of service, problems and pitfalls

inevitably ensue. Applied research can serve the function of providing the necessary input to develop theory, establish programs and ensure quality of care. Additionally going to the gente can create a means for feedback necessary for Chicano professionals, as human beings, to gauge their competence.

NOTES

1. The data reported herein was collected by Sylvia Castillo and Genoveva García, graduate students at the University of California, Berkeley.

2. Fifteen questionnaires were partially completed, with some demographic characteristics omitted. Six questionnaires omitted all demographic characteristics questions. Thus, of the total of 76, 55 women were willing to describe themselves.

THE BILINGUAL EDUCATION ACT--
A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF TITLE VII

RAYMOND CASTRO

School of Education
Harvard University

I. THE NATURE OF ASSIMILATION

The assimilation of ethnic, racial and religious minority groups into the American mainstream is an issue yet to be resolved. Indeed understanding of the issue itself is muddled by the differing interpretations given to critical pieces of litigation and legislation related to this theme. Following the *Brown* decision, these include: the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965, the 1965 Voting Rights Act as ammended in 1970, *Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools,* and the recent *Lau* decision.

Interpretations differ apparently because various groups and individuals have used these measures to achieve very different ends. Discussions of cultural pluralism, racial equality, sex discrimination, or equal educational opportunity are not incompatible, but the writing and activism in these various areas have glossed over some fundamental assumptions which may help to untangle this ever-growing knot of idealistic hopes and socio-economic conditions. These assumptions are manifested by tensions--tensions produced by the conflicts between unity and diversity at the societal level and tensions between equal opportunity and isolation at the individual and group level.[1]

One policy area particularly illustrative of these tensions --though not normally seen in this light--is the newly recognized specialization known as bilingual education. For the first time in this country's history, it is said, the federal government formally recognized the existence of non-English mother tongues by encouraging their use in the instruction of pupils from linguistically different backgrounds. Strengthened

by the passage of ESEA's Title VII in 1968, the Office of Education received unprecedented funds for a five-year period to develop bilingual programs throughout the country. With that funding period now over, an examination of the effects of bilingual education seems to be in order. One major obstacle to getting this sort of examination underway, however, is the confused purpose of bilingual education. For example, bilingual education has been hailed by some as a victory for the forces of pluralism, while others see it as a way to increase the educational opportunities (and presumably social mobility) of disadvantaged youth.

Since almost everyone agrees that language is symbolic of cultural differences, advocates of cultural pluralism viewed Title VII as a legislative attack on the conformity-producing aspects of schooling. Others, however, considered the bill to be a version of compensatory education, i.e., native language instruction would compensate for some children's deficiency in English and, therefore, assist in their future development. The implication is that acculturation, symbolized by learning English, will lead to social and economic assimilation for linguistic minorities.

Tempting though it is to focus on the tension between pluralists and acculturationists, the most troublesome tension seems to exist within people themselves. For most, the difficulty lies not so much with choosing between cultural identity or increased social/economic opportunity but striving to attain both. For example, Chicano parents who recognize the importance of English for survival in the U.S. and value the preservation of cultural traditions must find for their children a brand of education equally committed to both needs. Such Chicano parents believe that while learning English (acculturation) is required for good jobs and economic security (assimilation), neither is worth the involuntary loss of Spanish and indigenous culture. Thus, the most perplexing question is: How can one partake of the social and economic benefits of the U.S. without losing the richness of a unique cultural tradition?

The purpose of bilingual education is confused, then, because of the tension which characterizes the assumptions that people bring to it. Yet this tension suggests another way to view bilingual education's purpose: In what ways can bilingual education help to relieve the tension created by people's pursuit of many--often conflicting--ends? The answer to this question cannot easily be determined. Bilingual programs are a rather recent phenomenon: systematic, long-term evaluations of programs are virtually non-existent.[2] In light of this, an examination of past polities related to linguistic minorities might be revealing. A history of language policy may demonstrate what can be realistically expected from a piece of legislation like Title VII. Before examining that history, however, it may be useful to formulate some theory-based hypotheses concerning its meaning.

A Review of the Literature on Language Policy in the U.S.

For the purpose of manageability, this review is limited to those studies which have focused on the experiences of linguistic minorities and have theorized about the experiences in terms of the policies affecting those groups. The studies that follow are interpretive analyses of immigrant and native group experiences based on historical data of groups in this country.

In a study on English literacy and racial discrimination, Leibowitz conducted the first comprehensive survey of U.S. language policy ever to appear in English--at least to this author's knowledge.[3] The conclusion of the article states that laws requiring knowledge of English should be limited to official government proceedings and promulgations. Leibowitz continues:

> Statutes requiring English literacy as a condition of access to other areas of American life have generally been designed to resist the entrance of certain racial groups. In the past, these groups have been the most recently arrived aliens. But now, due to decreased immigration, the burden of these English literacy tests falls on native-born citizens--the Negro, the Mexican, the Puerto Rican, and the Indian. There is considerable evidence that these laws presently continue to operate as a mechanism of racial restriction rather than as an educational device designed to uplift the American populace. In light of this, the courts should operate with a presumption that these statutes are discriminatory, and impose upon the states the burden of showing their educational or assimilative purpose.[4]

It is important to note that Leibowitz does not question the need to assimilate linguistic minorities. He cautions, for example, that implementation of the Bilingual Education Act should not interfere with the eventual goal of incorporating the non-English-speaking into the normal school system.

This same theme was re-emphasized by Leibowitz in a work entitled "Educational Policy and Political Acceptance: The Imposition of English as the Language of Instruction in American Schools."[5] Leibowitz argues that changes in language policy over time reflect the political and social status of the group affected. According to Leibowitz, the history of U.S. language policy reveals that the imposition of English on certain groups at certain times is significantly related to the attitude of the dominant majority toward these groups. The moral of the story is that unjust treatment of minorities can be traced to the lack of respect held for these people by the majority.

In a more recent paper the disrespect shown toward linguistic minorities in the United States is presented as economically motivated. Greed and the need to control become the most

important variables for Leibowitz in explaining the series of policies related to language:

> The position put forth here is that the reason for the designation of language is solely to control, to limit access to economic and political life and that the effect over time from both the vantage point of minority language use and status of speakers is very great.[6]

Leibowitz's conclusion seems to question the validity of the American Dream--a concept which holds that "America" is a land of opportunity for all who believe in hardwork and democracy. According to David K. Cohen, this concept crystalized as an ideology when it gained popularity around the turn of the century with the advent of compulsory education. Because this belief system maintains that schooling is the best way to overcome social and economic inequality,

> . . . [it] assumes that adult social and economic status is determined on the basis of standards similar to these used to evaluate school performance: intelligence, order, discipline, and respect for authority. The ideology also implies that the desideratum of social reform is not the aggregate redistribution of social and economic status, but the maintenance of merit standards on the basis of which qualified individuals can affect a personal redistribution.[7]

The schools, it seems, were given major responsibility for assisting people with the task of personal redistribution. If we accept the social control argument put forth by Leibowitz, then we must believe that schools also assisted in limiting the access of groups to a full economic and political life.

Data gathered by Cohen suggests that, although some members of linguistic minority groups progressed in school, this progress appears to be inversely related to the degree of ethnic group affiliation. Cohen's study, which examined the occurrence of inter-group marriages among ethnic groups with high school retardation rates, states that:

> . . . assimilation had something to do with school progress. The continued severity of retardation for Italians and Poles is a case in point; it may be explained partly by the fact that they were less likely to assimilate than other ethnic groups. The table [a federal census table], indicates, for example, that there were insufficient cases of mixed marriages in these two groups to compute retardation rates.[8]

Thus, assuming some positive correlation between school progress and economic-political fulfillment, it would appear that some linguistic minorities were not impeded by English-only

language policies or other legislative obstacles. Ability to overcome such obstacles, however, also seems to require a willingness to acculturate, i.e., to change cultural patterns to those of the host society.[9]

More conventional interpretations of the history of education in the U.S. have sung praises to the contributions of this country's schools. Lawrence Cremin, for example, sees the opening of public schools to millions of foreign-born and their offspring as a "transformation" of the schools, which serves as a testament to their effectiveness in accommodating the immigrant.[10] This view of history more recently has been thrown to Blacks, Chicanos and other ethnic minorities in response to their demands for more just treatment. But the evidence already presented indicates that not all immigrants were equally accommodated. Cohen's study suggests that those most willing to acculturate were most likely to reap economic and social benefits.

The German sociologist, Heinz Kloss, argues that there is something about the lure of the American Dream itself which caused the immigrants to freely give up their claim to maintain native language and culture.[11] According to Kloss's study, immigrant groups not only refrained from questioning the economic expansionism of the U.S. but actually sought to avail themselves of it as quickly as possible. In a more recent discussion of language rights, Kloss summarizes his analytical survey of language policies in this and other countries as follows:

> . . . immigrant groups *can lay no claim to promotion-oriented* [i.e., active support; beyond tolerance] *rights.* These rights imply measures for which the bill has to be paid off out of public funds and not by the ethnic group itself nor by any of its associations, nor by any of their individual members. To attain promotion-oriented rights an ethnic group must prove that its desire to keep its language alive is more than a fleeting sentiment which understandably flares up in any host country but perhaps only to fade out after roughly a generation. Only after the group has managed to keep the language and a feeling for the language alive among the grandchildren of the immigrants, only after the language can be held to have taken root, can the state be requested to promote the language.[12] (emphasis added)

Based on his study of ethnic groups over time, Kloss believes group language rights play a small role in societies which attract people who desire to become a functional part of their new home country. A country like the United States presumably will attract few people who aren't primarily concerned with attaining total integration. Kloss draws a distinction between the rights of immigrant groups and indigenous groups, implying that while indigenous groups have a right to

language-promotion policies, immigrant groups forego such rights. He also presents convincing evidence of the inevitable trend towards language shift that characterizes all linguistic minorities in societies where the dominant language is associated with increased economic opportunity.

Despite Kloss's belief that immigrants' principal concern is not cultural maintenance but total integration, other historians have concluded that America's policies with respect to linguistic minorities have impeded the process of total integration. The revisionist historian Colin Greer, for example, has stated that it "was in spite of, and not because of, compulsory education that some immigrant children made their way."[13] In support of this statement, Greer points out that economic stability came *before* success in schools for European immigrant groups. Citing the Jews as an illustration, Greer claims they achieved some degree of economic stability because they utilized previous entrepeneurial experience (e.g., over 66% of Jewish immigrants had experience in industry[14]) and established clearly delineated ethnic boundaries. The impact of schooling on the lives of immigrants is summarized in a lengthy but useful passage by Greer below:

> United States census data for 1910, 1920, and 1930 reveal that assumptions of school success preceding social progress where it occurred are as ill-informed as most popular assumptions about the inevitability of mobility itself. Things seem to have worked in quite the reverse order, with cultural background and economic status being reflected and reinforced in the school, not caused by it. In that sense, the school was a less effective route up the social and economic ladder than we have generally believed.
>
> From very early on, schools seem to have had highly differential effects among the ethnic groups. Immigration Commission research workers found in 1911 that even controlling for exposure to America--length of residence--ethnic differences still predominated, leaving Irishmen and Italians considerably less advanced than Russian Jews. This finding was confirmed between 1911 and 1920 in big cities like New York, smaller cities like St. Paul and Minneapolis in Minnesota, and confirmed yet again by smaller studies of expanding towns such as Hartford, Connecticut. Census data in 1920 and in succeeding decades up to and including 1960 made it clear that even when immigrants became Americans, neither schools nor society offered quite the mobility imagined.[15]

For Greer, the principal question is neither the extent to which immigrants freely gave up cultural ties nor the degree of social control exercised over their socio-economic opportunities. Greer asks the following: Did American policies

aimed at acculturation facilitate the obvious success that some immigrants have experienced? Utilizing the data of people like Michael Katz and David K. Cohen, as well as his own accumulated evidence, Greer's answer is a resounding no!

The past experience of linguistic minorities also reveals that many of those individuals who believe to have benefited from society's opportunities are experiencing a kind of assimilation which falls short of their expectations. In *The Hidden Injuries of Class*, Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb cite the example of Frank Rissarro:

> Frank Rissarro, a third-generation Italian-American, forty-four years old when we talked with him, had worked his way up from being a shoeshine boy at the age of nine to classifying loan applications in a bank. He makes $10,000 a year, owns a suburban home, and every August rents a small cottage in the country. He is a man who at first glance feels satisfied--"I know I did a good job in my life". . . .
>
> He won a job processing loans for people who come in off the street; he helps them fill out the forms, though he is still too low-level to have the power to approve or disapprove the loans themselves.
>
> A success story: from chaos in the Depression, from twenty years of hacking away at sides of beef, Rissarro now wears a suit to work and has a stable home in respectable surroundings. Yes, it is a success story--except that *he* does not read it that way.
>
> In fact, toward educated white-collar work itself, beyond all its symbolic connotations of success, Frank Rissarro harbors an innate disrespect: "These jobs aren't real work where you make something--it's just pushing papers."
>
> Then why has he striven so hard to be upwardly mobile? One ready answer is that he wanted the house, the suit, the cottage in the country. And Rissarro himself gives that answer at first. After a few hours of talk, however, he conveys a more complicated and more difficult set of feelings.
>
> He feels compelled to justify his own position, and in his life he has felt compelled to put himself up on their (higher class people) level in order to earn respect. All of this, in turn--when he thinks just of himself and *is not comparing himself* to his image of people in a higher class--all of this is set against a revulsion against the work of educated people in the bank, and a feeling that manual labor has more dignity.
>
> What does he make of this contradiction in his life? That he is an imposter--but more, that the sheer fact that he is troubled must prove he really is inadequate. After all, he has played by the rules, he has gained the outward

> signs of material respectability; if, then, he still feels defenseless, something must be wrong with *him*: his unhappiness seems to him a sign that he simply cannot become the kind of person other people can respect.
>
> This tangle of feelings appeared again and again as we talked to people who started life as poor, ethnically isolated laboring families, and have been successful in making the sort of material gains that are supposed to "melt" people into the American middle class.[16]

It is likely that interviews from other class and ethnic groups would reveal equally conflicted feelings of ambivalency.[17] This story does indicate that the material acquisitions identified with assimilation is not satisfying enough for the Rissarros of the country.

Summarizing his position on the dialectical relationship between the experience of ethnic minorities and the American Dream, the noted sociologist, Joshua Fishman, observes:

> That primordial ethnicity could not fully maintain itself under the impact of this (American) dream, and that ethnicity cannot fully and quickly disappear in a new world animated by this Dream alone, are as much due to the nature of ethnicity as to the Dream itself.[18]

Here Fishman underscores the complex interrelationship between the nature of ethnicity and the American Dream. If people's desire to partake of the American Dream has negatively affected the maintenance of ethnic heritages, then the continued existence of ethnic enclaves suggests that there is something about ethnicity (e.g., self-respect or a sense of belonging) that the Dream alone cannot, or at least has not, provided.

Fishman also helps to illuminate the one consistent message generated by the preceding interpretations of policies related to linguistic minorities: that while each furthers our understanding, no one interpretation seems to adequately explain immigrant group experiences. Based on these different approaches to the past experiences of linguistic minorities--especially European immigrants--what can be expected from a review of language policies? What, to return to the main concern, can be expected from a piece of legislation like Title VII, the Bilingual Education Act?

In a landmark study on the assimilation of groups in America, Milton Gordon maintains that attempts to understand the assimilative process which governs ethnic, racial and religious minorities have failed to take into account the necessary distinction between acculturation and assimilation.[19] Analyzing the theories of assimilation, Gordon claims that theorists have confused group demands for assimilation with acculturation.

> We may state the emergent generalization, then, as follows: *Once structural assimilation has occurred, either simultaneously with or subsequent to acculturation, all of the other types of assimilation will naturally follow.* It need hardly be pointed out that while acculturation, as we have emphasized above, does not necessarily lead to structural assimilation, structural assimilation inevitably produces acculturation. Structural assimilation, then, rather than acculturation, is seen to be the keystone of the arch of assimilation. The price of such assimilation, however, is the disappearance of the ethnic group as a separate entity and the evaporation of its distinctive values.[20] (emphasis in the original)

In this light, assimilation may be seen as the just struggle of groups--some immigrant and some native--to achieve a decent economic, psychological and social existence. Acculturation, on the other hand, may be viewed as that concept which describes the imposition of one language and value set as a requirement for assimilation. The challenge for marginal groups, according to Gordon, has always been to achieve assimilation without forced acculturation. Employing Gordon's observation and the theoretical interpretations surveyed above, it can be hypothesized with some justification that a historical examination of policies related to linguistic minorities will lead to the following conclusion:

> While linguistic minorities have been manipulated by various policies which sought to use English (acculturation) as a means of sanctioning the unequal distribution of economic and social benefits (assimilation), the same groups responded in such a way as to minimize forced acculturation while striving for assimilation.

Should this conclusion be substantiated, it may be hypothesized further that (a) the Bilingual Education Act as a *policy*, fits the pattern of manipulation suggested above, but that (b) bilingual education as a *program* or form of *policy implementation*, may represent a way in which linguistic minorities can increase assimilation to a degree while warding off the impact of acculturation.

In the form of null hypotheses, these conclusions may be stated as follows:

> *Hypothesis #1:* An examination of language policies in the U.S. will not reveal attempts on the part of policy makers to use English (acculturation) as a sanction for controlling the distribution of economic and social benefits (assimilation).
>
> *Hypothesis #2:* Linguistic minority groups did not respond to acculturationist language policies designed

to impose a different language and accompanying set of values with attempts to mitigate their impact.

Hypothesis #3: Bilingual education is neither a piece of policy characterized by an acculturationist bias nor a program or form of policy implementation which imposes acculturation on its target groups.

The themes suggested in Hypotheses #1 and #2 will be discussed in the following section--History of Language Policy. In a discussion of the ideas provoked by Hypothesis #3, the section entitled "Bilingual Education Policy and Programs," will treat the Bilingual Education Act and its subsequent programs. We will conclude with a re-evaluation of the hypotheses and some remarks on the dialectical relationship between stated policy and policy implementation.

II. HISTORY OF LANGUAGE POLICY

U.S. Language Policies: ? to 1850

In his account of the conquest of New Spain, Díaz states that the encouragement of native language maintenance played a strategic role in supporting the dominant position of the Aztecs.[21] The Aztecs encouraged native language maintenance among those tribes forced to become members of the Aztec empire. To implement this policy, the Aztecs selected individuals to act as interpreters between them and the various tribes. This is not offered as support of either the type or effects of the social organization developed by the Aztecs. El Inca Garcilaso de la Vega has described quite poignantly the resentment displayed by other tribes toward Aztec domination.[22] The purpose here is to point out the fact that language policies (i.e., conscious decisions or non-decisions) existed in the Américas much before the impact of the European was felt.

There is little indication that either ethnic culture or language received serious attention by the British settlers during the 17th and 18th centuries. The simple guiding light was freedom of religious expression. Later, in the 1700's, libertarian philosophy gained wide acceptance in the British colonies. Cries of religious freedom were replaced with demands for freedom in general, and the groundwork was laid for Revolution against the British. The importance of ethnic culture and language continued to go unnoticed. It is doubtless, however, that "Anglo-conformity" was a prevalent ideology during colonial times; bigotry had begun long before American colonization. Milton Gordon writes, for example, that "suspicion of those who were 'foreigners' either through religion or national background, or both, was not uncommon. Concern was especially manifested in Pennsylvania, which had received the greatest quantity and variety of non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants, and, on the eve of the Revolution was about one-third German

in population."[23] Still, the writings of people like Benjamin Franklin, George Washington and Thomas Jefferson suggest the major concern was that peasant immigrants familiar only with monarchies and feudal systems would pollute the democratic environment which had come to be associated with "America."[24]

The U.S. Constitution (formulated in 1789), furthermore, makes no mention of a national language. The assumption implicit in the choice of English as the language of the Constitution should not, of course, be underestimated. The fact remains that most other countries--as evidenced by their constitutions--have made the national language an explicit policy.[25] For the British colonizers, language choice was an issue of relatively little concern.

Official recognition of language choice in the U.S. commenced around 1800. The governmental position at that time was a clear tolerance for native language maintenance. In ways similar to the procedure adopted by the Aztec empire, the federal government permitted the use of English, French and Spanish in the local courts by 1804. Two years later, federal laws were printed in French for the first time. A later provision more openly recognized the French-speaking minority and required that all laws applicable to the Louisiana Territory be printed in both French and English.

The German immigrants to the U.S. constituted another large linguistic minority. During the first half of the 19th century, more Germans immigrated to the U.S. than any other group. Because of their relative strength--Germans virtually controlled the midwest during the 1830's--German-speaking residents fought to have their language positively recognized by the government.[26] At the state level, the influence of German-speaking Americans was even greater. By 1844, the state of Ohio had two cities, Cincinnati and Dayton, which mandated the provision of bilingual schooling for students who sought to learn the German language. The effects of this breakthrough were so dramatic that German gained a legal foothold in other states as well. Heinz Kloss summarizes this as follows:

> More important and more enduring were those efforts which aimed not merely at having German taught locally, but simultaneously at creating a legal framework for preventing state authorities from interfering with such teaching. In 1887, a Colorado law permitted the bilingual public school; in 1872, an Oregon law even permitted the monolingual German public school. While only the German language was admitted in a few instances, in most cases the legal provisions were all-inclusive; but nearly always the German-Americans were the ones who brought such laws into being and who drew the chief benefit from them.[27]

After 1850, especially, these laws flourished. Some of the most pertinent laws are outlined in Table 1.

Table 1

States Having Laws Allowing Non-English Mediums of Instruction in Public Schools, 1850-1910

Year	State	Referring to Which Foreign Tongue	To Be Taught at Whose Direction?
1854	Wisconsin	all	School board
1857	Illinois	all	--
1861	Iowa	German or other languages	Majority of school district's voters
1867	Kansas	German	"Freeholders representing 50 pupils"
1867	Minnesota	all	School board
1869	Indiana	German	Parents of 25 pupils
1872	Illinois	all	School board or voters of district
1877	Minnesota	all	School board
	(grade schools only)	all	(if unanimous)
1913	Nebraska	all	Parents of 50 pupils
	(grade schools only)		

Source: Joshua A. Fishman, *Language Loyalty in the U.S.* (The Hague: Mouton, 1966), p. 235.

For the people involved in this thrust to preserve native language, German became more than a way to facilitate instruction in the primary schools, it became the very symbol of ethnic unity. According to Nathan Glazer, many German-speaking immigrants in the early 1800's began to give serious thought to the possibility of a German-speaking state. Some had even set their sights on a new German nation.[28]

The Germans were not the only immigrants to try to link ethnic identity with a land base. In 1818, the Irish made a formal request for a land grant to the U.S. Congress. The Congress denied the request on the grounds that official assignment of national groups to a particular land area could lead to similar requests from other groups. The formation of such ethnic enclaves, they reasoned, would fragment the nation. The federal government's position on the rights to land when dealing with the Native American nations is an exception to this stance. But a review of the implementation of policies recognizing Indian rights reveals a history of non-compliance on the part of the U.S.[29] Nonetheless, Marcus Hansen correctly

observes that "probably no decision in the history of American immigration policy possesses more profound significance" than the denial of a land grant to the Irish.[30] Despite the rapidly changing nature of 19th century America, it is likely that some members of Congress had stumbled upon the realization that *whereas a linguistic minority per se posed no particular threat, a linguistic minority with an economic base (e.g., land) could pose a serious threat to both the national unity and the position of controlling political and economic interests--the clear majority of which spoke English.*

The granting of land to the Irish would have created an irrefutable precedent for later concessions to the more powerful German-speaking group. It must also be remembered that in 1848, the U.S. signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement (Guadalupe Hidalgo) with the Republic of México. Since the treaty accorded the Spanish-speaking residents of the acquired territory the "rights and privileges of citizenship," the U.S. was forming one of the most linguistically diverse nations in the western hemisphere.[31] The 1818 land grant decision suggests the direction this nation would later choose to resolve the problems highlighted by the linguistic diversity.

While the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo does not expressly state that the Spanish language would be encouraged and respected in the area now considered the southwestern United States, the wording of the Treaty suggested as much. The fact that the territory's residents, almost exclusively monolingual in either Spanish or a native tongue, were granted automatic citizenship is perhaps suggestion enough. The initial organic act governing the territory of New México, however, was passed in 1850, without recognizing that over one-half the population was of Spanish-speaking descent. Three years later, Congress did authorize the New México Assembly to employ a translator, interpreter and two clerks for each house in order to accommodate the Spanish-speaking populace of the territory.

California's early years, just before and after statehood, illustrate the growth of this Spanish-speaking movement. Just prior to the 1849 state constitution, Spanish/English bilingual classes surfaced throughout the state. These were mostly developed in connection with religious instruction. One Protestant minister's journal describes the California bilingual class as one in which the teacher possessed little Spanish and the children little English.[32] By statehood, 18% of all education was private and Catholic; students were mainly of Spanish-speaking descent and taught in that language.[33] Perhaps in recognition of this kind of education, the 1849 California Constitution made no provision for the language of instruction. Indeed, the constitutional convention saw fit to translate all resolutions and articles into Spanish and published the final document, which provided that all laws be printed in Spanish and English, in both languages.

U.S. Language Policy: 1850-1900

The diversity of language usage in California was not to be tolerated long. In the decade following ratification of the California Constitution, the state legislature passed bills suspending publication of the state laws in Spanish, requiring court proceedings to be in English, and imposing a new tax of $5.00/month for foreign (e.g., Chicano and Chinese) miners and a head tax of $50.00 to discourage the immigration of people declared ineligible for citizenship.[34] California was to play a large role in the formation of national attitudes towards linguistic minorities.

After 1850, the policy orientation in California shifted dramatically. This change was triggered by the influx of Chinese immigrants. Chinese immigration to California began in 1847. By 1870, some 50,000 Chinese had arrived.[35] Another ingredient was added to the already boiling linguistic soup in California. The first official display of anti-Chinese prejudice involved a special message to the legislature from Governor Bigler in which he slandered the Chinese and called upon the elected body to put a stop to Chinese immigration. Subsequent to this, the tension related to Chinese laborers mounted quickly.

On the one hand, laws like the 1855 pig-tail ordinance, which required the removal of queues from Chinese men convicted of breaking the law, shows the resentment held by other California settlers for the group of non-Christian laborers from the East. On the other, railroad giants like Mark Hopkins were organizing slave-like recruitment efforts to gather thousands of Chinese for the railroad. To add to this explosive situation, many of the miners and workers in related fields also began to resent the threat that the industrious Chinese posed to their economic interests. By 1867, the anti-coolie clubs had grown strong. Four years later, Governor Newton Booth was elected to office on an anti-Chinese platform.

The Chinese immigration controversy had a direct impact on California's language policies. Between 1850 and 1900, the legislature prohibited religious schools--the only examples of bilingual education--from receiving state funds (1854), enacted a law providing that all public schools be taught in English (1870), and amended the California Constitution of 1879, to restrict the vote to those who could read and write English and to require official proceedings in all branches of government be conducted and published in English only (1894).

The welfare of linguistic minorities on the East Coast was also being threatened. The threat came from a vicious, anti-Catholic movement which materialized in the form of a group called the Know Nothing Party. The Know Nothings apparently knew something, for they convinced many others of their position. Anti-Catholic feelings spread rapidly and resulted in violent attacks against the Irish and German Catholics.

Because of these feelings, language laws became less tolerant during the second half of the 19th century. When the formation of the none-too-subtle American Protective Association culminated in open attacks on minority language and religion, the Germans responded by developing their own parochial schools.

In direct retaliation to the creation of Catholic and Lutheran schools, some new states (e.g., Nebraska, Colorado, Washington and Wyoming) adopted constitutions which prohibited sectarian instruction. These constitutions were adopted between the years 1875 and 1889. In 1889, two other states passed laws requiring that parochial and public schools teach elementary subjects in English. Called the Bennett Law in Wisconsin and the Edwards Law in Illinois, these two pieces of legislation represented the first time a government had required the English language in the schools.[36] Despite the fact that the Catholics, German Lutherans and other religions were successful in having the Bennett and Edward Laws repealed in 1893, the English-only movement was well on its way to becoming a national phenomenon.

The experience of the European (namely, German and Irish) and Chinese immigrants and the conquered Native Americans and Spanish-speaking people suggests the importance of economic considerations in the formulation of U.S. language policy. The tolerance for linguistic minorities on the East Coast and in the middle west appears to have decreased sharply when it became apparent that the occupation of valuable land (i.e., in terms of agriculture and natural resources) by self-contained minority groups posed a threat to the economy. Before that realization was made, this country was content to allow the Germans, for example, control of the undeveloped middle west. At one point in the 1800's, tolerance was so great that the German-speaking Amanites were unimpeded in their efforts to found the seven villages of the Christian Communist settlement in Iowa. Similarly, the California historian, Rolle, notes that the Chinese were generally more respected before evidence of their growing economic success was realized.[37] The Native American treaties are particularly illustrative of this policy reversal. A treaty made in 1828 with the Cherokee Nation, for example, guaranteed rights to native language maintenance. It was later subverted by legislation which permitted the establishment of Indian boarding schools which offered instruction in English only. Government boarding schools represented a critical attempt to acculturate the indigenous population and coincided with efforts on the part of the federal government to acquire more land.[38]

U.S. Language Policy: 1900-1940

The 1898 acquisition of Hawaii was followed by a heavy two-year influx of Japanese and Chinese immigrants arousing renewed anti-Oriental feelings.[39] By 1900, Japanese immigration

in the U.S. reached 12,626; ten years later that number increased by almost five times as much. The initial organic act for Hawaii was also passed in 1900. Directing that all legislative procedures be conducted in English, the act initially permitted laws to be published in both English and Hawaiian. Shortly thereafter, this was changed to an English only policy.

The politics of language on the mainland created a situation no less volatile. Anti-Japanese feelings in San Francisco took the form of the Asian Exclusion League (AEL) which began in 1905. AEL's campaign the following year was so effective that the San Francisco Board of Education recommended the establishment of special schools for Chinese and Japanese students separate from those of Caucasians. The order to segregate Asian students was postponed because of the devastating effects of the earthquake. When it was issued it was rescinded by President Theodore Roosevelt because of diplomatic protests from Japan. After much pressure from Japan, the Board of Education ceased efforts to openly separate Orientals in public schools.

Language policies in New México during the early 1900's contrasted sharply with those of California. New México's Constitution of 1911, required the ballots for its ratification to be printed in both Spanish and English, the laws of its legislature to be printed in both languages, and teachers to be trained in Spanish to teach Spanish-speaking pupils.

California refused to follow suit. In 1913, the California legislature passed the Alien Land Act or the Webb Act. This piece of legislation sought to prevent aliens ineligible for citizenship from holding land. Seven other states, including New México, initiated similar laws. Less than ten years later, another bill (1920 Anti-Alien Initiative Measure) was passed in California prohibiting the ownership of land by the Japanese or the leasing of farm land to them. At the time California's legislature passed the 1920 Anti-Alien Measure, it must be said, the Japanese virtually controlled agriculture in the San Joaquín Valley. The Japanese farmers had turned the semi-arid valley into an agricultural gold mine with their hard work and effective style of irrigation. The eventual result of the 1920 Anti-Alien Initiative Measure was the displacement of the Japanese from the San Joaquín Valley.

Just prior to the Anti-Alien Measure, it appeared that language policy might follow the course initiated when the Phillipines (1916) allowed a literacy requirement for voting to be met by a knowledge of Spanish, English or a native language. In 1919, the federal government required all teaching in public or private schools to be in English and allowed Hawaiian to be taught in addition to English only in the high schools. At the same time, the governor of Hawaii, an executive branch appointee, initiated legislation, passed in 1920, to severely limit the operation of private foreign-language schools which were used as cultural supplements to public schools. There was an

unexpected outcry against the act. In 1920, a survey of education in Hawaii subjected private foreign-language schools to careful scrutiny and recommended their abolition unless re-established in the future by the Territorial Department of Education upon evidence of sufficient demand. Three years later the Hawaiian legislature, by law, subjected foreign-language schools and teachers to licensing and regulation with the declared purpose of fostering Americanization. English literacy and American history were the keys to implementing this piece of controversial legislation.

As a result of World War I, pro-American sentiments took some incredible forms. In retrospect, it is not surprising that the loyalty shown towards America should have expressed itself in wide-spread anti-German feeling. Economic motives already had fed the fires of bigotry well. For the many German-speaking citizens, the local legislation which ensued reached a point of tragic absurdity. The Findlay, Ohio, town council, for example, levied a fine of $25 for the use of German on the streets. The movement to Americanize all newcomers to this country made significant gains during the 20's.

By 1920, all the states had passed compulsory education laws. The role of the schools in the process of minority group acculturation became clear. With the aid of the schools, children of immigrants would learn to appreciate American values, develop good manners and work habits, and speak the English language. The English language was to be the symbol of individual and group adjustment to America--and many immigrants were not dissuaded by this symbol. The idea of becoming a part of a new dream presented them with the hopeful possibility of a better future. The symbol became associated with America's twin promises of luxury and leisure for all. As people lined up for their chance to dive into the melting pot, however, they could not have realized that for many of them the symbol would also be associated with complete denial of tradition, religion and even parents--a denial based on shame. For those that remained unaffected by the lure of the American Dream, laws and ordinances were instituted to guarantee that all would *choose* to become a part of America. Language evolved as a reliable indicator of the extent to which one had become a part of the country. Thirty-four states required English as the language of instruction in the schools by 1923.

The year 1923 also marked the first time our legal system was called upon to decide the fate of linguistic minorities. In *Myer v. Nebraska*, the Supreme Court ruled "that prohibition or undue inhibition of the use or teaching of a foreign language is an unconstitutional violation of due process."[40] The decision also stated, however, that the state statutory requirement of English in public and private schools was permitted by the Constitution. The court's involvement in the state of Nebraska encouraged a similar approach to disputes over language in the Pacific.

In the 1926 case of *Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad*, the Supreme Court interpreted a Phillipine statute, known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Act, as a complete prohibition on books in languages other than Spanish, English or a local dialect and held the law unconstitutional. Despite the court's decision to limit the ruling to the Phillipine Islands and the unique role of Chinese persons in the business world there, the case suggested that the government had some responsibility to serve its diverse populace in the language of individual choice whenever reasonably possible.

This position was more strongly asserted by the Supreme Court the following year when it declared the 1923 territorial legislation, which restricted foreign language teaching in Hawaii, unconstitutional. In *Farrington v. Tokushige* the court ruled that "the Japanese parent has the right to direct the education of his own child without unreasonable restrictions."[41] Official severance between private foreign language schools and public authorities was thus achieved.

For all the interpretational ammunition the Supreme Court gave to those who may have questioned the validity of the melting pot concept, the resentment against non-white groups spread wildly during the 1920's.[42] In the case of those non-white groups considered to be unacculturatable, this resentment culminated in active exclusion. Two attempts (e.g., Box Bill 1925 and Harris Bill 1926) were made to limit the immigration of Mexicans in Texas. Both attempts were defeated by railroad and agricultural interests. Since the railroad and agricultural interests were mainly concerned with exploiting the relatively cheap labor of the Mexicans, it might be argued that these two pieces of legislation were intended to protect the rights of the Mexican worker. The literature provides little to indicate that such was the case, however. Legislation in other states suggests that the Box and Harris bills were part of a larger wave of legislation prompted by racial discrimination. During this same period, for example, California's exclusionary stance took the form of repatriation for persons of Mexican ancestry and an amendment to the California school code which permitted the segregation of "Indian children or children of Chinese, Japanese or Mongolian descent."[43]

With the economic depression as a backdrop, language policy of the 30's was mostly pre-occupied with Puerto Rico. Indeed, the one group experience which best summarizes U.S. language policy in the first fifty years of this century is that of Puerto Ricans.

When the United States granted citizenship to Puerto Ricans--even monolingual Spanish speakers--in the unprecedented Jones Act of 1917, this country created a most unusual situation. As citizens, Puerto Ricans could migrate to the mainland without having to face exclusionary immigration laws. The United States' position with regard to this phenomenon is exemplified by its attempts to impose the English language on residents of the island of Puerto Rico.

As early as 1903, the United States initiated its plan to make English the official language in Puerto Rico. The Faulkner Policy in 1905, established English as the language of instruction at all grade levels. Despite fierce protests on the part of nationalists seeking autonomy or complete separation of Puerto Rico from the United States, the Faulkner Policy dominated island instruction for the next decade. As the notion of citizenship for Puerto Ricans gained acceptance, the English-only policy was curtailed somewhat. It is likely that the members of Congress recognized the need to instill "American" values among the Puerto Ricans as quickly as possible. Fearing that the English-only approach might slow down the process of acculturation--a dangerous possibility in the wake of granting mass citizenship--the Commissioner of Education, Miller, adopted a policy which employed Spanish as the language of instruction for the four lower grades of elementary school, Spanish and English in the fifth grade, and English only from the sixth grade through high school. This policy prevailed in Puerto Rico for the next twenty years.

During that twenty-year period, a research team at Teacher's College of Columbia conducted a survey to determine whether English was perceived as imposed or willingly adopted by Puerto Ricans.[44] The research group found that the English language was not perceived as imposed but actively sought by Puerto Ricans because of its social and economic advantages. This finding notwithstanding, José Padín, the first Puerto Rican Commissioner of Education, instituted a policy of Spanish only for the first eight grades of school. Padín's policy, which took effect in 1934, was based on educational not political grounds. For Padín, teaching English still had a legitimate place in Puerto Rico but not at the expense of the cognitive development of Puerto Rican children. The previous Miller policy had failed to contribute to either intellectual advancement or the acquisition of English. Language again became a volatile political issue in Puerto Rico, for the federal government interpreted Padín's efforts as anti-American and pressed for the reaffirmation of English. The experimental attempt to use the native language to teach Americanism had apparently failed.

By 1937, key senators as well as President Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke openly on the need for all Americans to learn English in order to adopt American ideals and principles. This led to the resignation of Padín and the appointment of Gallardo, who re-introduced English in the lower grades with a plan which called for gradual, increased use of English at each higher grade level. Yet, after only five years (1942), Gallardo abandoned his 1937 plan and returned to a policy of Spanish as the sole medium of instruction for elementary grades, with English taught as subject matter. The Puerto Rican historian, Osuna, documents that Gallardo made this shift in policy because of his belief that bilingualism without diglossic norms

was impossible.[45] If Gallardo's move wasn't politically motivated, it had become clear that the term *bilingualism* was used as a euphemism for the eventual goal of English only in Puerto Rico.

In 1946, the Puerto Rican legislature passed a bill making Spanish the language of instruction and English a compulsory subject. The bill was vetoed by the governor of Puerto Rico (still a presidential appointee) and President Truman. The battle over language choice in Puerto Rico reached a climax when Luis Muñoz Marín, the first elected governor of Puerto Rico, appointed Commissioner Villaronga. Villaronga seized upon the language issue with little hesitation. The Spanish language became the sole language of instruction through grade 12 in 1949.

U.S. Language Policy: 1940-1967

During the period between 1940 and 1967, policies related to language choice on the mainland moved in several directions. Congress passed a Nationality Act (1940) which required spoken English for naturalization, but the act was later amended (1950) to exempt those who were over fifty years of age and residents in the U.S. for twenty years. World War II also greatly influenced the situation of German and Japanese-speaking citizens. After Pearl Harbor, for example, the Japanese closed all the language and culture schools on the West Coast. The forced encampment of the Japanese during the second World War was probably the most crucial blow. Much land and related assets were lost by the Japanese farmer during this short but agonizing time. Before the war, it must be remembered, the Japanese had firmly established themselves in central California's agricultural industry.

In the 1950's, the Phillipine Islands adopted English as the language of instruction (1958), and Puerto Rico unsuccessfully tried to amend federal law to allow the use of Spanish in both the pleadings and proceedings of the U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico (1959). The issue of language choice surfaced again in the early 1960's, when some interest was gathered in Puerto Rico to gain state status for the island. But all of these are overshadowed by the 1967 passage of ESEA's Title VII, the Bilingual Education Act.[46] This piece of legislation and the subsequent programs can now be discussed in the light of its historical precedents.

Re-Evaluation of Hypotheses

After reviewing the history of policies related to language and the current experience with Title VII, the first two hypotheses formulated above can now be re-evaluated.

Hypothesis #1: An examination of language policies in the U.S. will not reveal attempts on the part of policy

makers to use English as a sanction for controlling the distribution of economic and social benefits.

Little attention was given to the spread of linguistic and cultural diversity in America until the early nineteenth century. When Congress turned down a request by an Irish group for a land grant to be used as a settlement for Irish immigrants in 1818, however, attention on the issue of diversity increased rapidly. The Congress, and others, seemed to recognize the precedent that would be set in granting land to the Irish. Different linguistic minority groups--each with a land base--could pose a threat to the dominant position of those controlling political and economic interests, the clear majority of which spoke English. The decisions which characterized the remainder of the 19th century reinforced this theme.

The Irish were not the only people affected by such decisions. Chinese immigrants, for example, were considered overly industrious and were believed to be threats to whites seeking employment with the railroad, working gold mines or establishing businesses. Anti-Chinese sentiment resulted in the California legislature declaring religious schools ineligible for state funding; religious schools were the only examples of bilingual education in California during the 19th century. Religious prejudice fed by the anti-Catholic Know-Nothing Movement served as the basis for English-only laws in other parts of the country as well. Laws like the Bennett and Edwards Laws requiring English in midwestern schools are good examples. It seems more than a bit coincidental, however, that the Catholics most affected by these laws were German and Irish immigrants who had gained an economic foothold in the agricultural industry. Racial prejudice affected language, and language in turn affected the distribution of goods.

The 20th century further developed this trend. In response to Japanese immigration, California established the Anti-Alien Initiative Measure in 1920. The law prohibited the owning and leasing of land by the Japanese. Before this law, the Japanese virtually controlled California's San Joaquín Valley, an area of land they developed into one of the most fertile regions in the state.

The federal government, meanwhile, worked diligently at imposing English in Hawaii, the Phillipines and Puerto Rico so that the economic development of these U.S. territories might be facilitated. Economic concerns also caused anti-Mexican feelings to result in the repatriation of Mexicans--many of whom were U.S. citizens. Mexican labor, it must be remembered, formed the backbone of the fruit and produce industry in the Southwest, especially California.

Both World Wars, of course, further contributed to anti-German and anti-Japanese sentiments. These groups were hurt by policies related to these sentiments. The Japanese, due to their forced encampment during World War II, were especially

hurt. Much land and assets were lost by the Japanese as a result of this. As suggested in the following discussion, the people affected by these policies did strike back. None were able to completely avoid the negative effects that these policies generated.

The hypothesis that an examination of language policies in the U.S. will not reveal attempts on the part of policy makers to use English as a sanction for controlling the distribution of economic and social benefits has not been substantiated. Based on the experience of both immigrant and native groups, the hypothesis must be rejected.

> *Hypothesis #2:* Linguistic minority groups did not respond to acculturationist language policies designed to impose a different language and accompanying set of values with attempts to mitigate their impact.

The example of Puerto Rico clearly disproves hypothesis #2. Immediately after the acquisition of Puerto Rico, the direction of language policy surfaced: the island would be bilingual at first (i.e., English was given official status equal to that of Spanish) and then move to an English-only policy as soon as possible. In 1905, the Faulkner policy established English as the language of instruction in the schools. The rationale was that English would lead to social and economic integration for the Spanish-speaking Puerto Ricans--assimilation, in effect. Perhaps because Puerto Rico's potential as a site for economic development and strategic defense had already been recognized, mass citizenship was granted a decade later. The English-only policy was softened: this change in policy, dubbed the Miller policy, was in effect for twenty years. Why this change in policy occurred is a subject of great speculation. Some regarded it as a symbol of growing U.S. tolerance for the culturally and linguistically different. Others saw it as a response to the need to inculcate American values into this mass of new citizens without waiting for extensive proficiency in English. Regardless of the motive, the Miller policy represented the first break in attempts to impose English on Puerto Rico since U.S. occupation at the turn of the century. Native Puerto Ricans eventually took full advantage of this hiatus.

In 1935, Padín, the first Puerto Rican Commissioner of Education, re-introduced Spanish at the elementary level to promote cognitive development. Padín claimed to have made his decision because the children were not advancing scholastically in English even with the softened language policy. The U.S. clamped down on Puerto Rico and successfully pressured for Padín's resignation and the reinstatement of English in 1937. Amidst angry protests--the Puerto Rico Libre movement had grown considerably--this policy was short-lived. The Spanish language was finally declared as the sole medium of instruction in 1949,

by a Puerto Rican Commissioner appointed by the first elected governor of the Island.

The struggle to choose a form of self-expression in Puerto Rico is not over. U.S. tolerance of this Spanish language medium action created the illusion that a pluralistic attitude was maintained towards Puerto Rico. As late as 1968, however, when the issue of statehood resurfaced as a controversy, a government appointed study commission made it clear that raising the English language to official status would be a requirement for statehood.[47]

Other examples of linguistic minority responses to acculturationist language policies include: German and Irish Catholics and German Lutherans teaming to have the Bennett and Edwards laws repealed in 1893; immigrants to the midwest, Chinese in the Phillipines and the Japanese in Hawaii all winning Supreme Court cases which found the prohibition of foreign language usage in official matters unconstitutional; and more recent Supreme Court cases in which Chicanos, Chinese and Puerto Ricans successfully fought to have schools recognize their responsibility to the linguistically different. That linguistic minority groups did not respond to language policies designed to impose a differing language and accompanying set of values with attempts to mitigate their impact is a hypothesis with no foundation in the U.S. experience.

III. BILINGUAL EDUCATION POLICY AND PROGRAMS

The Bilingual Education Act: Current Language Policies

The contemporary bilingual education movement began in a meeting of the National Educators Association (NEA) on October 31, 1966.[48] A group of educators who had become discontented with the treatment of linguistic minorities organized themselves around the goal of forcing NEA to take an official stand in favor of special programs for students with non-English mother tongues (N-EMT). This move was mainly in response to the rapidly growing number of English-as-a-second-language (ESL) programs. In California, for example, ESL was first attempted in 1963.[49] Finding its first home in California's Imperial and San Diego counties, ESL was intended as a linguistic bridge to English for the sons and daughters of Mexican migrant workers. The Bracero Program--an agreement between the U.S. and México to provide Mexican laborers with jobs in California's agricultural industry--was then in full swing. Two years after ESL was established in California, it was extended to the whole state and was aimed at all foreign-born children. Bilingual education was intended as a way to change national attitudes toward N-EMT's and to re-direct the orientation of traditional language policy, which was "the eventual elimination by education and decree of all but one language . . . to serve both official and general purposes."[50]

In terms of national politics, Title VII did have some precedents. Only some ten years earlier, the 1958 National Defense Education Act had emphasized foreign language learning in Titles VI and XI. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 suspended literacy tests as a condition for voting in certain cases.[51] But NDEA was clearly interested in future scientists and diplomats who would see to it that the U.S. did not lag behind in the race for improved defense technology. It was Russian not Navaho, for example, that received the attention of NDEA's architects. The Voting Rights Act, which later (1970) suspended the literacy test altogether, was a response to litigation challenging the constitutionality of English literacy requirements.[52]

Bilingual Education and the Legislative Struggle

A bilingual education bill was drawn up and presented on the floor of the Senate in January of 1967--only three months after the NEA meeting. Senate Bill 428, the Bilingual Education Act, did not go unquestioned, however. Indeed, the Senate membership was so divided that it voted to conduct hearings in order to determine the need for bilingual education. The state of California accepted a piece of bilingual legislation as early as May of 1967. The bill authorized that the California Education Code be amended to allow bilingual instruction "when such instruction is educationally advantageous to the pupils--if it does not interfere with the systemic, sequential and regular instruction of all pupils in the English language."[53] (Prior to this, only English had been permitted as the language of instruction in the schools.) Despite such signs as the California bilingual education provision, the U.S. Office of Education testified against S.B. 428, maintaining that bilingual education could be handled through the compensatory education provisions of ESEA. This undoubtedly contributed to the compromise which involved re-writing the bilingual education act as one of the titles of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). As Title VII of ESEA, bilingual education became a federal law in January 1968.

Title VII was a far cry from the kind of legislation either envisioned by the original supporters of bilingual education or needed by the country--based on what we know about the role of language. During the hearings, much of what we know about the role of language was stated in clear terms. It was pointed out, for example, that if the school "rejects the mother tongue of an entire group of children, it can be expected to affect seriously and adversely those children's concept of their parents, their homes, and of themselves."[54] Because it was received as an amendment of ESEA, however, the Bilingual Education Act adopted a bureaucracy and a set of guidelines which had already proved to be inadequate for compensatory education

programs. Its potential usefulness to bilingual instruction was the subject of justifiable suspicion.

Even as a law, Title VII initially lacked strong support. The *Washington Observer* reported that ambivalency of Congress toward bilingual education led to a 96-95 vote to uphold the recommendation of the House Appropriations Committee that no money be appropriated for Title VII. Intense White House pressure, the article claimed, was required before Congress voted late in 1968, to support Title VII with an appropriation. Yet, this author's conversation with one participant in the struggle over Title VII's passage reveals a very different interpretation of events. According to this participant, it was the President and not Congress who failed to give Title VII full support. Apparently influenced by his home state--Texas did not allow bilingual education until 1969 and then only at the option of local districts--and despite the fact that Senator Yarborough (D-Tex) first introduced SB 428, President Johnson signed the bill reluctantly. This second interpretation maintains that Johnson's hesitation caused the bill to be submitted late in 1968.[55]

The final appropriation amounted to half the original $15 million authorized for the first year. In 1969, 69 programs were funded for a five-year period. By 1972, 217 projects were funded under Title VII, which focused mainly on Spanish but also recognized at least 16 other languages (e.g., Chinese, Navaho, Portuguese and Russian).

In 1967, Title VII was considered a positive recognition of language differences on the part of the U.S. government. As the events leading up to Title VII suggest, the bill had attracted the support of many who were sincerely committed to a pluralistic philosophy.[56] Bilingual education appeared to many as a constructive response to the violent agitation which plagued urban areas in the 1960's. At the implementation level, however, bilingual education, as this society has defined it to date, not only fits the pattern of previous language policy but represents a climax to the trend.

The remainder of this section will analyze the implementation of bilingual education and summarize the results in terms of the tensions related to pluralism versus acculturation and assimilation versus group segregation.

The nature of the promise embodied by bilingual education first took shape when the scuffle for money ensued. It is revealing to note that almost two years elapsed between the passage of the bill (1967) and the actual allocation of funds (1969). By the time monies were allocated to programs, a sum significantly less than the original authorization of $45 million over a three-year period was granted to local bilingual programs. Fishman noted the following:

> What we have not realized--and probably do not really comprehend to this very day--is that an authorization is

> just that and nothing more. However, once authorizations are signed and the jubilant citizen groups go home to celebrate their little victories, the legislative process gets down to the real business of appropriations. Authorizations are not appropriations! Hardly any educational appropriations are as much as 50% of what their respective authorizations mentioned. The final authorization for the Bilingual Education Act was 45 million dollars over a three-year period. We were sufficiently inexperienced to be elated by the immensity of that paltry sum. How naive we were! The appropriation was only 7.5 million dollars and it provided nothing beyond a one-year period![57]

Fishman also emphasized the need for pro-bilingual educationists to learn the political ropes if language programs are to become a legislative priority.

The funding level is less of a problem than the confusion which surrounded what kind of program was to be funded. The wording of the 1967 bill was just vague enough to leave the bilingual education movement directionless. As the Act states, Title VII funds were intended as a way to "meet the specific needs of children . . . who have limited English-speaking ability and come from environments where the dominant language is other than English."[58] Some felt this meant native language instruction; others believed this to be a re-statement of the need to learn English. Most wondered how the two ends might be pursued equally. The Act didn't provide much assistance since it suggested no program guidelines. This confusion fed the preconceived notions of most educators: bilingual education meant learn English as quickly as possible, i.e., acculturation. The programs reflected this bias.

Characteristics of the First Bilingual Education Programs

Because of the delay in signing the bill, the first bilingual education programs were funded in 1969. In a study entitled "The First Seventy-Six Bilingual Education Projects," A. Bruce Gaarder outlines some of the salient features of these first programs receiving monies from Title VII.[59] The seventy-six federally funded bilingual projects (as of 1970--by the end of the five-year cycle almost twice as many programs were in operation) are scattered throughout the country. The average cost of each program is about $99,000. Differing significantly in purpose and scope, the projects require a wide range of qualifications from their respective staffs. Teachers' qualifications, for example, were as follows: 49 projects required teachers to be mere bilinguals or possess only a conversational ability, 6 required fluent bilingual ability, 1 required complete literacy in both languages, 15 programs boasted of having at least one teacher educated abroad, and the others called for teachers who were hopefully or potentially bilingual. The

qualifications of directors--in those projects which required a separate director--are equally revealing: 12 programs set qualifications at a high level (e.g., literacy in both languages, relevant experience, and pertinent academic training), 20 projects required nothing more than bilingualism, and 28 demanded not even limited knowledge of the non-English tongue.

These indicators suggest that the none-too-subtle bias of the local schools was in the direction of English only as the goal for bilingual education. A program, after all, cannot be expected to do more than that which is indicated by the skills of the staff. For most of the programs, though, the qualifications of the professional staff tells only part of the story. Another part can be explained by the pervasive use of instructional aides. Aides or paraprofessional teachers are usually a critical component of the bilingual program because they are both bilingual and drawn from the community being served by the project. At the student/teacher level the aide is often able to offset the professional teacher's lack of experience and knowledge related to the target student group. Still, the subordinate role of aides in the classroom serves only to reinforce the underlying theme of most programs: let's get on with the task of teaching these kids English.[60] Concerning the first seventy-six projects, Gaarder observes:

> Sometimes the aides work with bilingual teachers. In other projects only the aides are expected to be bilingual, and the regular teachers, the "master" teachers, are Anglos. Much can be said in favor of bringing into the schools persons who represent fully the usually underrepresented ethnic minorities. But if those representatives obviously have less professional status, less training, less authority and receive less money than the teachers, the other-medium side of the project is getting less than a full, fair trial.

This inequity is illustrated in the plan of one bilingual project which proposed that 40 bilingual aides be hired at $2.00/hour "to encourage and energize the parents." To be sure, staffing patterns are not the only indications of program goals, but they do say a lot about the kind of results projects expect to achieve. Even those projects which have relatively high standards of teacher qualifications (e.g., one project demanded that bilingual teachers have at least 21 units of Spanish) make the assumption that one can teach all subjects --even at a basic level--in the second language. For example, the author is a Spanish/English bilingual, yet he would be hard-pressed to teach a science or algebra lesson in Spanish. The reason for this is simply that the author's Spanish is used in domains which are informal or conversational in nature. English, on the other hand, is the language of his entire formal schooling experience. With the exception of those teachers

and aides educated in non-English-speaking countries, the same schooling was available to our bilingual teachers, most of whom probably don't use the non-English language at all in their lives outside the school. The demands of providing bilingual education are great--a fact which even well-intentioned educators are only now beginning to realize.

Other Characteristics of Bilingual Programs

Other characteristics of the first seventy-six bilingual education programs reinforce their acculturationist bias. Most programs state that the development of teaching materials will constitute a major part of the curriculum changes envisioned to support bilingual instruction. Yet, the poor language skills of the staff already mentioned and the lack of attention given to the local community as a source of curriculum development, reveal the likelihood that few useful materials can be produced in such a manner. This is exacerbated by the ambivalence of bilingual programs toward the culture associated with the non-English mother tongue (N-EMT). One project states that it will "develop curriculum authentic in respect to Mexican American culture," but the only formal requirement for the development specialists is expertise in setting "behavioral objectives"; neither familiarity with the Chicano culture nor knowledge of Spanish is mentioned. Another plan puts its position on the role of native culture (and the kind of bilingualism envisioned) rather succinctly:

> Those areas in which the student must succeed in high school and college--for example, mathematics--will be taught in English . . . those areas which the student associates with his own background, for example, native literature . . . will be taught in Spanish.[61]

Lastly, the amount of time devoted to instruction in the N-EMT gives further indication of the importance placed on instruction in the mother tongue. Of those projects which so specified, six aim at providing bilingual education through grade 12, four favor N-EMT, and 34 favor English. Two programs scheduled 25 minutes or less daily for instruction in the mother tongue; one of these scheduled only 10-15 minutes of daily work utilizing the N-EMT as the medium of instruction.

In another survey of bilingual education program descriptions, Rolf Kjolseth found that the great majority of bilingual programs (well over 80%) highly approximate the extreme of the assimilation model while the remaining few are only moderately pluralistic.[62] To Kjolseth, the assimilation model means that,

> . . . the ethnic language is being exploited rather than cultivated--weaning the pupil away from his mother tongue through the transitional use of a variety of his mother

> tongue in what amounts to a kind of cultural and linguistic "counter insurgency" policy on the part of the schools. A variety of the ethnic language is being used as a new means to an old end. The traditional policy of "speak only English" is amended to "We *will* speak only English--just as soon as possible and even sooner and more completely if we begin with a variety of the ethnic language rather than only English!"[63]

Here Kjolseth voices the suspicion of other pluralist educators who have observed bilingual education programs.[64] This suspicion centers on the belief that if the greater majority of bilingual programs are contributing to native language shift rather than maintenance, then the bilingual education movement may represent a more subtle--and perhaps more effective--way of contributing to the process of acculturation. For the pluralistically oriented educator, indicators which seem to corroborate this suspicion (such as Kjolseth's study) are most disheartening. The pluralist views the success of bilingual education programs in terms of their contribution to the maintenance of native language and culture. Indeed, one educator with an admittedly pluralistic bent has written that the greatest obstacle to the success of bilingual programs is "the doubt in many communities that the maintenance of non-English languages is desirable."[65]

Current Bilingual Education Programs

With its initial allocation, Title VII eventually funded over 200 programs. Whatever doubt may have still remained about the legislative purpose of Title VII funds, however, was sufficiently removed in 1974, the last year of the act's first five-year funding period. During the summer of 1974, Congress amended Title VII by the passage of Public Law 93-380.[66] Public Law 93-380 was largely intended to extend and increase appropriations for bilingual education. But the authors of this bill also saw fit to use this document as a clarification of Title VII's purpose:

> . . . the Congress declares it to be the policy of the United States, in order to establish equal educational opportunity for all children (A) to encourage the establishment and operation, where appropriate, of educational programs using bilingual educational practices, techniques, and methods, and (B) for that purpose, to provide financial assistance to local educational agencies, and to State educational agencies for certain purposes, in order to enable such local educational agencies to develop and carry out such programs in elementary and secondary schools, including activities at the preschool level, which are designed to meet the educational needs of such children; and to

> demonstrate effective ways of providing, for children of limited English-speaking ability, instruction designed to enable them, while using their native language, *to achieve competence in the English language*.[67] (emphasis added)

While less than satisfactory to some bilingualists, this bill seemed to summarize the attitude that existed among most educators and legislative representatives alike. Those that were disappointed by the bill were particularly upset by the seemingly subordinate role given to the non-English mother tongue. A bilingual program that fosters pluralism, they argue, must give both languages equal status.[68]

Research on the relationship between social factors and language usage supports this notion and brings attention to the effects of societal or community pressures on language choice.[69] If a Spanish-speaking student comes to realize, for example, that the use of English allows him/her greater social rewards, then that student will view English as more important than Spanish. In short, the student learns not only language but the values and attitudes associated with the use of some languages compared to others. Thus, a program which fostered the use of two languages among all students and teachers would seem to contribute to bilingualism more effectively than the program which limited the use of the non-English language to non-English speaking students.

Despite increasing recognition of the need for equal status of both languages in bilingual education programs, the Office of Education has chosen to follow the letter of the law.[70] In an education briefing paper published by HEW's Education Division, Public Law 93-380's purpose is described as follows:

> . . . to help local education agencies better serve their non-English speaking students. While the classroom demonstration projects included some inservice training and curriculum development, they reached only a small number of students. The new law broadens the program to include more deliberate and systematic teacher training and curriculum development. These efforts should increase the capacity of the Nation's education system to serve the special needs of the non-English speaking student.[71]

What are the special needs identified by the U.S. Office of Education? The briefing paper interprets the law as an attempt to serve the two million students who "need special instruction in English."[72]

The 1974 Bilingual Education Act is scheduled to serve over 200,000 children with non-English mother tongues during the 1975-76 academic year. A federal appropriation of $450 million for a funding period ending June 30, 1978, is to be administered by the Office of Education and other educational agencies such as the National Institute of Education (NIE).

As the bill itself makes plain, the bulk of this unprecedented appropriation will be aimed at relieving many children of a potentially harmful burden--the inability to speak English. In 1975, for the first time, the highly conservative Council for Basic Education has endorsed bilingual education, but only "if the objective of fluency and a return to full time English is clearly kept in mind, if the numbers of children in a given foreign language group make it practical, and if competent teachers can be obtained."[73] The Council flatly opposed including English-speaking students in such programs for the purpose of learning a second language. Calling it a "misguided practice," the Council said this tended to "downgrade the primacy of English in our society."[74]

Despite the clearly acculturationist thrust of the 1974 act, the bilingual programs are still being met with strong resistance. In Dade County, Florida, for example, bilingualism has become an explosive issue. Approximately one-third of the school population claim Spanish as the original language. Most are children of immigrants who fled from Cuba after the Castro-led revolution. Bilingual programs have an enrollment of more than 104,000 students. In addition, 237 teachers and almost twice as many aides are employed by bilingual programs. Yet, a Mr. Linton J. Tyler won election to the Dade County School Board in 1974, with a pledge to halt the growth of bilingual education. A considerable number of people apparently are less than enthusiastic about dual-language instruction. One major criticism is that this is an expensive program which seems only to polarize children and staff. Some even feel it is un-American. *U.S. News & World Report* quoted one resentful Dade County parent as follows: "If every culture came to America and demanded to be taught their own culture, we'd be nowhere. Why not learn American first?"[75]

Supporters of bilingual education in Dade County argue that the program has already proven itself in terms of reducing the drop-out rate among Spanish-speaking students. These advocates also claim that dual-language programs will mitigate the negative effects of foreign-speaking ghettos in the U.S. The assumption here, of course, is that staying in school and fostering English in self-contained ethnic communities possesses some inherent positive worth. Presumably, these measures indicate some degree of success. This author wonders how this version of success differs from that of the opponents to bilingual education. The values inherent in encouraging more formal schooling and language conformity seem to embody even the most conventional views of Americanism. The person who said "why not learn American first" might be surprised to see bilingual education presented in this light. The most significant difference between advocates and opponents of the kind of bilingual education discussed here is the extent to which the individual non-English speaker must bear the burden of learning English. The advocate of bilingual education wants to provide

public assistance to learn English; the opponent would have the individual learn at his/her own expense of time and money. Those--perhaps the majority--who see the merit of learning English but worry about children losing the native language seem less certain about the kind of program they envision.

The conflicts (e.g., an English-only backlash) now surfacing in Dade County may represent future struggles in other parts of the country. For while Dade County continues to be the site of the largest bilingual education effort, other states and local governments have initiated rapidly growing programs. In Los Angeles 10,000 children are given bilingual instruction concentrating on grades K-4. Houston's bilingual classes serve 6,500 students. In more and more states, bilingual education has become mandatory for some. Both Illinois and Michigan, for example, have passed laws requiring bilingual training in public schools with 20 or more non-English speaking children. Chicago has programs in 83 schools located mainly in the city's large Spanish-speaking population.

As a result of a federal court consent decree won by the Puerto Rican organization ASPIRA (*ASPIRA v. Board of Education)*, the New York bilingual education program became mandatory for all Hispanic children unable to participate effectively in English-taught classes.[76] The larger voluntary program in New York served over 22,000 students last year and included such languages as (in order of student enrollment) Spanish, Italian, French, Yiddish, Chinese and Greek. Almost 7,000 of these are English-speaking students who enrolled to learn a second language.

Bilingual Education Programs of the Future

What to expect of bilingual education programs is still an open question. The acculturationist bias of most public school bilingual education programs will continue, to be sure. This realization must precede any attempt to identify realistic expectations of bilingual programs today. For those comfortable with an acculturationist bias, the future struggle seems clear. The extent to which such programs expand in some areas largely will be effected by the political battles between those that feel learning English should be publicly subsidized and those that insist that the responsibility lies with the individual.

At the same time, however, the undoubtedly large contingent that refuses to trade native language and cultural traditions for learning English may be moved to act more forcefully. This group must organize independent community supported education alternatives which encourage language varieties, cultural traditions and value orientations which differ from those taught by public schools.[77] Or, it must cause U.S. educators and legislators to look to other countries for ways to promote inter-group communication without requiring conformity as the price for learning another language. Canada, for example, has

made bilingual education a societal issue. Canadian law states that both English and French "enjoy equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all the institutions of the government of Canada."[78] Whereas the language law does not oblige any citizen to learn a second language nor does it dictate language of instruction to the twelve provinces, the federal government prints postal stamps, money, highway signs, and even labels for commercial products in both languages. The government in Ottowa has designated more than 50,000 jobs in the governmental bureaucracy as bilingual; it has also started a language school for civil servants; and in many positions civil servants cannot be promoted without demonstrating dual-language proficiency.[79] Perhaps regional or state policies can be made to follow Canada's example by recognizing the equal status of significant language groups (e.g., Chinese, Navaho or Spanish) in certain areas of this country.

If the history of language policy tells us anything, much more than the right to language choice is at stake here. The controversies, debates and political struggles over diverse language programs may lead more people to reflect not only on what language should be employed in education programs but also what contents, processes and values those programs should address. In their discussion of the future of bilingual education, John and Horner make the following observation:

> Educational innovations will remain of passing interest and little significance without the recognition that education is a social process. If the school remains alien to the values and needs of the community, if it is bureaucratically run, then the children will not receive the education they are entitled to, no matter what language they are taught in.[80]

Re-Evaluation of Hypothesis

In view of the previous discussion of Title VII, a re-evaluation of hypothesis #3 can be undertaken.

> *Hypothesis #3:* Bilingual education is neither a piece of social policy characterized by an acculturationist bias nor a program or form of policy implementation which imposes acculturation on its target groups.

A review of Title VII as both policy and program makes the position outlined in hypothesis #3 untenable.

Culminating with Title VII, the bilingual education movement was a response to the imposition of English. Despite the 1958 National Defense Education Act's plea for more bilingual people (albeit for defense purposes), the early 60's were characterized by a flourishing of English-as-a-Second-Language

programs. These programs were designed to teach English to students with non-English mother tongues. Around 1965, formal (NEA statement) and informal (public demonstrations) protests were levied against the ethnocentric language programs. Two years later Title VII was passed.

The bill's stated purpose was to provide funds which would allow schools to work with the special problems of children "from environments where the dominant language is other than English."[81] Since the bill never stated whether the eventual goal of bilingual education is English literacy, bilingualism or total instruction in the native language, bilingual education programs tended to reflect the bias or predilections of the school personnel involved. One study claims, for example, that 80% of all bilingual education programs describe themselves in clearly acculturationist terms.[82]

Intended to broaden the scope of bilingual education, the 1974 amendment to Title VII makes its purpose more explicit: this purpose is to assist non-English speaking students "to achieve competence in the English language."[83] Acculturation is the clear purpose with assimilation implied as the eventual goal. If the experience of European immigrants tells us anything, it is that the social and economic benefits of this society will not be enjoyed by linguistic minorities simply because of their willingness to acculturate. Milton Gordon's conceptual distinction appears useful here: whereas assimilation requires some degree of acculturation, the act of acculturating does not guarantee assimilation.[84] The dimensions of this societal trap can now be made plain; acculturation exemplified by policies like Title VII has been offered as the road to assimilation. Since acculturation does not guarantee assimilation, the unequal distribution of social and economic benefits may be allowed to continue under the guise of tolerance for linguistic differences. Like a giant vice acculturation and assimilation may come together to entrap certain groups in a way which reinforces rather than relieves their depressed position on the margins of society.

Title VII programs for the most part have tried to tell linguistic minorities that learning English and acquiring the values necessary to progress in school would lead to greater economic and social benefits for the individual. While the causal relationship between these two phenomena is subject to considerable question, learning English certainly never hurt the economic development of many European immigrants. The linguistic minorities of today, however, are not demanding economic development alone; these groups--some indigenous to America--are searching for a way to survive without losing native languages and traditional values. For them, the greatest challenge is not choosing between survival and a traditional life but developing a way to achieve both. Because Title VII programs have not addressed both survival needs and the needs

of personal fulfillment related to tradition, they have failed a large portion of the population they were intended to serve.

In short, neither learning English alone nor preserving native language alone will satisfy most groups. The failure of bilingual programs to recognize this has contributed to the confusion surrounding bilingual education today. Whether or not one sees assimilation as a proper goal, bilingual education as we know it today is a policy which may prove to be yet another obstacle in many groups' struggle for a more human existence.

IV. SOCIETAL BILINGUALISM: A POLICY TO FOSTER ASSIMILATION AND CULTURAL PLURALISM

The earlier reference to Canada provides a useful way to conceive of a language policy which fosters both assimilation and pluralism. Canada was not offered as an ideal model of policy formation but rather as an example of the kind of commitment required to create a language policy which contributes to both assimilation and pluralism. This commitment recognizes one basic reality: that bilingualism requires a policy which goes beyond the level of any one institution (e.g., education) to a broader approach at the societal level. Canada's attempt to promote bilingualism among civil servants, for example, is based on the belief that Canada has a responsibility to serve linguistic minorities in a way which promotes mutual respect. If the linguistic minority member is expected to adapt to social and economic conditions in order to survive, Canada reasons, then the society must also adapt to provide service in a different language. This recognizes the inherent worth of individuals from rich, culturally diverse backgrounds.[85] A country's ability to adapt would naturally be affected by the degrees to which members of the same linguistic minority group are clustered together. Whenever possible, however, the results seem predictable: the need for some individuals to adapt will become less threatening if the society also demonstrates a willingness to adapt. As a result, the society will benefit from increased participation of culturally rich individuals (pluralism) and the individuals will enjoy greater social and economic integration (assimilation).

Within the context of the U.S., a language policy founded on the same commitment would possess the following characteristics:

(a) That the federal government be required to serve significant linguistic minorities in their native language. This would mean that languages such as Spanish, Chinese and Navaho would be used upon individual client request in carrying out the business of federal agencies like the Internal Revenue Service.

(b) That the federal government be required to develop a regionalized plan for serving specific linguistic groups in certain areas of the country. Certain regions with identifiable linguistic minorities will be required to staff all federal agencies with personnel who are fluent in languages used locally.

(c) That the federal government reward local governments with increased revenues for modifying its public service effort to meet the needs of significant linguistic minorities. This money will be used for the purpose of staff training and program development--a process not unlike that which currently governs Title VII grants. The difference between the current and proposed policy is that the proposed one requires local plans to include all institutions (e.g., the courts, welfare as well as education) and to demonstrate prior commitment through expenditure of local funds.[86]

NOTES

1. The following works treat the emotional and psychological importance of language to individuals and groups in different countries and contexts: Joan Findling, "Need Affiliation and Future Orientation in Extra Group and Intra Group Domains," in *Bilingualism in the Barrio*, J. Fishman, et al., eds. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Publications, 1971); Einar Haugen, *Launguage Conflict and Language Planning: The Case of Modern Norwegian* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966); Irene Howard, *Vancouver's Svenskar: A History of the Swedish Community in Vancouver* (Vancouver: Vancouver Historical Society, 1970); and the *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* (Ottawa, Canada: Queen's Printer, 1967).

2. For examples of the few longitudinal studies that exist, see:

Anastasi, Anne and Fernando A. Cordova, "Some Effects of Bilingualism Upon the Intelligence Test Performance of Puerto Rican Children in New York City," *The Journal of Educational Psychology*, Vol. 44 (1953), p. 15.

Carrow, Sister Mary Arthur, "Linguistic Functioning of Bilingual and Monolingual Children," *Journal of Speech and Hearing Disorders*, Vol. 22 (September 1957), p. 371.

Darcy, Natalie T., "Bilingualism and the Measurement of Intelligence: Review of a Decade of Research," *The Journal of Genetic Psychology*, Vol. 103, Second Half (December 1963), p. 259.

Diebold, A. Richard, Jr., "The Consequences of Early Bilingualism in Cognitive Development and Personality Formation," Edward Norbeck, Douglass Price-Williams, and William M. McCord, eds., *The Study of Personality* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968).

Jenson, J. Vernon, "Effects of Childhood Bilingualism," *Elementary English,* Vol. 39 (February 1962), pp. 132, 358.
Lambert, Wallace E., G. Richard Tucker, and d'Anglejan, "Cognitive and Attitudinal Consequences of Bilingual Schooling: The St. Lambert Project Through Grade Five," *Journal of Educational Psychology,* Vol. 65 (1973), p. 141.
MacNamara, John, "The Effects of Instruction in a Weaker Language," *Journal of Social Issues,* Vol. 23 (1967), p. 121.
Treviño, Bertha, "Bilingual Instruction in the Primary Grades," *Modern Language Journal,* Vol. 54 (1970), p. 255.
Cohen, Andrew D., "Bilingual Schooling and Spanish Language Maintenance: An Experimental Analysis," *The Bilingual Review,* Vol. 2, Nos. 1 and 2 (January-August 1975).

3. Arnold H. Leibowitz, "English Literacy as a Sanction for Discrimination," *Notre Dame Lawyer,* Vol. 45, No. 7 (Fall 1969). Joshua A. Fishman, *Language Loyalty in the U.S.* (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1966) was published before the Leibowitz study, but it is not as comprehensive as the latter's treatment of policy (legislation and litigation) at the federal and state level.

4. Ibid., p. 50.

5. Arnold H. Leibowitz, "Educational Policy and Political Acceptance: The Imposition of English as the Language of Instruction in American Schools," Unpublished manuscript (Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied Linguistics--ERIC Clearinghouse for Linguistics--ED 047321, 1971).

6. Arnold H. Leibowitz, "Language as a Means of Social Control," Unpublished manuscript prepared for VIII World Congress of Sociology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada (August 1974), p. 3. Leibowitz, in all fairness, also emphasizes the role of bigotry in the formation of language policy, as the following quote indicates: "We have tried to show the political pattern behind the imposition of English language requirements and their subsequent relaxation, the fact that language was basically being used as a means for controlling people's behavior. The decisions to impose English reflected the popular attitudes toward the particular ethnic group and the degree of hostility evidenced toward that group's natural development. If the group is in some way (usually because of race, color or religion) viewed as irreconciably alien to the prevailing concept of American culture, the U.S. has imposed harsh restrictions on language practices; if not so viewed use of the foreign tongue language has gone largely unquestioned or even encouraged" (p. 48).

7. David K. Cohen, "Immigrants and the Schools," *Review of Educational Research,* Vol. 40, No. 1 (February 1970), p. 14.

8. Ibid., pp. 19-20. (The table mentioned in the quote can be found on p. 20.)

9. This definition of acculturation is taken from Arnold M. Rose, *Sociology: The Study of Human Relationships* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 557-8.

10. Lawrence Cremin, *Transformation of the School* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961).

11. Heinz Kloss, "Excerpts from the National Minority Laws of the United States of America," in *Occasional Papers of Research Translations* (East-West Center, Institute of Advanced Projects, 1966), p. 124.

12. Heinz Kloss, "Language Rights of Immigrant Groups," *International Migrant Review*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 1971), p. 260.

13. Colin Greer, *The Great School Legend* (New York: The Viking Press, 1972), p. 4.

14. Ibid., p. 95.

15. Ibid., p. 85.

16. Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, *The Hidden Injuries of Class* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 18-26.

17. See William F. Greenbaum, "America in Search of a New Ideal," *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (August 1974) for a discussion of alienation among upper class New Englanders.

18. Joshua A. Fishman, op. cit., p. 402.

19. Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

20. Ibid., p. 81.

21. Bernal Díaz (Translation and Introduction by J. M. Cohen), *The Conquest of New Spain* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963).

22. El Inca Garcilasco de la Vega (Translation by María Jolas), *The Incas: The Royal Commentaries of the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega 1539-1616* (New York: Orion Press, 1961).

23. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life*, op. cit., p. 89.

24. See Maurice R. Davie, *World Immigration* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936), for quotes from Franklin and Washington and Saul K. Padover, ed., *Thomas Jefferson on Democracy* (New York: The New American Library (Mentor Books), 1946).

25. Leibowitz, "English Literacy as a Sanction for Discrimination," op. cit., p. 5.

26. Heinz Kloss, "The Bilingual Tradition in the U.S." (Quebec: Centre International de Recherches sur le Bilinguisme, 1971).

27. Heinz Kloss, "German American Language Maintenance Efforts" in Fishman, et al., *Language Loyalty in the United States*, op. cit., p. 235.

28. Nathan Glazer, "Ethnic Groups in America: From National Culture to Ideology," in M. Berger, T. Abel, and Charles H. Page, eds., *Freedom and Control in Modern Society* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1954).

29. For an ethno-history of Southwestern Indians see: Edward H. Spicer, *Cycles of Conquest* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1962).

30. Marcus Lee Hansen, *The Immigrant in American History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), p. 132.

31. *Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlements with the Republic of Mexico,* February 2, 9 Stat., 929 (1851), T.S. No. 207 (effective July 4, 1848).

32. Samuel H. Willey, *Thirty Years in California* (San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft, 1879).

33. Leibowitz, "Educational Policy and Political Acceptance," op. cit., p. 47.

34. Leonard Pitt, *Decline of the Californios: A Social History of Spanish-Speaking Californians, 1846-1890* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), p. 226.

35. Andrew F. Rolle, *California, A History* (New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell Co., 1969) (2nd Edition), p. 382.

36. In 1870, California enacted a law providing that "all schools shall be taught in the English language" (Calif. Stat., Chap. 556, Sec. 55, 1870), but local variation was apparently tolerated.

37. Rolle, op. cit., p. 384.

38. The Appropriation Act of 1871 contained a rider--critical to disputes over land--which refused to recognize either the Indian tribe or nation as legal entities for treaty purposes. The first federally sponsored boarding school was founded in Pennsylvania only eight years later.

39. See Rolle, op. cit., for a discussion of the 1902 bill restricting Chinese immigration, p. 387.

40. *Meyer v. Nebraska,* 262, U.S. 39, 403 (1923).

41. *Farrington v. Tokushige,* 273, U.S. 284, 298 (1927).

42. Milton Gordon discusses three theories of assimilation: (1) Anglo-conformity--foreigners should give up their past cultural identity and take on the social and cultural characteristics of their new Anglo-dominated homeland; (2) Melting pot--a biological and cultural merger to produce a new American type (the type most discussed often bears remarkable similarity to the Anglo ideal); and (3) Cultural pluralism--the preservation of ethnic group culture, while striving for political and economic integration into American society. See Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of Gordon, op. cit.

43. See E. Bogardus, *Essentials of Americanization* (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1923) (3rd Edition), especially Chapter XVI for a classic statement on Mexican immigration problems. California Education Code as quoted in Leibowitz, "Educational Policy and Political Acceptance," op. cit., p. 59.

44. *Survey of Language Instruction in Puerto Rico* (Columbia Teacher's College, Columbia University, 1926).

45. See J. Osuna, *History of Education in Puerto Rico* (Office of the Commissioner of Education in Puerto Rico, 1949), pp. 365-399.

46. In 1967, the U.S. House of Representatives merged a number of bills, principally H.R. 13103, to produce Title VII, the Bilingual Education Act, which became law in January 1968.

47. See "Study of the United States-Puerto Rico Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico," 15 (1966).

48. Interview with Dr. Gilbert Sánchez, participant/observer in the passage of Title VII and Associate of the Center for Applied Linguistics, Washington, D.C., Summer 1974.

49. The information on the history of English-as-a-Second-Language programs was gathered from Tay Lesly, "Bilingual Education in California," Master's Thesis, Teaching English as a Second Language, U.C.L.A., 1971.

50. William A. Stewart quoted in Theodore Anderrson and Mildred Boyer, eds., *Bilingual Schooling in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970). While Lesly, op. cit., claims that facts don't justify Stewart's view, the arguments in this work do.

51. The 1965 Voting Rights Act suspended literacy tests as a condition for voting, when: (1) past performance indicated discriminatory administration of tests; or (2) voter completed 6th grade in a school with a language of instruction other than English.

52. This litigation is discussed in detail in Leibowitz, "English Literacy as a Sanction for Discrimination," op. cit.

53. California Education Code, Section 71, amended May 24, 1967.

54. See statement of Bruce Gaarder in *Hearings on S. 428 Before the Special Subcommittee of Labor and Public Welfare*, 90th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

55. The excerpt from the *Washington Observer* was found in *The Center Forum*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (September 1969), p. 8. Dr. Sánchez (see Note 48 above) provides the opposing interpretation.

56. Interview with Dr. Gilbert Sánchez, op. cit.

57. Joshua A. Fishman, "The Politics of Bilingual Education," in James Alatis, ed., *GURT 1970: Bilingualism and Language Contact* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, Proceedings of the Georgetown University Round Table Conference on Linguistics and Languages, 1970), p. 49.

58. Quote from original Title VII bill found in Vera P. John, Vivian M. Horner and Judy Socolov, "American Voices," in *The Center Forum*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (September 1969), pp. 2-3.

59. A. Bruce Gaarder, "The First Seventy-Six Bilingual Education Projects," in James Alatis, ed., op. cit.

60. Based on the observation of Ms. Antonia Castro, Bilingual Teacher, El Monte Elementary School District, March 1975.

61. Gaarder, op. cit., p. 166.

62. Rolf Kjolseth, "Bilingual Education Programs in the U.S.: For Assimilation or Pluralism?" in Paul R. Turner, ed., *Bilingualism in the Southwest* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1973), pp. 15-16.

63. Ibid., p. 16.

64. Vera P. John and Vivian M. Horner, *Early Childhood Bilingual Education* (New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 1971) and Theodore Anderrson and Mildred Boyer, eds., op. cit.

65. Theodore Anderrson, "Bilingual Education: The American Experience," Paper presented at Ontario Institute for Studies in Education Conference, Toronto, Canada, 1971.

66. Amendment to Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Public Law 93-380, 20 USC 8806-900a-1, August 21, 1974.

67. Ibid., pp. 20-21.

68. See Reynaldo Flores Macías, et al., *Educación Alternativa: On the Development of Chicano Bilingual Schools* (Hayward, California: Southwest Network, 1975).

69. See Joshua A. Fishman, "Bilingualism With and Without Diglossia; Diglossia With and Without Bilingualism"; John J. Gumperz, "On the Linguistic Markers of Bilingual Communication"; and Dell Hymes, "Models of the Interaction of Language and Social Setting"; all found in *Journal of Social Issues,* Vol. 23, 1967.

70. For an example of this growing recognition, see Reynaldo Flores Macías, "Schooling of Chicanos in a Bilingual, Culturally Relevant Context," *Parameters of Institutional Change: Chicano Experiences in Education* (Hayward, Calif.: Southwest Network, 1974).

71. U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare/ Education Division, *Education Briefing Paper: Bilingual Education* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 2.

72. Ibid., p. 1.

73. Council for Basic Education, "When it Takes Two Languages to Teach the Three R's . . .," *U.S. News & World Report,* Vol. 79 (July 7, 1975), p. 67.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. *Aspira v. Board of Education.*

77. See Clementina Almaguer, et al., "Casa de La Raza" in *Parameters of Institutional Change,* op. cit., pp. 69-77 for a description of the values underlying one alternative Chicano school.

78. "Bilingualism in Canada," *U.S. News & World Report,* Vol. 79 (July 7, 1975), p. 68.

79. Ibid.

80. John and Horner, op. cit., p. 187.

81. See Title VII quoted in *The Center Forum,* op. cit., p. 3.

82. Kjolseth, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

83. Public Law 93-380, op. cit., p. 21.

84. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life,* op. cit.

85. For a more detailed discussion of Canada's policy, see *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism,* op. cit., p. xxviii.

86. This policy is more fully developed in Raymond E. Castro, "Shifting the Burden of Bilingualism: The Case for Monolingual Communities," *The Bilingual Review*, Vol. 3, Nos. 1 and 2 (January-August 1976).

CHICANOS AS A POST COLONIAL MINORITY: SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY OF THE PARADIGM OF INTERNAL COLONIALISM

FRED A. CERVANTES

Chicano Studies,
Political Science
University of Southern California

I. TRIBUTE

Behind the ethereal wall of objective scientific inquiry, traditional social scientists have devoted themselves to the highly normative practice of developing paradigms of assimilation and integration in studying ethnic minorities. With the recognition that not all assimilate well, nor can be accommodated easily within the United States political and social economy, have come a few realizations and some puzzlement. Quite a few notions of social and cultural deviation have been advanced to explain why Chicanos and other "deviants" persist with attitudes and behaviors that have been associated with patterns of futility or failure by the institutions of schooling, politics, penality, and mental and physical health.

Robert Dahl, to cite a relatively innocuous example of traditional political wisdom for the "minority" scholar, suggests that the persistence of ethnic voting patterns is a somewhat puzzling deviation that, surely, will eventually lose its significance.[1] If Dahl just seems to beg important questions, Nick Vaca has identified for us a whole legacy of analysis in the literature of the social sciences that is far more troubling.[2] Vaca notes that over the years the Chicano and his culture have been systematically condemned for creating a set of values that presumably have resulted in social and economic failures because these values were so often diametrically

opposed to the acceptable and functionally superior Anglo values. In becoming deviants in their own land, Chicanos have had every thing from their high fertility rate and high school drop-out rates to their family and convict behavior attributed to such "dysfunctional" norm-myths as Machismo and Indian fatalism.

Within the baleful framework of blaming the victim (without really getting normatively involved) there has been little room for the Chicano social scientist. Understandably and commendably we have looked for alternative conceptualizations elsewhere and have been receptive of those that provided a critical framework for looking at historical and institutional forces in terms of their impact on people. There has long persisted a Chicano folkloric tradition that has chronicled the conflicts between Mexicanos and external forces of political and cultural assault. These lessons were hard to come by in the schools of the Southwest. Moreover, Chicanos have shared with Native Americans the distinction of being the special objects of scrutiny by state and federal as well as local law enforcement agencies in the Southwest. Not only have Chicanos been the primary concern of the Texas Rangers since their inception in 1835 to "protect the frontier," but we have known the Immigration and Naturalization Service and U.S. Forest Service as an oppressive controlling force, which is *inter alia*, not to forget the LAPD or the Kern County Sheriffs. So the search for alternative conceptualizations stems from more than an interest in rejecting academic trends in sociology, political science and history.

Out of an identified and professed need for a new perspective, Barrera, Muñoz and Ornelas developed their conception of the barrio as an internal colony.[3] The influence of this model is widely appreciated and is notably represented in its further association with the works of Tomás Almaguer,[4] Guillermo Flores and Ronald Bailey.[5] In their essay, Barrera, Muñoz and Ornelas indicate the limitations of the older "assilationist/accomodationist" view and present the inadequacy of the more recent tendancy of explaining Chicano powerlessness as a function of inadequate Chicano leadership. They declare that their model offers a more realistic and effective means of singling out significant aspects of the Chicano "situation."[6]

In applying the model of internal colonialism, previously used by Blauner as an instructive analogy to traditional colonialism, Barrera, Muñoz and Ornelas have gone a step further to urge that the concept of internal colonialism should be regarded as something more than a heuristic device.[7] In this sense, a few Chicano social scientists have braved the U.S. academic waters and shown a consistent willingness to extend an essentially Marxist concept of analysis to U.S. political behavior. To provide an interesting twist to William Appleman Williams charge against U.S. historians, there has not been a great evasion of Marxist analysis on the part of Chicano

political scientists.[8] (Even though I can remember being at a symposium on Chicano politics here in Austin three years ago when it was personally easy and intellectually pragmatic for a Chicano political scientist to wonder out loud about the contemporary and scientific relevance of all this 19th century Marxist stuff he was hearing from Carlos Muñoz.)

As a few voices in the professional disciplines (Williams, Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy and Irving Horowitz) have long suggested, there is much to learn about U.S. society from a Marxist perspective. Moreover, it is a perspective that has become more important to understand for Chicanos and others who find themselves at the bottom of the socio-economic and political ladder in a political economy that has become increasingly multi-national and is straining under new constraints of scarcity and political challenge to its established patterns of capital expansion. Put another way, the Marxist paradigm remains the most significant systematic critique of capitalism as well as being its most important ideological threat.

II. CRITIQUE

Having noted the importance of the Marxist perspective, it is from this perspective that I would challenge the adequacy of explaining the contemporary Chicano "situation" in terms of the model of internal colonialism.

At different points in their essay, Barrera, Muñoz and Ornelas define internal colonialism as a condition of powerlessness and a condition involving the domination and exploitation of a total population.[9] As they put it: "The essence, then, of being an internal colony means existing in a condition of powerlessness."[10] This essence, however, does not really distinguish internal from external colonialism. Nor, for that matter, does such a definition really distinguish colonialism from the exploitative relationship which exists between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

In another broadly inclusive observation, the three authors state that:

> No one disputes that colonialism in its modern usage refers to a relationship in which one group of people dominates and exploits another.[11]

While this can be granted, it really does not take us very far in clearly defining colonialism as a type or system of exploitation distinct, for example, from the mechanisms of class exploitation. In their exposition of colonialism, however, the three authors cite the importance of González-Casanova's idea that a relationship of domination and exploitation of a total population that has distinct classes. Or as Guillermo Flores has noted in citing Memmi's work, colonialism establishes power and privilege for even the poorest colonizer over the colonized.[12]

Restated in a way that further pursues the Aristotelian ideal of understanding a phenomenon's "essence," it can be said that while exploitation and domination are necessary for colonialism to exist, these conditions are not sufficient. Flores suggests the critical importance of understanding colonialism in terms of an institutional control mechanism, which, for me, connotes state and administrative controls capable of clearly and materially elevating even the poorest colonizer to a position of power and privilege over the colonized.

Consequently, a bothersome question arises for me when the three authors assert that:

> The crucial distinguishing characteristic between internal and external colonialism does not appear to be so much the existence of separate territories corresponding to metropolis and colony, but the legal status of the colonized (i.e., whether or not there is a distinct legal status for the colonized).[13]

I would wonder if colonialism can exist at all without a separate legal status for the colonized. According to Barrera, Muñoz and Ornelas, internal colonialism exists if domination or exploitation of a distinct group is maintained even though the colonized have the same formal legal status as the colonizer, whereas external colonialism is said to exist where there are clearly separated legal statuses for the colonized and colonizer. If this distinction is unambiguous it seems arbitrary and, within its own unexplained context, it is dubious if for no other reason than that the distinction violates a coherent understanding of internal and external colonialism based on territoriality. More importantly, what is the conceptual difference between internal colonial and class exploitation according to their schema?

To return to an earlier proposition: for colonialism to exist it is not enough that a pattern of exploitation be identified. Colonialism has been understood as a distinct mechanism of exploitation, noteworthy in its use of economic and legal institutional forms to differentiate the exploited from the exploiters. From a Marxist-Leninist perspective colonialism has been viewed as the material extension of legal administration to politically institutionalize economic inequalities. Even in terms of the concept of neo-colonialism, dependent status is institutionally and jurisdictionally arranged by those who are the alien political administrators or economic exploiters.

The political antidote for both colonialism and neo-colonialism in the Third World has been anti-colonial movements of national liberation, that have articulated struggles of national self-determination. Dialectically speaking, this means that the rise of nationalism as a force of political

liberation is the negation of colonialism. Consistent with this implication, those who subscribe to the internal colonial model have examined the Chicano movement with a view toward demonstrating the bases of contemporary Chicano nationalism. Indeed, if contemporary Chicano nationalism can be clearly demonstrated it would be a satisfying and satisfactory way to substantiate the existence of colonialism regardless of how well the model of internal colonialism stands up to the analytic scrutiny of traditional Marxist or Stalinist concerns. However, demonstrating that Chicano nationalism is an antithesis of colonialism in contemporary times seems unlikely.

The question of the nature of Chicano nationalism aside for the moment, let us turn to some interesting variations on the internal colonial model advanced by Tomás Almaguer and Guillermo Flores. They challenge us to go beyond Marx, Lenin, Hobson and Stalin while nevertheless submitting their variations on a theme to the dialectical and historical requirements of a non-doctrinaire but coherent Marxist perspective. Moreover, it is instructive to see how their analyses relate to the unresolved questions raised above concerning Chicano nationalism and the definition of internal colonialism.

In the latter part of their essay, Barrera, Muñoz and Ornelas depict racism and stereotyping as both justifications and mechanisms of colonialism, concluding that:

> Of all the mechanisms of domination, the racist mobilization of bias may be the most pervasive and most subtle in its effects.[14]

In his essay entitled "Race and Culture in the Internal Colony; Keeping the Chicano in His Place," Flores picks up where his colleagues left off. He accepts their model and develops his own concept of racial-cultural surplus value, which he views as a major legacy of the colonial past and an operational characteristic of internal colonialism today.[15]

According to Flores the racial-cultural superordinate position enjoyed by the colonizer is part of the surplus value that accrues to all colonizers, presumably without regard to class position--unlike the dynamic end result of economic surplus value which accrues to the bourgeoisie. In the case of racial-cultural surplus value advantage is maintained through a vast ideological apparatus that guarantees racism despite official (political) myths to the contrary. Although dialectical interaction is assumed, there is no clear delineation of substructure and superstructure in this conception of change in which an economic concept, i.e., surplus value, is borrowed to depict attitudes and values without indicating the limits or logic of such an analogy.

Viewing internal colonialism as a "highly fluid system of domination," Flores makes no attempt to determine if racism is more a function of colonialism or an operational part of

it.[16] Compatible with the Barrera, Muñoz and Ornelas distinction between internal and external colonialism there is not apparent need to make such an assessment in the Flores model. All forms and manifestations of dependence blend together into colonialism that is bisected only into its internal and external parts by the knife of legal status. If colonialism is nothing more specific than domination and exploitation, however complex, then understandably "internal colonialism is nothing more than the domestic face of world imperialism," as Flores remarks elsewhere (along with Ronald Bailey).[17]

While Flores and Ronald Bailey have stressed the importance of being historical in understanding Chicano colonial status, it is Tomás Almaguer who, in a recent issue of *Aztlán*, has taken us furthest in developing a dialectic of Chicano colonialism.[18] Drawing on European history as a history of competing colonial forces, he brings into dialectical as well as historical perspective the conditions of contemporary Chicano oppression. In his dialectics of racial and class domination, Almaguer sees the expansion of mercantile and industrial capital as driving forces for colonial advantage that were preconditions for the absorption of half of the Mexican territory by the United States in a process of one group of colonizers overwhelming others. He reminds us that the United States was not the only colonizer in the area and that U.S. military and political predominance did not mean a complete cultural and social rout of the Mexicanos, but established a context of struggle and conflict that has in turn, determined the status and struggle of Chicanos today.

In reading Almaguer's account of the complex pattern of colonization that affected the people and area that became the Southwestern United States, I became mindful of the salient importance of Marx's discussions on capital accumulation and Lenin's thesis on imperialism, and recalled William A. Williams instructive survey of *The Making of the American Empire*. But why the legacy of this important colonial experience, which today manifests itself in the racism that we all have known as Chicanos, in the proletarianization of Chicano workers and in other forms of domination and exploitation, should be called internal colonialism is unclear to me--except as a function of an established definition that Almaguer has also assumed.[19]

With a little added help from Marx's writings, Almaguer can be cited to support the suggestion of making the transition from the model of internal colonialism to a model of post-colonialism. He contends that: "The foundation of Chicano oppression is based on the organization of social relations of production,"[20] to which one can add Marx's insight that "Social relations of productions, change, are transformed, with the change and development of the material means of production, the productive forces."[21] This is to say that the means of oppression changes and is transformed by the dialectics of market expansion. It is suggested that colonialism as a form

of oppression that defines social relations of production in a particular way changes and may be usefully transformed to a post-colonial means of exploitation once the proletarianization of a dependent people is realized. This pattern of development seems to have been particularly evident in the U.S. with the taking of territories followed by the *selective* granting of statehood.

The point to be made at this juncture is that the contemporary Chicano "situation" can more usefly be conceptualized as being in a state of post-colonial development which, as the term implies, must be understood within the dialectical context of its colonial experience. It is the *legacy* of colonialism that manifests itself in various post-colonial structures of economic and racial-cultural dependencies. As a dialectical process, colonialist oppression of the Mexicano and the Chicano has undergone a series of institutional quantitative changes that has produced a qualitative change that, I suggest, is not usefully or clearly understandable as a different face of colonialism. In addition to the arguments stated above, I would offer a number of other practical and analytic reasons for this shift in conceptual emphasis.

In the first place there is the problem of finding an ideological base in the Chicano movement for the negation of presumed colonialism, i.e., a distinct and salient Chicano nationalism (assuming as I do that nationalism means something more than cultural or ethnic identity). Central to the political nationalism is the idea of the struggle for self-determination not just the right to practice interest group politics equally. In its anti-colonial form, the teleology of nationalism is devoted to the liberation and self-government of a particular oppressed people. The Marxist-Leninist prototype of a model, is specific and rigorous in determining whether or not a distinct community constitutes a nation or potential nation. Stalin prescribes that there must be an "historically constituted" community of people with a common language, a common territory, a common economic life and a common "psychological make-up" that manifests itself in a common culture.[22] According to him a nation does not exist or "ceases to be a nation" if *all* of the features are not apparent. All of the characteristics are regarded as being necessary and sufficient for each other. For the Chicano nation-builder Stalin's is a most demanding model. Stalin can be rejected, of course, for his dogma or his rigor, but final questions concerning the existence of distinct territoriality, separatist politics and economic life must be answered in determining any reasonable concrete measure of Chicano nationalism.

Trapped by having accepted internal colonialism as a definition of Chicano political reality, some of my colleagues, it seems to me, have futilely attempted to interpret reformist politics as Chicano nationalism or, worse, as the power of the Chicano movement to de-colonize the United States.

The lack of political representation is cited as an important example of the political dimensions of internal colonialism by both those who have developed and those who have accepted the model.

The trouble with regarding the lack of representation as a significant aspect of colonialism is that electoral politics can then be logically viewed as an anti-colonialist activity. To stretch this notion to an absurd theoretical conclusion, each new Chicano representative can be cited as an example of the anti-colonial negation of having less or no representation! Regardless of the symbolic significance of the election of two Mexican American governors last year, my common sense tells me that as the number of Chicano elected officials in the Southwest increases, there will be less rather than more evidence of Chicano nationalism working as a force of anti-colonial national liberation. I think it ironic if understandable to admonish Chicanos to intensify their electoral participation as a part of the struggle against internal colonialism.[23]

Even El Partido de La Raza Unida, which has become a factor in Texas electoral politics in the name of justice and equity for Chicanos, finally is not a voice for Chicano nationhood. La Raza Unida, nevertheless, has emerged as a voice against the oppression and domination of Chicanos. Its candidates have sought power through the ballot box and the articulation of Chicano interest, by Chicanos for Chicanos, running for city council, school board seats and state and county offices. While the Partido seeks to redress the political oppression and economic exploitation of Chicanos in Texas and elsewhere, its aim is to reform and make the existing political system serve the interest of Chicanos. The activities of La Raza Unida remind us that one does not have to prove that there is colonialism, internal or external, or practice anti-colonialist politics to demonstrate and tactically respond to the inequities of exploitation.

Flores' conception of internal colonialism as the disparity between our psychological and social ideology on the one hand and our official, i.e., political ideology on the other hand, creates a distinct but related problem. In this schema, reducing the disparities between professed and actual beliefs becomes an anti-colonialist act. The "ideological transformation" that he calls for is, it seems to me, aimed more at making the 18th century promise of "American pluralism" work rather than developing Chicano liberation.[24] His idea of developing critical awareness and consciousness to combat well-developed patterns of psychological exploitation seems to be an approach to the legacy of colonialism rather than a direct anti-colonialist assault. He finds that in its growing sophistication, the Chicano movement increasingly has attacked institutional inequity and decreasingly attacked racist individuals.[25] The awareness that he suggests is developing is an interest group orientation toward gaining access to U.S. institutions.

In viewing the structures of the welfare system as an institutionalization of colonialism as Almaguer, for example, does, virtually all poor people are reduced to the status of the colonized. This is problematic for a number of reasons. First of all, this factor tends to equate class status with colonial status, erasing the essential distinction advanced by González-Casanova that colonialism must be understood to level class status for the colonized. Secondly, this factor is not particularly useful for demonstrating the colonization affecting Chicanos in that the largest number of poor people in this country are Anglos. Thirdly, even though Chicanos and Blacks may be disproportionately affected by *some* welfare bureaucracies, we find that the welfare bureaucracy does not govern the lives of most Chicanos and that large numbers of Chicanos have been excluded from the benefits of the welfare state. It is the exclusion of Chicanos, it seems to me, that is a part of the basic oppression and exploitation of the Chicano in relation to the Anglos who have taken relatively much from the public trough. To be sure, a welfare bureaucracy creates dependence. But it is odd to consider welfarism colonialist activity when so much energy in the Chicano movement has been spent on trying to make governmental agencies more responsive to the welfare of Chicanos. Is it colonialism and, if so, who are the anti-colonialists?

Finally, there is something to be learned and questioned in the recent comments of Carlos Muñoz on the politics of protest and Chicano liberation.[26] The most important thing he suggests to me is that we simply do not find ourselves in a colonialist situation. He laments that in the absence of a mass based working class organization, Chicano protest has been effectively channeled into the ongoing political process.[27] Yet he persists in conceptualizing about this phenomena within the framework of the model of internal colonialism asserting that the politics of *Chicano cultural nationalism* has been more of a politics of reform than of radical social change.

To view reformist politics as cultural nationalism I submit, begs an important question and assumes by definition the teleology of Chicano liberation. How novel to regard reformist politics as the stuff of national liberation. I would argue that Muñoz has engaged in reductionism in making trends he has assessed critically conform to an assumed definition of internal colonialism that is as questionable now as it was when it was formulated. Furthermore, I would suggest that the reformist thrust of progressive Chicano politics suggests that Chicano nationalism is not a very important political factor in and of itself.

III. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

Considering the extent of Chicano advocacy of reform and the interest in making pluralism work in this polity, it seems

to me we should be ready to close off the dead-ends of the model of internal colonialism but nevertheless extend the main Marxist track on which this theoretical perspective has taken Chicano social scientists. Barrera, Muñoz and Ornelas have demonstrated the need for critical models in our professions and have shown us the essential utility of understanding Chicano politics in relation to the forces of colonialism. Almaguer and Flores have highlighted the importance of casting our analysis of colonialism in a dialectical and historical mold. Following Almaguer and Flores, I underline the importance of setting such questions as the analysis of Chicano nationalism within a context of historical conflict. From this perspective, I am persuaded that we have passed into a post-colonial period in which Chicano progressives have become the leaders of a national minority seeking multicultural pluralism rather than an anti-colonial force seeking national liberation.

To reiterate, colonialism implies a particular pattern of exploitation. Conquest, suppression and separate political administration of an oppressed nation of people offer the clearest example of colonialism. In the case of Chicanos, this kind of colonialism did not abruptly end with the conclusion of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, but the Treaty signalled the beginning of a shift from colonialism to other forms of exploitation. Anglo land barons created the Texas Rangers to keep the Mexican colonized and resist the threats of separatism emanating from Mexican rebels in South Texas until the early part of the 20th century. The notorious "Santa Fe Ring" systematically went about undermining political and economic assurances of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. These are obvious examples of the trauma of U.S. imperialism effecting the Chicano. Moreover, the Rangers are still with us and most of the land of Nuevo México is owned by Anglos and the federal and state governments; and Chicano poverty in Northern Nuevo México and South Texas still suggests the reality of colonialism. But for most of us, this is the legacy of colonialism. Even among the Chicanos of Nuevo México and Texas, where the conditions of exploitation are the worst for large numbers of Chicanos, anti-colonial feelings that would nurture a sense of separate nationalism, it seems have been negated by the reality of reformist politics that seeks redress at the polls or from the courts. However, much of South Texas and Northern Nuevo México have remained in the colonial past. The areas of the Southwest where Anglos first came to clearly outnumber Mexicans were the first to pass into a political post-colonial status.

Territorial status under the U.S. system of government has been roughly equivalent to colonialism. The grant of statehood conversely, was a rough indicator of the beginning of the transition out of colonialism. It was in Texas that the Anglos first came to significantly outnumber Mexicans and first clearly demonstrated their political power in the Southwest--even before the war on México. It was Texas that first became a state in

1845 even before that war. However, the concentration of the Anglo domination of population in the eastern, central, and northern parts of the region created a special problem. It is this distortion of population distribution despite the Anglo numerical superiority that, I would argue, necessitated the maintenance of a quasi-colonialist regime in the southern region of the state while the rest of the state made an early transition to post-colonial status. The difference was that the Anglos could guarantee overall political and economic dominance through their demographic power while they needed to maintain regional colonialism to guarantee exploitation of the Mexicano in South Texas.

In California the number of Mexican and Anglo inhabitants was relatively balanced until after the Gold Rush of 1849--the Indians having been colonized by both. California became a state the next year. Nevada, according to Morison and Commager was "admitted prematurely in 1865 because the Republicans thought they needed its electoral vote."[28] For me the interesting thing about Nevada's admission only four years after it had been reorganized as a territory is that, having been the most extreme example of a mining region it attracted a safe Anglo population majority regardless of its overall size. Colorado had its rush of Anglos after the discovery of gold in the foothills of the Rockies in 1859 and after the development of the railroads in the seventies brought an influx of Anglo farmers. It became a state in 1876.

While having a culturally "safe" (note Utah's late admission date of 1896), and dominant Anglo population may not have been sufficient for statehood, it seems to have been necessary for the political rites of passage to post-colonial status. For Chicanos in the Southwest it was the adverse shift in demographic balance that initiated the beginnings of the post-colonial period. As is generally the case with dialectical conflict, the process of change was uneven. Resistance followed the new material and political reality, particularly in South Texas; but it was eventually quelled and new, more sophisticated forms of exploitation than colonialism were instituted where the scars of colonialism remain.

For us, there remain ample reasons to sustain our probes of U.S. society from the critical perspective that has been introduced by Barrerra, Muñoz, Ornelas, Almaguer, Flores and others. But it is important to relate these concepts more closely to the realities of contemporary Chicano history and politics. For this reason I would advocate conceptualizing the patterns of Chicano resistance, struggle and exploitation as a legacy of colonialism rather than as an example of internal colonialism.

I suggest the importance of looking at topics such as the following as post-colonial phenomena in order to delineate more complex patterns of exploitation, dependence and subordination and superordination: (a) economic dependence, economic entry and racism; (b) restriction of status mobility; (c) the impact

of sexism and feminism on Chicanos; (d) cultural suppression of Chicanos; (e) labor market segmentation of Chicanos; (f) the proletarianization and metropolitinization of Chicanos; (g) the imposition of bureaucratic dependence upon Chicanos; (h) symbolic representation of Chicanos and the meaning of Chicano voter participation.

NOTES

1. See Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).
2. Nick Vaca, "The Mexican American in the Social Sciences 1912-1970, Part II: 1936-1970," *El Grito* (Spring 1970).
3. Mario Barrera, Carlos Muñoz and Charles Ornelas, "The Barrio as an Internal Colony" in Harlan Hahn, ed., *People and Politics in Urban Society*, Vol. 6 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), pp. 465-498.
4. Tomás Almaguer, "Historical Notes or Chicano Oppression: The Dialectics of Racial and Class Domination in North America," *Aztlán-IJCSR*, Vol. 5 (Spring/Fall 1974), pp. 27-56.
5. Guillermo Flores and Ronald Bailey, "Internal Colonialism and Racial Minorities in the United States: An Overview" in Frank Bonilla and Robert Gerling, eds., *Structures of Dependency* (1973), pp. 149-160.
6. Barrera, Muñoz and Ornelas, op. cit., pp. 480-482.
7. See Robert Blauner, "Colonized and Immigrant Minorities" in his *Racial Oppression in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) and his "Internal Colonialism and Ghetto Revolt," *Social Problems* (Spring 1969), pp. 393-408.
8. William Appleman Williams, *The Great Evasion* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1964).
9. Barrera, Muñoz and Ornelas, op. cit., pp. 481-483.
10. Ibid., p. 481.
11. Ibid., p. 482.
12. Guillermo Flores, "Race and Culture in the Internal Colony: Keeping the Chicano in His Place" in Bonilla and Gerling, op. cit., pp. 189-223.
13. Barrera, Muñoz and Ornelas, op. cit., p. 483.
14. Ibid., p. 490.
15. Flores, op. cit.
16. Ibid., p. 201.
17. Flores and Bailey, op. cit., p. 154.
18. Almaguer, op. cit.
19. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
20. Ibid., p. 43.
21. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publicher, 1968), p. 81.
22. J. V. Stalin, *Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955), Vol. II, pp. 303-307.

23. For a good example of this see: Rodolfo Acuña, *Occupied America, The Chicano's Struggle Toward Liberation* (San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1972)--particularly the last chapter.

24. Flores, op. cit., p. 195.

25. Ibid., p. 215.

26. Carlos Muñoz, "The Politics of Protest and Chicano Liberation: A Case Study of Repression and Cooptation," *Aztlán*, Vol. 5 (Spring/Fall 1974), pp. 119-142.

27. Ibid., pp. 120-121.

28. Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager, *The Growth of the American Republic*, Vol. I (New York: Oxford Press, 1942), p. 703.

CHICANAS IN POLITICS: AN OVERVIEW AND A CASE STUDY*

EVEY CHAPA

Executive Director
Chicana Research and Learning Center
Austin, Texas

ARMANDO GUTIERREZ

Political Science
University of Texas, Austin

Over a quarter of a century ago Harold Lasswell characterized politics as "who gets what, when, and how." The complexity and depth of this seemingly simplistic statement is evident in the fact that even today, most political scientists adhere in one form or another to that concise definition. Perhaps the most important part of the definition lies in the fact that it not only concerns itself with the end results of politics, who gets the rewards and when, but also with the *process* through which these ends are achieved, that is, how. As such, it allows a much more meaningful and insightful approach to the mechanisms and techniques employed in the process of politics.

A most important point regarding Lasswell's definition is that there is no value judgment made on either the political process itself or the end result of politics. While many look upon politics as a corrupt and "dirty" game, and it often is, there is nothing *necessarily* corrupt and "dirty" about politics. It is only as politics is practiced in certain instances that it becomes such. Using the definition given, allows us to approach the study of politics without a jaundiced view of what we should expect to find.

Another equally important aspect of employing the definition given us by Lasswell, is that it makes clear that politics

is all encompassing. That is, virtually every act that the person makes in his or her everyday living is, or can be, a political act. It is important that we realize that the act is not necessarily political, but that it can be such. Thus, while the act of purchasing groceries may not be construed as political by the consumer, it does help to secure the economic standing of the owner, and may therefore secure his or her position as an "influential" in city, state, or even national politics.

Similarly, activities that may seem to be overtly personal may in fact have important political overtones. An important example is the use of devices to control family size. For the last quarter of a century or so, people all over the world have been told that they should begin controlling the size of their families in order to decrease poverty and suffering. Here in the United States, these messages have particularly been aimed at racial and cultural minorities--the Black, the Chicano, the Puerto Rican, the Native American and the poor white. Most recent demographic studies show that these groups are demonstrating a tendency to adhere to this advice. The political importance of this fact is that when an oppressed group accepts the blame for its own depressed economic and social conditions, the chances of that group rebelling against the dominant group are significantly decreased. Thus, in the case of fertility patterns, it is apparent that many of this nation's most dominated minorities have accepted the idea that their poverty is self-inflicted, that is, if they did not have so many children they would no longer be poor. Entire minority groups, therefore, spend generations attempting to rise out of poverty by adjusting their family patterns. Needless to say, such efforts effectively deflect disenchantment with the political, economic, and social order for decades at a time.

All of these ideas highlight the need for minorities to come to a much better understanding of the nature and process of politics. Effective political action is virtually impossible without such an understanding. The realization that even in one's poverty and depression there is still the potential for political power, is most fundamental to rebellion.

These arguments make clear the need to study politics. For the oppressed in particular the need to develop this clear understanding of the working of the econopolitical system is crucial. In recent years we have indeed seen an increase in the study of the system on the part of the oppressed groups of this society. Black writers and analysts have put together a relatively large body of literature on their thoughts regarding the direction which Black political and economic activities should take. More recently the same has begun to happen among Chicano thinkers.

This paper, however, seeks to move into an area a bit different from those mentioned above. It seeks to explore Chicanas in politics. Why such a move when the body of

literature on Chicano politics in general is still sadly lacking?

While the justification for such an undertaking should be self-evident, we feel it necessary to discuss what are extremely important theoretical and practical points which underlie our work. Without such a framework, this paper becomes nothing more than a compilation of historical facts which, while important in and of themselves, do little to further the liberation of a people too long oppressed.

First, it is important to discuss some of the dominant themes in the area of Chicano politics. There are, on the one hand, those who argue that it is necessary to preserve Chicano culture as a basis for the raising of self-esteem and as a platform from which to launch Chicano political activity. On the other hand, there exists the contradictory argument that Chicano culture must be destroyed in order to end polarization so that all peoples may begin to live together without fear and hostility. This argument implies that Chicano culture tends to inculcate and reinforce values that cause rigid boundaries between Chicanos and other peoples, thus creating hostility and racism towards all others, even those groups which have much in common with Chicanos.

It is a well established fact that one cannot interact with others on an equal basis and have a positive or non-racist view of others unless he or she has a firm sense of their own identity. In a society like that of the United States, based on monopoly capitalism, a commodity fetish is created which in turn fosters a system in which people are evaluated on the basis of what they have, rather than on who they are. This commodity fetish results in the loss of, or perhaps even in the lack of the development of, identity. The emphasis in such a setting is necessarily on material acquisitions, and, as a consequence, personal identity is sacrificed. People thus come to have a firm sense of what they have, but not of who they are--they lack identity.

The final result of this process is the complete identification on the part of the ethnic member with the identity and interests of the dominant group. Thus, the false consciousness of which Marx warned, comes to be inculcated in the ethnic member and he or she is no longer able to challenge the oppressive class. Such pernicious socialization can only be ended by the destruction of the institutions which inculcate and reinforce such false consciousness.

This destruction, coupled with the creation of alternative institutions to build a strong sense of ethnic identity, will allow people to create a society without racism. As long as success continues to be defined in terms of the acquisition of material and psychic commodities, the competition for these goods will reinforce fear and buttress the barriers between people. In simpler terms, it is called divide and conquer.

The same basic argument can be made of sexism. The only useful purpose it serves, is to reinforce those who control the econopolitical system of any given society--the ruling elites. Just as racial or cultural differences are used by these elites to divide groups whose interests are actually similar, such is the function of sexism. It is devastating enough to have divisions along ethnic and racial lines, but when divisions exist within these groups, the development of a sense of group solidarity, not to mention class solidarity, is virtually impossible. The end result is that unity within, as well as between, oppressed groups becomes highly difficult to achieve, thus perpetuating an oppressive social structure.

In a social system emphasizing the acquisition of commodities, individuals and groups seek to protect their acquiring power and strongly resist, sometimes violently, threats to that capacity. Men have come to measure their worth and develop their identities on the basis of how much they acquire, not only economically but also sexually. A man's identity is thus inextricably tied to how much he owns, including women. It is not surprising that men react in contradictory directions to the liberation of women. On the one hand, they are supportive to the extent that it effects women not immediately related to them such as wife and daughter, in regards to sexual mores. For the perception of the liberation of women by some men, perhaps more in hope than in fact, is that women will now be more "loose" in dress and behavior. The idea is that there will now be more women available and willing to engage in sex more freely. On the other hand, there exists the perception that the liberation of women, particularly those closely related to the male, will create a situation where he will now have a new competitor--the woman. Given the fact that this is a threat to his acquiring power, and by extension, to his identity, the male doggedly resists. Once again, we confront a situation where the interests of the dominant elite are protected by the division within those groups who supply the labor to make that elite powerful.

What we submit is that such division and conflict is not inherent in racial, cultural or sexual differences. Only in class differences is conflict inherent. What is more, there is evidence, both from the past and from the present, that division has not always been present and that unity is therefore achievable. We focus on one dimension of this topic--the Chicana within the political past and present of the Chicano people. By relating the ways in which Chicanos and Chicanas have worked together, as equals, we hope to break down one of the barriers to unity. It is difficult for a people who have had little opportunity to discover their past to know the lessons of that past and build from them. By compiling and presenting this information within the theoretical context delineated, we hope to add a small, but not insignificant, piece to the puzzle that will eventually allow us to see the

whole. In discovering this whole we should see that politics, "who gets what, when, and how," is not inherently evil. Only as it is practiced in specific political systems does it become the tool of the ruling elite to perpetuate its dominance. By discovering how this system has operated, and that the myths it has created about the Chicana and Chicano are only distortions meant to divide, perhaps we can continue to build the force for fundamental transformation, a transformation from a politics of "movidas" to one of "gente." To achieve this transformation requires the liberation of Chicanos and Chicanas. There cannot be a Chicano liberation struggle without a corresponding Chicana liberation struggle. It is crucial that Chicanas and Chicanos recognize this fact. To this end we dedicate this paper.

CHICANAS IN POLITICS

In examining the political realities of the Chicano community many dimensions can be considered. Few attempts, however, have been made to examine the efforts of la mujer Chicana in politics. If we are to believe that Chicanas are, or have been, involved in politics, then it would not be through the existing information readily available in the classrooms of this nation. The academic reality of la mujer Chicana is that her contributions to society have been ignored and, in the limited information which exists, la mujer Chicana is portrayed in a manner which precludes the possibility of political involvement. Anna Nieto-Gómez, editor of *Encuentro Femenil*, states this academic reality as a rationale for the development of Chicana Studies:

> The traditional presentation of the history and the culture of the forefathers of the Chicano has in the main been negative, and it has attached little if any importance to the contributions of the Chicano in the United States . . . If there should be occasion to mention these contributions, there is total absence of the Chicana and her life-giving contributions in agriculture, medicine, and art. The Chicana is never seen as a participant in history, much less as a generator of the historical process . . . Traditional sociological depictions of the Chicana also reflect attitudes entrenched in the social bias of sexist racism. Unfortunately, it has been these social attitudes that have summed up the qualities of the Chicana. If sociologists have described the Mexican people in general as passive, ahistorical, traditional and therefore non-progressive, they have treated the Chicana as a nonexistent being and as a receptacle without feeling or mind of her own.[1]

This section then, is devoted to determining the pattern of social biases which form the basis of most studies concerning la Chicana, as well as to surveying the existing literature in order to establish the extent of the neglect which exists concerning the contributions of la mujer Chicana. In addition, the political reality of the Chicano community will be explored through the eyes of Chicanas who are, and have been, disproving the negative stereotypes created by academicians.

The Politics of Being Chicana

There are certain political processes which must be considered when discussing the issue of the treatment of Chicanas by the academic community. Chicanas face *at least* a dual discrimination process, that of racism and sexism. The tendency to depict the Chicana in a very limited stereotypic category, as well as to ignore her as a valuable and contributing member of this society, demeans the very existence of the Chicano community and the persons therein. When you demean a person's existence by dwelling on the negative and misinterpreting life styles, family interaction and so forth, then this becomes the academic roots of the stereotypes which have been created and perpetuated about that person.

These discrimination processes are evident in reviewing the materials written by Anglos, both males and females, in reference to la mujer Chicana. According to male Anglo researchers concerned with the difference in political attitudes due to sex, the Chicana would fall into the apolitical category by virtue of the fact that she is a woman.

> The findings on sexual differences in political orientations have obvious sexist overtones to them. Women are seen as being generally less rational, interested and active in making politically important choices. Thus, the stereotype of the emotional, irrational, soap-opera preferring woman is carried into the political arena.[2]

It would seem logical that Chicanas would receive at least token treatment in those materials written by Anglo women, but, for the most part, such is not the case. The Anglo women are so concerned with disengaging themselves from the apolitical category in which they have been placed by Anglo males, that they tend to overlook the fact that not all women are Anglo. This is a different dimension in the discrimination process which may be considered, sexist racism.

> Sexist racism is manifested by those who consider and recognize only the needs of the single, Anglo and middle-class women. It is also reinforced when Anglo women are compared as more "politically active, educated" and in

> general superior to non-Anglo women who in turn are viewed as passive, apolitical and illiterate beings.[3]

Perhaps the neglect Chicanas have experienced as contributors to this society is preferable to the treatment Chicanas receive as a result of studies specifically developed to examine the Chicano community.

> The Chicana is depicted in most studies as a passive, submissive woman with masochistic tendencies. Examining the results of studies such as *Across the Tracks: Mexican Americans in a Texas City* by Arthur J. Rubel, or *Curanderismo: Mexican American Folk Psychiatry* by Ari Kiev, or *The Mexican American People: The Nation's Second Largest Minority* by Grebler, Moore and Guzmán, we are told that Chicanas all love to be dominated and/or beaten.[4]

These types of studies would lead the reader to believe that Chicanas cannot possibly have the desire to be involved in politics, after all she is, "submissive, unworldly and chaste,"[5] "naïve and rather child-like,"[6] as well as "faithful and obedient."[7]

Chicanas, however, experience a different political reality than those depicted by the above mentioned social science efforts. In reviewing Arthur J. Rubel's study, Sally Andrade, an instructor in psychology at Houston Community College, states:

> Events of the last ten years seem to indicate that many Chicanos, young and old, do not accept Dr. Rubel's thesis or conclusions. But, then could a Black or Chicano anthropologist go into Appalachia for two years, study seven families intensively, administer a questionnaire to fifty migrant families and another fifty-four women--and then generalize his/her results to White America? I think not.[8]

Ari Kiev's study is also being questioned by Chicanas. Anna Nieto-Gómez states:

> Kiev reinforces this image of the superfatalistic masochistic woman. Indeed, Kiev goes one step further to explain how functional masochism can be in a world she cannot control . . . The myth of masochism perpetrates the sexist attitude toward women in general. Instead of describing the Chicana, Kiev may be projecting his own values concerning masculinity . . . At the same time the author's nationalistic perceptions of a fatalistic and passive culture tend to exaggerate this myth of the masochistic woman to the twenty-third power![9]

Perhaps those who should be questioning these studies more than anyone, are the Chicanas who are involved in politics. When Virginia Muzquiz, County Clerk of Zavala County, Texas, was given the opportunity to comment on the opinions of social scientists concerning la mujer Chicana, she responded:

> I would say that they are not right. These are ideas that have been invented about us and actually it is just the opposite. I would say that the reason la mujer Mejicana was not involved in politics before is because she did not have the opportunity, just as her men did not. Those statements are made precisely so that they will stay in our heads; they want us to think that we just want to stay home. This is not true because the history of la mujer Mejicana demonstrates that there were many women who dared--women who were great because of their daring. Therefore, it is not as the Anglos say and I would never accept this; that they don't want us to have the opportunity is something else.[10]

It would appear then that Chicanas do have opinions and perhaps could be involved in politics. This, however, is difficult to begin to understand since Chicanas are almost totally excluded from the curricula in many textbooks used at the university level. Two examples in which this occurs are *Introduction to Chicano Studies* edited by Livie Isauro Durán and H. Russell Bernard and, *Chicano Politics* edited by F. Chris García. Chicanas are also virtually excluded in *Occupied America: The Chicano's Struggle Toward Liberation* by Rodolfo Acuña and in *North from Mexico* by Carey McWilliams. These four documents are among those utilized by the academic community to fill the historical void concerning Chicanos. There is, however, a void within these efforts--la mujer Chicana.

Even though the treatment of la mujer Chicana is extremely limited in these particular documents Marta Cotera, a Chicana librarian and researcher in Texas, states that Chicanas have:

> . . . a long, beautiful history of Mexicano feminism which is not Anglo inspired, imposed or oriented . . . In fact, the entire community should be proud of the feminists in our history. We have a rich legacy of heroines and activists in social movements and armed rebellions from which we can draw models to emulate.[11]

Chicanas are developing the resources and the expertise necessary to implement the efforts to fill the information void concerning their involvement and contributions. They feel that the void has existed too long and some mujeres from California state their opinion in this manner:

> Over the years (350) there has been an acute absence of literature concerning the Chicana woman. This vacuum of literature has perpetuated myths and in effect had led people to believe that Chicanas have no significant role in society other than the impression that the Mexican woman has nothing to say and/or she does not care to participate in society. Like most assumptions these implications are not true.[12]

Chicanas do not believe that the image which has been imposed upon her by the academic community is valid. They are, in fact, declaring that they have been, and will continue to be involved.

> The Chicano community has traditionally encouraged the participation of aggressive women because of its more humanistic legal and educational system. And in the Movement in the United States, the Chicana has enjoyed full participation in all aspects, whether social, political, or militant.[13]

Chicanas and Their Political Reality

Chicanas then, are rejecting the long imposed stereotypes. Further, Chicanas are beginning to offer alternatives to these stereotypes based on their own perspective within their own cultural context. The alternatives are emerging in the form of research efforts and published materials about Chicanas, by Chicanas. At this point we will begin to examine this information which counters the stereotypic ideas concerning la mujer Chicana. First of all, one should realize who the Chicana is. According to Consuelo Nieto:

> She [la Chicana] cannot be defined in precise terms. Her diversity springs from the heritage of the indio, the español, and the mestizo. The heterogeneous background of her people defies stereotyping. Her roots were planted in this land before the Pilgrims ever boarded the Mayflower. As a bicultural person, she participates in two worlds . . . The Chicana seeks to affirm her identity as a Mexican American and a woman and to define her role within this context.[14]

With the richness of her background, la mujer Chicana has emerged throughout the history of her people to involve herself as an active participant in the historical/political process. The precursors of la mujer Chicana, las Mejicanas, set high standards of political involvement. La Mejicana has participated at all levels, as propagandists, suffragists, army officers and as political activists. In an article entitled, "La Mujer de la Revolución," Marta Cotera states:

> The women who fought for the Independence of Mexico were not five or six in number, they were thousands and they were from all social classes and from all parts of the Republic (of Mexico). And this was not the first time that the Mexicana woman had fought for her people nor was it the last. In the War for Reform of 1850, she also fought against the French and in the 1910 Revolution she also fought for justice for the poor.[15]

These incidences were not isolated nor were they few.

> When the woman has seen the suffering of her people she has always responded bravely and as a totally committed and equal human being. In battle she fought alongside the men. Out of the Mexican Revolution came the revolutionary personage "Adelita" who wore a rebozo crossed at the bosom as a symbol of a revolutionary woman in Mexico.[16]

Despite their activism in the military for social justice, the social and political status of la mujer Mejicana did not change when the 1917 Constitution was drafted. Demonstrating their determination, Mejicanas began to organize and activate for their rights. The period between the drafting of the 1917 Constitution and the passage of the constitutional amendment designed to give Mexican women full citizenship, including the right to vote, was filled with feminist and suffragist activities by Mejicanas. Their efforts were not expended in vain and Mejicanas received their full rights as citizens of México on July 7, 1959. In 1959, *Time* magazine printed a short article entitled, "Promise Kept":

> Just before his December 1 inauguration, President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines had a visit to his office from a resolute feminist named Amalia de Castillo Ledón. The conversation was brief and businesslike: "Senor Ruiz Cortines, will you carry out your promise soon?" "Yes," answered Don Adolfo. "Could it be immediately?" "Yes," answered Don Adolfo. Last week President Ruiz Cortines made good on his promise. Smiling down from the congressional gallery as the proposal was read (giving Mexican women full citizenship), was Amalia Ledón.[17]

Chicanas also have a strong history of feminism and/or direct involvement although not as well documented. These were women who against tremendous odds faced by a colonized people, activated, organized, and died for the rights of Chicanos. There are many illustrious examples:

> Sara Estella Ramírez who was a labor organizer from Laredo, Texas, during the period 1900-1909,

Teresa and Andrea Villarreal, sisters who were also involved in labor organizing during 1905-1915,

Jovita Idar and Soledad Flores de Peña who were among those who organized the first Mexican Feminist League in Laredo, Texas, in 1911,

Emma Tenayuca who was one of the leaders of the Pecan Shellers Strike of 1938 in San Antonio, Texas, and

Luisa Moreno who was a leader and a national organizer for the United Cannery, Agricultural and Packing Workers of America in 1938.

Moving into a more contemporary time in the Chicano Movement, many Chicanas presently can be acknowledged as we record our history:

María L. Hernández of Lytle, Texas, is a prominent Chicana educational and social reformer and orator in the San Antonio area. She is a Chicana leader who has maintained an activist role since 1924. Her interest in the welfare of the Chicano community is demonstrated by her efforts to organize La Orden Caballero de América in 1929 as well as La Liga de Defensa Escolar in San Antonio from 1935 to 1940 and again in 1945. She continues her activities in the 1970's at the age of 78 and actively participates in Raza Unida Party politics.

Virginia Muzquiz of Crystal City, Texas, is acknowledged as the political mother of José Angel Gutiérrez, the founder of Raza Unida Party. She has been active in politics since the 1950's and held the position of Chairwoman of Raza Unida Party in Zavala County during its developing stages. Statewide, she is recognized as an orator and community organizer. Her accomplishments include: organizer of Mujeres por la Raza Unida in Zavala County, statewide consultant to Raza Unida Party organizers on the *Texas Election Laws* and in 1973, she was elected "Chicana del Año" by Raza Unida Party. In 1974 she ran for, and won, the position of County Clerk in Zavala County under Raza Unida Party.

Elena Díaz of Crystal City, Texas, is presently serving as County Commissioner of Zavala County. In 1972, she became the first Chicana elected to office under the banner of Raza Unida Party. She has maintained an active role in the development of the Chicano community on various local committees and as a social worker.

Marta Cotera of Austin, Texas, is the leading Chicano document specialist in Texas and presently is a researcher with the Mexican American Council for Economic Progress. She is a political activist in her own right and a dedicated wife, mother and careerwoman, as well as an eloquent speaker for the rights of Chicanos and Chicanas.

Continuing to cite examples of contemporary activities which Chicanas have been documenting:

> On April 4, 1971, in Pharr, Texas, the mother of Alonso Loredo Flores, victim of the so called Pharr "riot," called a Marcha de Mujeres (Women's March) to protest police brutality and the killing of her son. Chicanas from throughout the state answered her plea and marched on Palm Sunday despite heavy rainfall.
>
> In the summer of 1972, a Chicana Caucus was formed at the first convention of the Texas Women's Political Caucus in Mesquite, Texas. Chicanas from throughout the state attended and activated for resolutions relevant to Chicanas. Among the resolutions the Chicanas presented and passed was one endorsing Raza Unida Party as a means to involve more mujeres in politics.
>
> On April 17, 1973, the Chicana Research and Learning Center was incorporated in the state of Texas. The Chicana Center is the first institution established in the nation which is concerned not only with providing community-oriented, social service activities but also with implementing research projects for Chicanas.
>
> In the Spring of 1973, the first issue of *Encuentro Femenil* was published by Chicanas from California who called themselves "Hijas de Cuauhtemoc." This marked the creation of the first Chicana feminist publishing organization as well as the first Chicana feminist journal.
>
> On August 4, 1973, in San Antonio, Texas, the first statewide Conferencia de Mujeres por la Raza Unida was held. The organization was created to give a working political knowledge to la mujer involved in el Partido de la Raza Unida (Raza Unida Party) and to involve more women in the efforts to develop a viable political alternative in the state of Texas. Two hundred Chicanas from all over the state attended and expressed a desire to continue to politically educate more women throughout Texas.

Only as we continue to examine the political realities of the Chicano community and as more investigative efforts are developed can an understanding be reached concerning what Chicanas are saying. They are telling the academic community that they do have a feeling of themselves as historical beings within their cultural context. They are saying that political involvement has always been a part of their lives. Perhaps their involvement is not totally documented at this point, this is why they are implementing the efforts necessary to bring their political reality into the academic community.

Chicanas in Crystal City, Texas

The majority of the experiences of las mujeres de Tejas in the political arena, on a large scale, paralleled and very often complimented the development of Raza Unida Party in Texas. The implication of the events which occurred to allow for a city and county to be controlled by Chicanos through the efforts of a third political party are indeed profound. These implications are described by Virginia Muzquiz, one of the primary organizers of Raza Unida Party in the following manner:

> La Raza Unida Party was born in Crystal City, Texas, a community situated 120 miles south of San Antonio and 45 miles from the Mexican border at Eagle Pass, Texas. For years Crystal City was known as the "Spinach Capitol." Now many Chicanos have come to think of Crystal as the "Capitol of Aztlan," the new Chicano nation.[18]

The prophecy of the academic community that Chicanas would be excluded or exclude themselves from political participation because of cultural or sexual traits, is not a reality in Crystal City nor in the statewide efforts of Raza Unida Party. A study was conducted in 1971, to investigate the effect of political liberation upon the social and political awareness of Chicano youth in grades 7 through 12 in Crystal City. Given past studies on women, one would generally expect to find lower levels of political awareness in the Chicanas, less negative perceptions of our political system and less support for the more militant forms of political activity. Such was not the case. Chicanas in Crystal City, even at these young ages, were found to be politically aware and interested.[19] It is no wonder then that Chicanas have made tremendous contributions to Raza Unida Party at all levels--as precinct workers, as candidates and as party officers.

> During 1971, in the formative stages of the development of Raza Unida Party as an official party in Texas, a phenomenal event took place for mujeres. Raza Unida Party was the only political party which included in its Platform a section devoted to la mujer. The precedent set by this fact has had, and will continue to have, a tremendous effect in involving more mujeres in Raza Unida Party.[20]

Summarizing the section of the Platform entitled "La Mujer": Raza Unida Party declares the belief in the family structure as the basis of development, but also clearly states that it must be a *total* development of the family--men, women and children. Raza Unida Party resolves in this section of the Platform de la mujer, that equal rights includes mujeres no matter what their status in life. In addition, Raza Unida Party

resolves "that the participation of women, to include the decision-making positions of Raza Unida Party, be actively continued through political education and recruitment of women."[21]

Paralleling the total development of Raza Unida Party on a statewide basis was the development of Mujeres por la Raza Unida. The actual planning stages of Mujeres por la Raza Unida did not begin until January of 1973. Mujeres, however, had already become involved at all levels of the development of Raza Unida Party and this mujer organization was planned as a vehicle to involve more mujeres, through political education, and to encourage their active participation. After the first statewide meeting held in the summer of 1973, eight regional Mujeres por la Raza Unida conferences were held throughout the state. The success factor was incredible. Virginia Muzquiz believes that "the Mujeres por la Raza Unida conference held in Crystal City in December of 1973 was a great success, and was very instrumental in encouraging more mujeres to become involved politically."[22] So much so that on February 4, 1974, in Crystal City, six mujeres filed for office out of the eight candidates who were running under Raza Unida Party. Of these six, five were elected and one lost by a marginal vote. The five mujeres were elected to the positions of district clerk, district treasurer, county clerk, and two justice of the peace positions. This adds to the county commissioner position and two school board positions already held by mujeres in Crystal City. Eight Chicanas in Crystal City have conducted strenuous campaigns and have been elected to positions of responsibility in the realm of Chicano politics.

Interviews were held with three of these elected officials, Virginia Muzquiz, the County Clerk who is the immediate past Chairwoman of Raza Unida Party in Zavala County; Elena Díaz, a County Commissioner who was the first Chicana elected under Raza Unida Party; and Mercedes (Chachi) Ruiz Cásares, a school board member. It was found that each of these mujeres maintained political attitudes which were extremely sophisticated. In addition, each of the mujeres articulated a political reality that was based on a knowledge of the community, pride in themselves as mujeres, and a commitment to their people.

It would appear that being apolitical is not inherent in Chicanas and that in fact, Chicanas in Crystal City demonstrate a strong interest in politics. Examining the factors which effected the political motivations of these three women, it was found that these mujeres voiced similar opinions. Each of the three mujeres stated that the following factors influenced their decision to become involved: (1) a concern for the community, (2) encouragement from la familia, friends and/or other mujeres and (3) the emergence of Raza Unida Party in Crystal City.

The 1971 Raza Unida Party Platform states that the goals of the party shall be to create a "humanistic alternative" in

order to serve the "needs of the individual communities and the general populace" by "ending the causes of poverty, misery and injustices."[23] It is no wonder then that these three women who are elected officials in Crystal City were attracted to Raza Unida Party. Even before Raza Unida Party came into existence, each of them had been involved in, or concerned with, serving the needs of their community. Virginia Muzquiz, who has been involved in politics for twelve years, stated that she had been concerned with the needs of the people of Crystal City even before her political activities. Although her efforts as an advocate for the people had been successful, she finally came to the realization that the only manner in which she could really help the people was to enter into politics. In her words, "a politician should serve the people by acting as a mediator between people and those institutions which are there to meet their needs. I have always done this but now in my position as county clerk, I am able to do this with more authority."[24] It would seem that if you are involved in the community and maintain that politics is another way to serve the people, then the transition from community advocate to politician should not be difficult. Elena Díaz reaffirms this by stating that:

> Serving as county commissioner is not difficult. It is like any other organization in which you have to attend meetings. I feel that serving in this position is the same as other community activities, if you are used to serving on committees and so forth. If you serve on a committee you serve to help the people therefore it is just the same as a political position.[25]

Mercedes Ruiz Cásares reinforced these ideas through her political philosophy by simply stating that she became involved in politics because, "I want to help my people."[26]

These three women who shared a concern for their community each decided to further serve by becoming involved politically. They stated that they did not experience opposition because they were women and had in fact been encouraged to become involved. Mercedes Ruiz Cásares feels that her family not only provided moral support but also encouraged her. She was provided by her parents with a political orientation because of their concern for the community. In addition, her husband is very supportive. She gives her brother credit for assisting her in the campaign to become elected to the school board.[27] When Elena Díaz was asked if she had received opposition because she was a woman, she stated that:

> It was not important that I was a woman or a man. Since the people in the community had known me for many years they were all interested in seeing me win. All of the women were happy that one of us had been encouraged to

> run and I never received opposition from the men. For this reason I feel that I never experienced opposition because of the fact that I, as a woman, was running for office.[28]

Since Virginia Muzquiz was the first Mejicana to run for office in the area and has served as a model throughout the state of Texas for many young Chicanas aspiring to political positions, one would wonder where she received her encouragement. She described historical and contemporary factors as providing her with encouragement to become involved. She is familiar with the involvement of la mujer Mejicana in a historical sense and says that Josefa Ortíz de Domínguez, who was involved in the Movement for Mexican Independence, serves as her model. In her present activities she has received no opposition from the community which she serves and acknowledges José Angel Gutiérrez, the founder of Raza Unida Party, for serving as her campaign manager when she first ran for office in 1964.[29]

Since these women wanted to be involved in politics and in fact were supported in their efforts, then some influence outside of their control must have deterred them. All three women do state that before Raza Unida Party they did not have the opportunity to run for office because of the Anglo male-dominated political system which existed in Crystal City. Each woman, as she described the political situation for mujeres before Raza Unida Party, stated that the Anglo did not allow political opportunities for Chicanos or Chicanas. It was not until after Raza Unida Party came into control that Chicanas were provided these political opportunities. Virginia Muzquiz describes what happened in this manner:

> The idea of Raza Unida Party became a realization and we saw that it was a good idea. It was then that the idea of influencing the involvement of more women florished. We begin to see mujeres become more interested and presently here in Zavala County we have many women involved in politics and holding political office.[30]

The example set by the Chicanas in Crystal City through Raza Unida Party can only serve to reinforce the ideas of mujeres who express an interest and commitment to be involved politically. It is important to note that these efforts are not isolated since mujeres have run for office through Raza Unida Party all over the state of Texas and in fact, forty-nine percent (49%) of the delegates who attended the Raza Unida Party state convention in 1974, were mujeres. The idea that mujeres would be excluded from politics in a political movement which is dominated by Chicanos appears not to exist even in other states. In many other areas where Raza Unida Party is being organized, platforms have been written

expressing similar concerns that men and women work together to develop Raza Unida Party.

The stereotypes which have been created by the academic community concerning la mujer Chicana have been invalidated not only by las mujeres of Crystal City but also by Chicanas throughout the nation. In conjunction with Chicano Studies programs being implemented on the campuses of this nation, Chicanas are beginning to develop an area of study concerning la mujer Chicana. In these academic efforts, Chicanas are faced with a two-fold task--that of refuting what has been written by the academicians and that of establishing relevant and accurate documentation concerning la mujer Chicana. That they face a difficult task which will require tremendous energies does not deter them. Chicanas have already proven their worth to the Chicano community and have the knowledge and experience to complete the task.

CONCLUSION

The intent of this paper has been to examine the political experiences, both past and present, of the mujer Chicana within the theoretical context of domination and subordination. As such the authors attempted to discuss and explode some of the myths about the Chicana's role in Chicano political history. Moreover, an examination of a case study where Chicanas have been able to overcome obstacles and play an active role in the Chicano liberation struggle evidences the possibilities of future involvement.

The paper began by presenting a theoretical framework based on the need to recognize the fact that male-female divisions within the Chicano community as products of the stereotypes imposed by the dominant society concerning Chicano political history, only serve to perpetuate the subordinate status of Chicanos and Chicanas in the United States. The paper then examines some of the dominant myths which social science has created and perpetuated. These myths, that the Chicana is a submissive, passive woman, incapable of, and uninterested in, political involvement, have been explored and disproven. Chicanas have, through their direct involvement in the historical/political process of the Chicano community proven themselves not only interested in, but capable of, assuming an active role in this process.

It is not enough, however, to describe Chicanos' past political involvement; the socio-economic characteristics of the Chicano community make it clear that such efforts have not had as their effect the termination of the Chicanos' subordination within the United States. The evidence of Crystal City, however, makes it clear that positive steps towards the end to the subordination is possible. Further, Crystal City demonstrates that Chicanos and Chicanas have seen the need for working together towards the liberation of the Chicano community.

The Chicanas and Chicanos in Crystal City have utilized the lessons of the past to develop a truly liberating ideology, as manifested in Raza Unida Party. Perhaps the greatest significance of this development is that the question of gender is no longer a determinant of political competence. As Elena Díaz so concisely stated, "It was not important that I was a woman or a man." Only the questions of involvement and commitment were considered as her qualifications. If an individual, male or female, is unaware of the historical antecedents for unity in political action, then Crystal City as a model for such unification becomes a contemporary precedent.

Without this knowledge, however, the void which has existed will continue to exist. This paper thus sought not only to present a brief sketch of Chicanas' past political involvement but also to examine continuing political involvement in a contemporary setting. This paper can be viewed only as a preliminary effort. Although phenomenal amount of efforts have been undertaken by a relatively few number of researchers, that the true story of the Chicana in relationship to the Chicano community has only begun to emerge, evidences not only the neglect of the past but also the task of the future.

NOTES

*This paper was written in a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect in an effort to bring the concerns of Chicanos and Chicanas into a realistic perspective and to begin to create a unified ideology entre hombres y mujeres.

1. Anna Nieto-Gómez, "Un Propósito Para Estudios Femininles de la Chicana," *New Directions in Education: Estudios Femininles de la Chicana* (California: Montal Educational Associates, 1974), pp. 4-5.

2. Armando Gutiérrez, "The Socialization of Militancy: Chicanos in a South Texas Town," Ph.D. dissertation, Political Science, University of Texas at Austin, 1974, p. 94.

3. Anna Nieto-Gómez, "La Feminista," *Encuentro Femenil*, Vol. I, No. 2 (1974), p. 34.

4. Evey Chapa, "La Mujer Chicana: A Historical and Sociological Overview." A presentation to Texas Christian University, Brite Divinity School, November 14, 1974. Unpublished manuscript, Chicana Research and Learning Center, p. 10.

5. Arthur J. Rubel, *Across the Tracks: Mexican Americans in a Texas City* (Austin: The University of Texas, 1966), pp. 67-68.

6. Leo Grebler, Joan W. Moore and Ralph C. Guzmán, *The Mexican American People: The Nation's Second Largest Minority* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 363.

7. Ari Kiev, *Curanderismo: Mexican American Folk Psychiatry* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 59-60.

8. Sally Andrade, "Chicana Attitudes Toward Family Planning, Project Reviews #1," Unpublished manuscript, Chicana Research and Learning Center, 1974, p. 3.
9. Anna Nieto-Gómez, op. cit., p. 5.
10. Virginia Muzquiz, "Entrevista con Virginia Muzquiz." Chicana Research and Learning Center Tape File. (Transcribed by Evey Chapa), 1975.
11. Marta Cotera, "La Mujer Mejicana: Mexicano Feminism," *Magazin*, Vol. 1, No. 9 (1973), p. 30.
12. Anna Nieto-Gómez, Adelaida R. del Castillo, Corinne Sánchez, and Martha López, eds., *Encuentro Femenil*, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 3.
13. Marta Cotera, op. cit., p. 32.
14. Consuelo Nieto, "The Chicana and the Civil Rights Movement, a Perspective," *Civil Rights Digest* (Spring, 1974), p. 36.
15. Marta Cotera, "La Mujer de la Revolución," *La Verdad*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (September 16, 1973), p. 6.
16. Enriqueta Longauex y Vásquez, "The Women of La Raza," *Regeneración*, Vol. II, No. 4, p. 34.
17. *Time*, Vol. 60, No. 25 (1959), p. 31.
18. Virginia Muzquiz, "Gaining Control," *Event*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 1974), p. 18.
19. Armando Gutiérrez, op. cit., pp. 122-125.
20. Evey Chapa, "Mujeres por la Raza Unida," *Caracol* (October 1974), p. 3.
21. "La Mujer," *Texas Raza Unida Party, A Political Action Program for the '70's*, 1971-72.
22. Virginia Muzquiz, "Entrevista con Virginia Muzquiz," Chicana Research and Learning Center Tape File. (Transcribed by Evey Chapa), 1975.
23. "Preamble," *Texas Raza Unida Party, a Political Action Program for the '70's*, 1971-72.
24. Virginia Muzquiz, op. cit.
25. Elena Díaz, "Entrevista con Elena Díaz," Chicana Research and Learning Center Tape File. (Transcribed by Evey Chapa), 1975.
26. Mercedes Ruiz Cásares, "Entrevista con Mercedes Cásares," Chicana Research and Learning Center Tape File. (Transcribed by Evey Chapa), 1975.
27. Ibid.
28. Elena Díaz, op. cit.
29. Virginia Muzquiz, op. cit.
30. Ibid.

TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLITICIZATION OF LUMPENPROLETARIAT: A DRAMATURGICAL FIRST LOOK

DAVID MONTEJANO

Sociology,
Yale University

This paper has some modest goals--modest if only because the analysis presented here is admittedly tentative and incomplete.[1] This paper should be viewed rather as an attempt to work out some ideas in a perhaps uncommon way. The dramaturgical approach suggested here emerged in a "grounded" manner in the course of my participant-observation experiences with a Brown Beret chapter in its formative period. The significance of appearance was clearly indicated by the consistent emphasis on uniform dress and, in particular, on the wearing of the beret. What made such emphasis sociologically important and interesting, however, were the organizational dynamics associated with the dramaturgy of uniform dress. Two aspects of this relation should be mentioned here.

On the one hand, the uniform and especially the beret proved to be an effective visible cue for attracting public attention. Even among people who did not know what the beret represented, there generally was a minimal reaction such as stares, smiles, frowns, winks, disapproving nods, and so forth. A dramaturgically significant feature of wearing the beret lay in this everyday vulnerability to public reaction.

On the other, personal behavior varied according to whether one was in "dress" or in street clothes. Considering that the membership was overwhelmingly recruited from the barrios's street-corner or vacant-lot society, such behavioral code switching would seem to be an important "middle" ground where batos locos socialized to everyday street life could acquire a public presentation of self.[2] Wearing the beret, then, not

only identified one publicly and thus made one vulnerable to public reaction, but simultaneously regulated code switching between "offstage" (private) and "frontstage" (public) behavior.

It should be emphasized that my argument concerning behavioral code switching is simply that it was necessary for a group composed of *lumpenproletariat* interested in presenting themselves as a political organization. I do not argue: (1) that such a middle ground is a transitory state, for the batos could (and did) either continue being politicized or return to their former street life; or (2) that behavioral code switching signifies politicization. The relation of code switching as well as of public visibility with politicization occurs indirectly through the complex group dynamics of an emerging political organization. The immediate task of the present paper is to delineate the dynamics revolving about the organization's major symbol, a brown beret. A dramaturgical analogy offers, then, a promising and parsimonious manner of presenting one important dimension involved in the politicization of this lumpenproletariat group.[3]

THE CHAPTER INTRODUCED

Only a few veteran members remained active Brown Berets after a serious and extensive personal conflict had caused the large city-wide Beret organization to disintegrate in the Spring of 1974. The conflict had been a serious setback. The organization no longer maintained its headquarters, an abandoned house which the Berets had occupied and fixed some two years before. More importantly, the experienced leadership which had created a network of organizational contacts over these two years were also gone. Nonetheless, Miguel and Paco, brothers and leaders of their local neighborhood chapter (the city-wide organization consisted of such local chapters), were determined to maintain the organization. Miguel, who now considered himself the jefe of the organization, began a recruitment campaign. Within two weeks, ten new members were recruited, a group which together with Miguel and Paco would constitute the core membership on which this present research is based.[4]

In order to facilitate discussion, an organizational roster (names are fictitious) with some biographical information follows. Where applicable, two ranks are shown--the first indicating the rank at which the individual entered the group, the second indicating his final rank. A single rank listing indicates no mobility during the research period. Concerning occupational information, the last specific job is listed in the case of those unemployed. "Unskilled laborer" is used whenever one's work was identified as highly transient and described in general terms (e.g., construction work, dishwashing).

List 1

Organizational Roster of Brown Beret
Chapter Under Research

Name	Age	Position	Occupation
Core Group:			
*Miguel	29 yrs.	prime minister	occupational therapist's aide
*Paco	32	lieutenant	unemployed house painter
Javalina	28	sgt.--major	aircraft painter
Memo	25	private--major	unemployed truck driver
Pancho	24	private--major	unemployed elevator operator
Monte	27	major	sociologist
Fat Louie	19	private--sgt.	unemployed unskilled laborer
Skinny Louie	16	private	unemployed unskilled laborer
Gibo	19	private	unemployed unskilled laborer
Rafael	20	private	unemployed unskilled laborer
Lopez	20	private	body and fender man
Giant	26	private	shoe shine man
Later Core Members:			
Tino	30 yrs.	major	machinist
Red	27	sgt.	unemployed semi-skilled laborer
Jorge	21	(refused rank)	college freshman
Peripheral Group (most stable):			
*Beto	26 yrs.	major	nurse's aide
*Turo	24	major--sgt.	Army private
*Tono	28	major	unemployed railroad laborer
Manuel	29	no rank	unemployed unknown
Pedro	53	no rank	semi-employed house painter
Mexicles	24	no rank	unskilled laborer
**Mique	30	no rank	unknown

Source: Field notes.

*Veteran members.
**Ex-Beret with rank of major.

A few additional points should be made in order to complete an elementary introduction to the Berets. The berets used by the organization were made in France and could be bought only at one military store--a rather obscure one at that--in the entire state. Fortunately for this chapter this store was in town. It wasn't uncommon to have Beret members from out-of-town chapters drive several hundred miles round-trip in order to buy berets. The accoutrements of the beret were one set of crossed rifles, centered and placed two fingers above the head band, and a parche--the emblem of the organization--which had to be sewn slightly to the left of the crossed rifles, four fingers above the head band. Any rank insignia had to be placed immediately above the crossed rifles.

This--a fully dressed beret--constituted the minimal uniform. The brown military jacket was deemed optional. The cost outlay--which varied, since the store owner knew well he had a monopoly--could be considerable:

brown beret.	$2.50	
crossed rifles	.75	
rank insignia.	.75	
	$4.00	minimum
military jacket.	8.50	(optional)
	$12.50	

The parche itself has an interesting history and symbolism, which unfortunately could only be alluded to in this paper. What is important to know is that, at the time of this research, these parches could no longer be obtained from the manufacturer with whom the Berets had contracted previously. This meant that new Beret members had to compete with each other for the fully dressed beret of a veteran member who had been "kicked out" or had withdrawn from the organization.

METHODOLOGY

In discussing the dramaturgy or symbolism of dress, some obvious questions which can be used to guide content analysis suggest themselves. Who can wear this symbol? What rules govern its wearing? What does the wearing or non-wearing do? Finally, What does this symbol mean for the user? These questions were basic criteria in reviewing references to the beret and uniform extracted from my field notes. Several reviews of this collection were made in attempting to cluster the references into qualitatively distinct categories which would focus on the visibility of the beret as an organizational symbol and on the process of behavioral code switching. The working category schema which finally crystallized classified the reference items in the following manner: statements or observations which: (1) associated public Beret behavior with the wearing of the beret (frontstage); (2) referred to the wearing of the beret and associated public reaction (visibility); (3) were directed towards the proper wear of the beret (rules of appearance); (4) referred to the organizational control of the beret as a symbol (distributional control); (5) indicated the personal feelings of a member towards the beret (cathetic commitment); (6) indicated the organizational definition of the beret (formal meaning); and (7) could not be classified into the preceding six categories (a residual category).

Since I believed that the dramaturgical arguments to be presented, if valid, should be able to withstand a rigorous control over the content analysis of my field notes, the procedure in which statements and observations were codified was operationally conservative. This means, specifically three

things: (1) only those references which occurred in a group context were coded. Statements and observations which involved only the researcher and one other individual were, for the present paper, excluded. (2) Only those references which explicitly indicated wearing of the uniform or beret were coded; this is a particularly important point, we shall see, when discussing frontstage behavior. Since a public performance for a Beret *means* wearing at minimum the beret, one could argue that all references to frontstage behavior was at least an indirect reference to beret use. Again, for the sake of avoiding any over-interpretation, statements and observations which implied, however strongly, the wearing of the uniform were excluded in the present paper. (3) Each statement or observation was attributed a value of one unit. Although an event may consist of several statements alluding to the beret, each statement was weighted as one unit and thus, coded independently of the other statements. Naturally, many statements were ambiguous in the artificial sense that they referred to two or more of the categories constructed above. As a general rule, all statements were classified under that category to which it most clearly belonged. In those cases where two or even more categories were more or less equally indicated, the unit value of the statement was distributed evenly among the relevant categories.[5]

It may be well at this point, for the purposes of concretely demonstrating the coding procedure outlined above and for describing the dramaturgy revolving about the use of the beret, to present some relevant passages from my fieldnotes. For the sake of condensed but coherent presentation, the "raw" fieldnote excerpts have been rewritten, and the dialogues translated from the barrio argot of the bato loco. The excerpts are all taken from the period of "mobilization," the period when the new recruits and this researcher were being introduced to the organization. In this manner, the initial socialization experiences can be simulated, however poorly, for the reader.

REVISED NOTES

Learning About the Beret: A Grounded Approach
15 Agosto, 7:30 p.m.-2 a.m.

Gathered outside in a vacant lot adjacent to a community center, the new members are told by Juanillo, a visiting veteran officer from another chapter, not to worry about not knowing all about la raza or the Berets; they would learn in a short time. Paco, who would emerge as the educator and philosopher of the group, similarly says that it isn't necessary to know all the "movimiento stuff," only that one follow the idea of carnalismo, especially when it comes to defending other Berets. A Beret has to be ready to die for the cause,

his people, and his fellow Berets. At the end of an impressive monologue, Paco says in reference to his beret "anyone who wants to take my beret will have to take the skin off my head" [me tienen que quitar el cuero de mi cabeza].[6]

Discussing the security the Berets will provide for a conference of illegal aliens, Paco makes the first reference to behavior as a Beret emphatically: "Don't show up stoned or drunk because the people attending the conference, especially the mojados are putting their lives on the line."[7]

La Javalina, an ambitious garrulous recruit who would later rise to be second in command, apparently has his own preconceptions of what being a Beret means. While drinking some beers in a cantina, he remarks to two other recruits that he can't wait to have the beret on so he can go back to El Club 45 (another tavern) to make up for the time he was chased from there.[8]

17 Agosto, 1:30 a.m.-8:30 p.m.

Some have asked me when am I going to buy my beret . . . apparently my ambiguous status as a non-Beret is puzzling.[9]

Paco enforces the rule that no drinking or smoking be done until after the conference ends for the day . . . It's interesting to see Paco also enforce the important rituals of the organization. He criticizes La Javalina and Memo, both of whom are wearing their berets for the first time, for the stems on their berets. "Se ven como chefs." He also shows them how their pants should be pegged around the boots, and shows them how to do the Chicano handshake properly.[10]

A Beret is severely criticized for having left his beret on the ground.[11]

18 Agosto, 3 p.m.-12:30 a.m.

I got to know La Javalina better today . . . in the morning when we went to buy some beers, he told me what I had missed (at the conference) last night . . . Java is happy and proud that the rucas wanted to take pictures with the Berets yesterday . . . lots of pictures [chingos][12] . . . and he mentions this conversation he had with an old man who said he was tired of talk--he wanted action and that's why he liked the Berets . . .[13]

Javalina also tells me that there almost was pedo last night when a drunk Chicano Marine walked through the middle of the security line the Berets had posted and said, "Those are funny uniforms."[14] Java says that he answered him saying, "Hey carnal, we're the Brown Berets," but another Beret started hechando madres. The drunk Marine returns the insults, and other Berets join in the racla. Paco and a friend of the Marine break up the racla. Paco angrily demands, "How is he (the Marine) going to learn about the Berets if you insult

him?" The Berets, however, are still laughing at the drunk Marine. They don't stop until Paco, even more angrily, demands that they give him their berets.[15] "The Berets have to educate the people, not insult their mothers."[16]

I told Paco that he had done well when he spoke before the conference yesterday (Paco had been concerned about his presentation). Paco seemed pleased and accepted my comment, mentioning that when he spoke it was very difficult not to let out madres y chingaderas.[17] He reminisces about a political rally at which he also had spoken. From the podium he had told the people about the candidate, "I don't like Jimmy at all, but he's raza and we have to work together. If he wins and he doesn't help the people, we're (the Berets) going to meterle una chingada en su culo." And the people just kept applauding. Paco said he later saw a picture taken while he was speaking and that it looked bien de aquellas: "flanked on both sides by two Berets with full uniform, their trousers bloused, their berets, and their sunglasses."[18]

19 Agosto

While walking downtown, a bato sees us (three Berets) and stops us, saying that he wants to join the raza unida. Miguel tells him that we're Berets, and the guy says he wants to join and that he knows a group of ex-pintos who hang around behind the church on Perez Street who want to join.[19]

21 Agosto, 7:30 p.m.-11:30 p.m.

La Javalina says that last night he was accosted in a cantina by a bato (who turns out to be an ex-Beret) because Java didn't have the parche of carnalismo on his beret and the guy thought that Java was mimicing the organization. The bato left him alone when he saw Miguel, whom he knew as the Prime Minister of the group, standing outside waiting for Java.[20]

Miguel tells the new recruits about the Berets' rules. "If a Beret gets drunk with his beret on or gets arrested for some pedo that he got involved in, the Berets will let him stay in jail--you better not expect us to take you out . . . moreover, if a bato gets in trouble often, if he smears the name of the organization [chotea] for something not related to the Berets, or if he doesn't come to meetings, we will expel him from the group after a hearing before all the members."[21]

In discussion plans to recruit in a small town tomorrow, Miguel warns, "everyone has to behave very well in the small towns . . . the people there pay a lot of attention to how one behaves . . . the Berets who cagen el palo will have to answer to the rest of us."[22]

23 Agosto, 6:30 p.m.-1 a.m.

Gibo criticizes his brother (who was a Beret for only a short time) because Jesús wanted Gibo to take off his beret on their way home and Gibo had responded by insisting that Jesús should not be ashamed.[23]

We arrive in the small town where Miguel said some batos were interested in forming a Beret chapter. (Actually the alambre Miguel had received was much in the same manner as that of 19 of August--a chance meeting cued by the visibility of the uniform.) No one, however, is at the ice station which was the rendezvous point. The ten Berets are milling outside the ice station wondering what to do next while Paco and Miguel rap about the disappointments we will have to face working with the people. Soon, however, we begin attracting attention. A car full of batos had circled the block to look at us and had returned with other cars. Soon ten cars full of batos from the town have converged on the ice house and Miguel is talking with apparent clique leaders about what we're doing in that town. None of the batos had heard anything about the scheduled meeting, but that didn't matter anymore--contact had been made. Meanwhile the town police car has circled the block several times.[24]

Having been led to their hang-out on a country road outside town, the ten Berets begin mingling with the twenty or so batos from the town. It's an impressive sight as the Berets in introducing themselves begin educating the batos in the ritual of the Chicano handshake and in calling each other carnales--rituals which most Berets have just learned in the past few days. La Javalina shouts for all to gather around the back of a pickup truck and for whoever wants to speak to get up on the pickup. Both Java and Miguel jumped onto the pickup. Miguel introduces his soldados and begins talking about the significance of the beret. "The color of the beret is brown because we, la gente chicana, are brown. The brown circle of the parche represents the world of all the bronze people; the red background of the parche represents the blood which Chicanos have lost in Vietnam and in gang fights in the streets; the eagle because we support the farmworkers' strike of César Chávez; and the hands shaking because we believe in carnalismo. A Chicano should not raise his hand against another Chicano. On the contrary we should help ourselves, so united we can fight the gringo."[25]

On the way home, Fat Louie mentions that one of the batos had confused them with the Green Berets but that he had corrected the bato.[26] La Java gets on my case for not having bought a beret.[27]

25 Agosto

Paco spends about 45 minutes trying to fit a beret on me.[28] In saying something about the beret, I refer to it as a cachucha and Paco quickly and firmly corrects me--"It's *NOT* a cap; it's a beret."[29]

I write the first set of theoretical notes on the importance of the beret as a visible symbol.[30]

DISCUSSION

Having shown the series of events through which I became aware of and learned the significance of the beret, its sociological import can now be discussed more systematically. From forty-five entries in my field notes, totaling 125 single-spaced typed pages, ninety-nine items were coded and classified as follows.

Statements or Observations Referring to:

Frontstage	9.5
Visibility	12.5
Appearance	32
Control	20
Commitment	12
Definition	5
Other	8
	99

Some methodological comments about the coding are in order.[31] It is evident that the conservative manner of reviewing fieldnotes excluded much relevant information. There were numerous references to frontstage behavior and public reaction which did not explicitly indicate beret wearing. A persuasive argument can be proposed that since being a Beret was publicly indicated by wearing a beret, any statement regarding public behavior as an organizational member implied beret use. A similar argument can be made for the public reaction Berets received--any such reaction generally presupposed identification or recognition, which in turn was cued by beret wearing. It is with the intention of proposing these arguments, however, that the discussion in the present paper restricts itself to statements and observations which explicitly and directly associate beret use with public behavior and public reaction. For the moment it should be merely noted that the frequencies of coded frontstage and visibility items are not representative. The same caveat applies to the number of coded items indicating cathetic commitment. What can be said with some certainty is that the "rules of appearance" and "organizational control" regarding the beret exhaust the relevant "universe" of items in my fieldnotes. The rules of appearance apply only to the uniform and particularly to the beret. Organizational

control of the beret, though employed as a group sanction upon deviant members, refers to the distribution of the beret as an organizational symbol and in this sense is unambiguous.

In order to simplify discussion and suggest the scope of the argument in this paper, a model suggesting the logical relations between the coded categories can be proposed. Although quite crude at this point, refinement will occur as the data analysis is presented.

Figure 1

A Simple, Logical Construct of the Dramaturgy of the Beret



In the present paper, the discussion will be largely limited to an analysis and refinement of the relations between visibility and frontstage behavior.

THE CONSTRAINTS OF FRONTSTAGE BEHAVIOR

The private "offstage" behavior of batos locos has been alluded to in the excerpts presented above and discussed at length in descriptions of similar street-corner groups. The personal freedom afforded by vacant-lot invisibility and individual anonymity means that the bato "puede hacer lo que le de la gana." Such freedom may be restricted by the peer group, but generally these restrictions do not include following the encumberances of conventional public etiquette.[32] In the social world of the bato loco, then, freely expressed behavior may run the gamut of conventional to unconventional conduct and may evoke group sanctions as well as approval. The offstage behavior of particular interest here is that group-approved conduct which is labelled as unconventional. Specifically, this refers to such everyday street behavior as cursing, however casually, shooting the finger (a body curse), wolfing at women, pissing in public, touching one's genitals, getting drunk or stoned, using drugs, dressing unconventionally (leaving one's shirt unbuttoned, hitching one's pants, even wearing sunglasses), fighting, and any other behavior which may be termed "disrespectful."[33]

Why a group of batos locos should give up some of their personal freedom and attempt to acquire a public "face" is a question beyond the scope of the present paper. Suffice it to say that the batos in the Brown Berets saw themselves as members of an organization and not a gang--that is, a group with "public" as opposed to "private" goals. This distinction is an extremely important one, and one that most Berets were always quick to make in differentiating their present status from their past biographies as gang fighters, tecatos, felons, or pachucos. Aware that their "gang" label still followed them, conventional frontstage behavior was basic to supporting their claim of personal change. One could argue, in fact, that a most effective strategy of demonstrating such change is to draw attention to it--in other words, to make one's present behavior highly visible. Aside the pejorative labelling which the Berets had to counter even within its own barrio, conventional behavior was, of course, functionally important for the organization's effectiveness. An organization could hardly afford to alienate the very people it wished to organize, educate, defend, and which might be the source of the few resources the organization could rely upon. Some examples were presented earlier--Paco in the incident of the drunk Marine, Miguel in his frontstage instructions for the recruitment trip. Perhaps a more critical reason, however, was the fact, dramatically illustrated months before through the disintegration of the city-wide Beret organization, that offstage behavior--particularly fighting, getting drunk or drugged--was dysfunctional for the organization's very survival. But such functional requisites, while important, are by themselves

inadequate in explaining the significance of frontstage etiquette for the Beret organization. A voluntary association with virtually no material rewards, it is perhaps not unexpected that the most explicit rationale the Berets had for maintaining frontstage behavior was ideological. Ideological commitment was overlaid upon the organization's functional needs--an overlay strikingly suggested by the brief preamble to the rules of the Beret chapter:

> In order for an organization such as ours to survive, we must have a love for our people, dedication, and discipline. If you really love your people, you yourself will straighten out . . . EL CARNALISMO UNE . . . NO SEPARA.

The constraints, then, created and enforced by a group seeking to establish and maintain itself as an organization, were based upon a combination of ideological, functional, and biographical reasons. What explicitly were these frontstage proscriptions? The rules of the chapter provide a convenient summary:[34]

> Any member of the organization found guilty of breaking any of these rules, is subject to disciplinary action and will either be put on probation or permanently terminated from the organization.
>
> (1) Every member will attend all called meetings, rallys, pickets, or demonstrations.
> . . . . . .
> (3) Every Brown Beret will be in uniform at all Brown Beret functions.
> . . . . . .
> (5) Under no circumstances will a Brown Beret indulge in the possession, sale, use, or distribution of hard drugs.
> (6) While in uniform, no Brown Beret will be seen in public while heavily intoxicated.
> (7) It is an absolute must that all Brown Berets preach "Carnalismo."
> . . . . . .
> (9) Under no circumstances will a Brown Beret raise his fist against another Chicano, unless in self-defense.
> (10) All Brown Berets will show respect for each other and to the people at all times.
> . . . . . .
> (12) Every Brown Beret will always look, and act his best.
> . . . . . .

Besides the right of self-defense, there was another rule--an unwritten one--which exempted one from maintaining carnalismo. As Paco succintly informed us one evening (18 Sept.), "A Beret can fight but he should fight for only three reasons--for his waifa, his jefita, and for his beret." In view of the conspicuous emphasis on the ideology of carnalismo, what can this unwritten rule signify? That a beret is as important, or nearly so, as one's wife and mother? That as a material interest, defending one's beret overrides any ideological commitment to carnalismo? In what sense does Paco's "unless" clause to the tenet of carnalismo actually make sense?

THE IDEOLOGY OF DRESS

If ideology is the most explicit rationale for motivating a conventionally acceptable frontstage performance, then one would suspect that the beret may be infused with ideological import which, in turn, would underscore its significance as a dramaturgical cue. The data on this point is interesting.

As has been suggested in various places throughout this paper, if there was any single ideological belief most forcefully and consistently articulated in Beret gatherings and functions, it was belief in the concept of carnalismo--a revolutionary idea of brotherhood for those who had become accustomed to live, and had learned to live well, in an everyday world of conflict. That the beret was emblazoned with the parche of carnalismo was, of course, significant: acquisition of the beret signified, however vague other ideological notions may have been and may have remained, a basic, unambiguous commitment to carnalismo. If this commitment represented a major biographical event, it would be expected that some cathexsis should occur about the beret. Miguel, for one, indicated as much. Explaining why one should respect the beret, he said simply, "the beret means more than the crucifix to me, because when I was a Christian I was going around plomando at my people, and when I became a Beret I stopped doing that." (Oct. 5) Such cathexsis could occur for a number of reasons other than a major biographical change--commitment to the group, attraction to an individual member, discovery of a sense of purpose in life, expectations of some great historical event, and so on. But it was generally more common that an expression of commitment did not indicate its underlying motivation. For example, Pancho, who by this time had replaced Java as Minister of Discipline, expressed the type of commitment that often drew much approval from veteran Beret members.

> Pancho, Miguel, and I are talking about the Beret jacket --a very scarce piece of uniform--which Pancho has on. . . . As if explaining why he has it instead of someone else, Pancho says to me "yo me muero Beret." Miguel traces the

> history of the jacket--from José to Daniel to Java and now to Pancho. Tongue in cheek, I comment "so everyone who has worn this jacket has left the Berets" . . . Miguel gives a responsive grin, the toothless grin he always gives when he hears an idea that "connects" . . . but Pancho replies solemnly "they'll have to kill me to get this jacket off me." (Dec. 29)

Even such explicit statements of commitment to the beret or Beret uniform were rare, however. Reviewing both the items of commitment and definition, we see that Miguel and Paco, the veteran chapter leaders, had an overwhelming share of the total statements expressed.

Table 1

Distribution of Commitment and Definition Statements to Beret Members

	Commitment (Date)		Definition (Date)	
Miguel	1	(Oct. 5)*	3	(Ago. 23)
Paco	4.5	(Ago. 15)	1	(Ago. 25)
Gibo	.5	(Ago. 23)	-	
Fat Louie	1	(Oct. 6)	-	
Memo	1	(Oct. 21)	-	
Pancho	1	(Dic. 29)	-	
	9	(12 total)	4	(5 total)

*Dates in parentheses indicate the earliest (or perhaps only) time that a category statement or observation was recorded in my fieldnotes.

Does such an uneven distribution mean, then, that the beret is invested with some ideological import mainly by the chapter's two primary leaders? That in some sense the dramaturgy of the beret is created and sustained by only two members of a Brown Beret organization? Unfortunately these are questions which can neither be confirmed nor disconfirmed here. Reviewing the remaining categorized items for which individual members can be identified, however, suggests a different emphasis, if not alternative explanation (see Table 2). Comparing the distribution and dates of items in all four categories, two tendencies appear: (1) more Berets were involved with the rules of appearance and expressed explicit statements, either informative or proscriptive, concerning them than any other aspect of the beret; and (2) the rules of appearance were the first set of characteristics of the beret which members articulated.

Table 2

Distribution of Control and Appearance Statements to Beret Members

	Control	(Date)	Appearance	(Date)
Miguel	2	(Nov. 6)*	3.5	(Sep. 22)
Paco	2.5	(Ago. 18)	4	(Ago. 17)
Java	6	(Sep. 18)	4.5	(Ago. 23)
Gibo	1	(Nov. 6)	4.5	(Ago. 23)
Fat Louie	1	(Sep. 22)	1	(Sep. 22)
Skinny Louie	2	(Sep. 22)	1	(Sep. 25)
Rafael	1	(Nov. 15)	-	
Panchl	1	(Ener. 8)	2	(Sep. 19)
Memo	-		2.5	(Sep. 22)
	16.5 (20 total)		23 (32 total)	

*The earliest date that a category statement or observation was recorded in my field notes.

In one sense, then, the learning experience of an organization in its formative period is suggested: members learn first the ritualism of an organization, and the boundaries and meaning of the rituals later. On the other hand, ritualism does not necessarily signify any less commitment but perhaps signifies only a different level or type of articulation of what a symbol represents to an individual. Looking at the clustering of items from an organizational perspective suggests yet another explanation. Miguel and Paco, besides the fact that they were the only veteran core members of the chapter, were also the individuals responsible for representing the organization and educating its members. Similarly, organizational control of beret distribution rested in the formalized position of Minister of Discipline, which Java filled during most of the research period. Concerning the rules of appearance, where we have the most even distribution of items among members, no specialized position charged with the enforcement of these rules existed, and the only pattern that emerged here (not shown) was that one never criticized his superiors for their dress.

Returning to the questions which headed this discussion, a cautious answer can be proposed. It does appear true that the ideological import of the beret is primarily *articulated* by two veteran officers, but this says little of the ideological commitment expressed through the sometimes militant concern with the ritualism and control of the beret as an organizational symbol. At this point, without more extensive data

analysis, I can say no more. What the implications of a ritualistic interest possibly devoid of substantive ideological understanding are for the process of politicization will be briefly discussed later. It should be clear, however, that in one sense it makes no difference for the dramaturgical dynamics created by a visible organizational symbol. Whether it is ideology, ritual, or some other in-group process that effects a public presentation, it is the visibility of such a presentation that catalyzes the interaction between audience, the team of actors, and the individual actor himself.

THE BERET AS A DRAMATURGICAL CUE

As mentioned previously, the dramaturgical significance of the beret lies in the fact that visibility simultaneously (1) places in effect the frontstage proscriptions of the organization for the uniformed member, and (2) makes the uniformed member vulnerable to public reaction, both favorable and adverse. We are now in the position where a review of the items of "visibility" and "frontstage" can suggest modifications in the simple dramaturgical model presented earlier. The items of *visibility* can be summarized as follows:

(a) Java wants to go to cantina w/bb on to make for fight (Ago. 18)	.5
(b) Drunk Marine says "those are funny uniforms" (Ago. 18)	1
(c) Bato loco recognizes Berets, wants to join (Ago. 19)	1
(d) Bato loco misidentifies us as the Green Berets (Ago. 23)	1
(e) Beto says we can't wear berets to sensitive meeting (Sep. 22)	1
(f) Memo once thought the Berets were clowns (Sep. 26)	1
(g) Miguel, Java discuss why can't wear berets in Mexico (Oct. 1)	1
(h) Policeman stops us to find out what we're doing (Oct. 4)	1
(i) Police 'copter follows grp. walking thru town (Oct. 5)	1
(j) Batos fighting at dance recognized as Berets (Oct. 27)	1
(k) Speakers at public mtg. piqued at Java's sleeping (Nov. 10)	1
(l) Policeman says "why don't you put your funny hats on" (Nov. 20)	1
(m) At public rally Paco asked to lead spontaneous protest (Dic. 29)	1

Clustered, these items can be fitted into five categories:

(1) general negative reaction	(b,f,k,l)
(2) social control	(g,h,i,l)
(3) positive reaction	(c,m)
(4) visibility of both "good" and "bad" frontstage behavior	(a,j,k,m)
(5) beret switching (on-off)	(e,g)
uncoded:	(d)

Neither the first three categories nor the last can be accommodated within the simple dramaturgical model. The notion of "vulnerability," however, appears to adequately represent a commonality of these four categories: negative reaction, social control, and positive reaction certainly express events independent of the actor's or team's control, and beret switching is apparently contingent upon perception of possible negative reaction. Before adding schematically the aspect of vulnerability, let us review the items of frontstage behavior to see what other features must be included in a revised model. The items of *frontstage* can be presented as follows:

(a) Java wants to go to cantina to make up for fight (Ago. 15)	.5
(b) Miguel warns grp. about behavior with beret on (Ago. 21)	1
(c) Rule passed that if drunk, take off beret (Sep. 18)	1
(d) Pedro says "not to shoot fingers in public w/bb on" (Oct. 5).	1
(e) Juanillo says "treat women respectfully when have bb on" (Oct. 5)	1
(f) Java says that particular chapter looks undisciplined (Oct. 6)	.5
(g) Miguel takes bbs off two Berets about to fight at dance (Oct. 27)	1
(h) Java will take off bb from any publicly drunk Beret (Nov. 6).	1
(i) Miguel: Bbs must be educated so when recognized and asked ques. (Nov. 15)	1
(j) Monte tells Java how his sleeping embarrassed org. (Nov. 15).	1
(k) Miguel wants full dress at protest so to look disciplined (Nov. 15)	.5

These items can be collected in four clusters:

(1) proscriptions	(b,d,e)
(2) appearances	(a,f,k,i)
(3) beret-switching	(c,g,h)
(4) vulnerability	(i,j)

Aside the new relation between frontstage behavior and vulnerability, another lacuna appears when beret-switching, whether

for purposes of frontstage behavior or visibility, occurs. The intent of beret-switching is to become invisible, but the unrevised simple model does not allow this possibility. Thus "invisibility," along with the appropriate "offstage" (private) and "backstage" (closed preparations for frontstage performances) statuses, is also added. Thus refined, a revised dramaturgical model can now be presented.

Figure 2

A Grounded Construct of the Dramaturgy of the Beret



1. general negative reaction (b,f,k,l)
   social control (g,h,i,l)
   positive reaction (c,m)
2. visibility of "good" and "bad" frontstage behavior (a,j,k,m)
   proscriptions (b,d,e)
   appearances (a,f,k,i)
3. strategic beret-switching (e,g)
4. proscriptive beret-switching (e,g,h)
5. vulnerability of frontstage behavior (i,j)
6. relations not analyzed in present paper

Placed within the context of this "grounded" dramaturgical model, the modest goals with which I began this paper can now be restated and modified. That the beret was an effective public cue is, at best, a trite argument and would not have been worth the effort if unconnected with other arguments. One can see more clearly now that the very vulnerability which Berets expose themselves to is what makes frontstage behavior so important. There is, in fact, a dramaturgical "vicious circle" formed by the relations between visibility, vulnerability, and frontstage behavior; and the only way to break it is to discard one's uniform.

If the initial statement that behavior varied according to whether one was in "dress" or in street clothes appeared slightly deterministic, it was because, under the old rules, there was no sanctioned way of performing backstage or offstage routines in a frontstage situation. But rules, like dress, can be refashioned. It was the genius of the developing chapter to formally extend beret-switching from strictly strategic matters to proscriptive ones concerning frontstage behavior. Since proscriptive beret-switching applied to situations where the frontstage rules were about to be broken or had been broken, it made "dress" contingent upon behavior--reversing, in other words, what had apparently been the case previously for the old Beret organization. Thus, Miguel did little to prevent two Berets from slugging it out at a public dance; he merely took off their berets before the fight started, seriously believing that the sudden invisibility of the angry batos would protect the organization. He was wrong. (Oct. 27)

Herein, then, one discovers the fragility of ideological conversion based on ritualism or symbolic dress: there need be no contradiction between commitment to an ideology which is mediated by dress and behavior which ostensibly runs counter to such an ideology. In the case of one Brown Beret chapter, although commitment to the tenet of carnalismo was presumably total, a member was not required to follow the frontstage rules unless he was in dress. Frontstage behavior could be donned and taken off as easily as the beret.

This dramaturgical discussion may have appeared quite tangential to the question of how *lumpenproletariat* individuals become politicized. But demonstrating that ideological commitment and "unconventional" street behavior may involve no apparent contradiction points to a need to strip "politicization" of its conventional "civic" morality. For given the stock scientific view of lower class life, the fact that vacant-lot societies should become "politicized" is an anomalous phenomena: something worth looking at and studying. This anomaly is created basically by three common-sense presumptions shared by most social scientists: (1) that lumpenproletariat are somehow qualitatively different from the "productive" classes; (2) that, therefore, the process of politicization, if and when it occurs, must somehow be intrinsically

different for this type of people; and (3) that politicization to be considered "effective" and "permanent" must somehow transform the previously apathetic, possibly criminal behavior of the street individual to the model behavior of conventional political man (or, at minimum, to anti-social behavior which is politically selective). If anything, the argument in this paper has been to suggest that the relation between politicization and behavior is far from an unambiguous, simple matter.

NOTES

1. The discussion relies solely upon a content analysis of my fieldnotes over a six-month period and does not base itself upon any of my interview material.

2. *Lumpenproletariat* may be a more descriptive term since these batos belonged to the most marginal stratum of the proletariat and, of necessity and preference, relied on the sub-economy for part of their livelihood.

3. One of the most promising aspects of a dramaturgical analogy is that in emphasizing the importance of visibility and symbols it demonstrates the commonality of many disparate phenomena. Limiting ourselves to the Chicano experience, dramaturgy would seem readily appropriate in interpreting the high school blowouts precipitated, at least initially, by conflict over dress codes, the fascination with pachucos (cf., Octavio Paz), and even the zoot-suit pogroms of the 1940's (cf., Turner and Surace).

4. This underestimates the number of people involved in this intense mobilization period, but those not counted--the majority were ex-Berets--were to withdraw, be "terminated," or maintain their membership only peripherally shortly after this period ended. There was, of course, a constant change in membership. The core group itself, though generally stable, lost throughout eight months three members and added three members. The peripheral group, with expectedly ambiguous boundaries, was much more variable in size. However, during the research period it never fell below five nor exceeded ten.

5. Of course it should be noted that levelling each statement to a value of one means that the "quasi-statistical" frequencies cannot tell us the importance of one event relative to another.

6. Coded as a statement indicating cathetic commitment.

7. Although clearly a frontstage statement, it contains no explicit reference to use of the beret and is consequently excluded for coding purposes here.

8. Coded as a statement referring both to frontstage and visibility.

9. Coded as a statement referring to the rules of appearance.

10. The relevant statement coded as reference to rules of appearance.

11. Coded as most clearly referring to rules of appearance.

12, 13. Although both statements refer to public reaction, no explicit mention of the beret is made and thus they are excluded for coding purposes.

14. Coded as reference to visibility.

15. Coded as reference to organizational control.

16. Although there are two explicit frontstage statements in this excerpt, and reference to beret use is strongly implied in the context, these statements are not coded.

17. A frontstage statement not coded.

18. Coded as reference to rules of appearance.

19. Coded as an observation referring to visibility of the beret. There was no other way the stranger could have recognized us as Berets.

20. Coded as a reference to both rules of appearance and to organizational control.

21. A frontstage statement explicitly linking wearing the beret with public performance. Coded as frontstage.

22. A frontstage statement not explicitly referring to the beret. Uncoded.

23. Coded as referring to both appearance rules and cathetic commitment.

24. The success of this trip must be attributed to the ease with which ten uniformed batos from out-of-town can become an object of attention in a small town. Though obviously indicating the visibility of the group, there are too many confounding variables (the size of the group, being strangers in a small town) to code this as an observation indicating the visibility of the beret.

25. Coded as statement indicating formal meaning.

26. Coded as visibility.

27. Coded as rules of appearance.

28. Rules of appearance.

29. This was difficult to code. Although the connotation is that a beret is something more than a cap, it could also be interpreted in a strict sense as merely a statement of fact. I finally coded it as "other."

30. Coded as "other."

31. Seven of the eight "other" items consisted of theoretical or conceptual comments. There was no apparent variation over time for any of these categories.

32. It should be noted that this freedom from, or relaxation of, public conventions is not distinctive to vacant-lot societies. It characterizes such disparate situations as nudist colonies, smoke-filled backrooms, Camp David, telephone conversations--as Watergate dramatically showed--and master bedrooms. It is sought consciously by utopian communities (sensitivity groups, collectives, monks) as well as by deviant groups. This freedom is basic to what Parsons has called "latent pattern-maintenance," or in the words of a Beret, "para dejarte cayer la greña."

33. Another aspect of offstage behavior involves the barrio's subeconomy, a subject which will not be discussed in the present paper.

34. Rules 5, 7, 9, and 10, may also be considered as "backstage" rules, in the Goffmanian sense of backstage being the place where preparations for the frontstage are made.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (Doubleday, 1959).

Erving Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (Prentice-Hall, 1963).

George McCall and J. L. Simmons, eds., *Issues in Participant Observation* (Addison-Wesley, 1969).

Octavio Paz, *Laberinto de la soledad* (Grove Press, 1961).

Ralph Turner and Samuel Surace, "Zoot Suiters and Mexicans: Symbols in Crowd Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 62 (July 1956).

MARXISM AND THE CHICANO MOVEMENT: PRELIMINARY REMARKS*

TATCHO MINDIOLA

Sociology and Chicano Studies
University of Houston
Houston, Texas

To some it is discouraging to realize that after 10 years of the most intensive protest activity ever to occur in Chicano history, accommodation and integration into existing U.S. society are the prominent if not main ideological goals. To be sure, these goals are tempered by the idea of biculturalism, but this modification has not changed the overall integrative nature of the Chicano movement. The masses of Chicano people have only begun to seriously question the equity and justice of the liberal capitalist order in the United States. There are progressive ideological tendencies which are becoming more pronounced both for Chicano intellectuals and for the Chicano people as a whole.

There appears to be an increasing number of Chicanos who in one manner or another are dealing with the writings and theories of Karl Marx. The growing use of Marxian concepts and ideas among Chicano intellectuals is obvious in the Chicano Academic literature.[1] Also, Anglo political organizations with Marxist orientations have a small but noticeable Chicano membership.[2]

Perhaps this encounter with Marxism was inevitable. There is the emotional as well as the intellectual appeal of Marx's ideas. They provide oppressed people not only with a theory of the causes of their oppression but also with a plan of predicted action that is supposed to eliminate the basis for this oppression. Every serious political movement since the time of Karl Marx has had to grapple with his ideas. In these respects the Chicano movement is no different.

The application of Marx's concepts to Chicano reality, however, raises some important questions which have always plagued Marxism not only as a body of theory but also as a basis for praxis. The purpose of this paper is to speak to some of these questions in the hopes of achieving some theoretical clarity.

One of the important obstacles in applying Marxism to Chicano reality concerns race and racism. Essentially the question is what is the primary basis for Chicano oppression, race affiliation or class position? It is well known that Marx and Engels did not incorporate the race variable into their overall analysis of capitalism. Despite the notable efforts of Oliver Cromwell Cox and other theorists there does not exist a wholly satisfactory explanation of racism developed from a Marxist perspective.[3] The Chicanos who have spoken to this issue state that racism is the ideological justification for the class exploitation of Chicanos. The roots of racism are said to be found in the development of the material order of society.[4]

This argument supports class as the principle basis for Chicano oppression, since it offers racism as the ideological veil for class exploitation. The difficulty with this analysis is that it treats racism as a consequence of class position. However, in the development of U.S. society, racism has not been the consequence of class position but rather a major determinant of class placement. The question that should be asked in analyzing Chicano oppression is whether or not Chicanos would have been locked in the bottom of the class structure had they not been Chicanos. The answer is no, they wouldn't have. This does not mean that Chicanos do not suffer from class exploitation, for indeed they do. According to Marxian theory, class exploitation is inherent in capitalist society. But, in terms of relative importance, the racial affiliation of Chicanos is the principal cause of their oppression because race determines their occupational placement within the working class. It, therefore, plays a direct part in determining the degree of class exploitation in affecting wages, working conditions, promotions, union membership, etc.

To impose a race theory on Chicano-Anglo relations, however, obscures the class divisions that exist within both groups. This is a criticism that is heard quite often and which has a degree of validity. However, from a Chicano point of view it is not necessarily true. When Chicanos state, for example, that "they own the means of production," Chicanos are accurately speaking to the high correlation that exists between race and class ownership of the productive wealth in the U.S. There exists no "Brown Bourgeoise." Anglos own the means of production. This fact can be seen as reinforcing the notion that race is the primary cause of Chicano oppression since imposing a race theory on Chicano-Anglo relations does not necessarily alter the fundamental owner-non-owner class aspect of capitalist society.

Central to the race-class issue is the question of "Who benefits from Chicano oppression?" One argument holds that the roots of racism are to be found in the capitalist mode of production. The capitalist class benefits from racism because it keeps the working class divided on issues of race and prevents them from realizing their common economic interests. Thus, the capitalist class is said to perpetuate racism since it benefits from the division of the working class.[5]

Another argument holds that the white working class benefits from racism because it insures the white workers' virtual monopoly over the better paying jobs. Capitalists are said to be "color blind" since the inherent logic of capitalism is to seek the cheapest labor regardless of race. Therefore, the white working class is said to benefit from racism while the capitalist class loses.[6] Both of these arguments have plausibility but they are too one-sided in trying to pinpoint which class benefits from racism. Consequently, they overlook the significance of racial awareness and the class collaboration that occurs within the Anglo population when it comes to matters of race.

Class collaboration also exists within the Chicano population, except that it is normally called nationalism when practiced by Chicanos and racism when practiced by Anglos.

Nationalism is an extremely important area of study for Chicano Marxists, not only because it is related to the race-class question but also because it is directly related to the organizational tactics to be used in achieving the socialist society, the role of Chicanos in a socialist movement, and the status of the Chicano people after the socialist society is achieved.

The role of nationalism in achieving the socialist society has both positive and negative aspects. The negative aspect holds that nationalism keeps the Chicano and Anglo working class divided along national lines which in turn helps prevent the formation of working class consciousness and solidarity and the eventual working class revolution that Marx predicted. All forms of nationalism, therefore, are said to be counter-revolutionary and should be discouraged as an organizational principle. This line of reasoning assumes that the working class remains potentially the most revolutionary segment of U.S. society.[7]

The positive aspect of nationalism is found in its cohesive nature. As a uniting force, nationalism is probably unparalleled in history. Thus, some Marxists argue that it can be used in a revolutionary manner not only to unite the people but also to achieve the socialist society.[8]

The use of nationalism towards this end entails the application of the two-stage theory of revolution. In the first stage a nationalistic appeal is made to unite all class elements to resist and overthrow the foreign oppressor even though the class elements within the oppressed group may be

objectively opposed to each other. Once this has occurred the second stage involves preventing the bourgeois tendencies within the oppressed group from setting up their own capitalism. For Chicanos the two-stage theory of revolution means ousting the Anglo oppresser from the Southwest and then preventing the establishment of "Brown capitalism."

The problem with the two-stage theory of revolution and nationalism as its organizing principle is that it hasn't always worked.[9] In some instances the bourgeois tendencies within oppressed groups have been able to stop the revolution at the end of the first stage and they have succeeded in setting up their own brand of capitalism. This is another reason why some people argue that nationalism should not be used as a revolutionary force to achieve socialism.

In addition to the problem of whether or not nationalism should be used to organize Chicanos there is the question of the role of Chicanos in a serious socialist movement. Their role is important because of the changes that have occurred within the working class as a whole.

The negative criticism of nationalism assumed that the working class was still the most revolutionary segment of U.S. society. This, of course, has been questioned. The working class is said to have lost its revolutionary potential because it has experienced an absolute increase in its standard of living, technology has changed the character of the working class, and the capitalists have control of the major consciousness influencing mechanisms in society. Therefore, it is argued, the revolutionary potential has now shifted to those groups who have not benefited from the gains the working class may have made, especially Chicanos and Blacks. The socialist effort will come from them.[10] If one accepts this premise then the role of Chicanos in a socialist movement becomes very important.[11]

The role of Chicanos in a socialist movement, however, will be largely determined by how they perceive their current status. If Chicanos see themselves as an internal colony then two facts stand out: (1) Chicanos became an internal colony through the land grabbing of the United States of lands belonging to Mexico; in other words, through an imperialist act. And (2) Chicanos became an internal colony through immigration. Therefore, it could be argued that Chicanos should work for a socialist movement that would consider giving México all or a major portion of her land back. Once socialism in the U.S. was achieved Chicanos themselves would then have to decide whether or not they wanted to become a part of capitalist México (if it's still capitalist) or a socialist United States.

On the other hand, if Chicanos see themselves as an oppressed nation within a nation, then the principles of self-determination and separation become important factors. From a Marxian point of view the principles of self-determination and separation are extremely controversial. Marx and Engels both

supported the separation and self-determination of Ireland, Poland, and the nations held captive by the German empire. Their writings on self-determination are not extensive and really do not go beyond the general statement that each case has to be judged on its own merits. The first Marxist to deal at length with the idea of oppressed nations within nations and the right of self-determination was Lenin.[12]

Lenin stated that oppressed minorities will be found within the borders of most countries. In their struggle for liberation from national oppression the minorities have the right to call for self-determination up to and including the right to secede. Socialists, Lenin argued, should support this demand, since their failure to do so would be counter-revolutionary and delay the struggle towards socialism. Whether or not a secession actually occurred would be settled by means of a referendum of the oppressed nation that desires to secede. Lenin felt, however, that the right to secede was not identical to actually seceding and forming another state. He believed that self-determination, including secession, was merely the logical expression of the struggle against national oppression. He felt that the more closely the nation approximated democracy the weaker would be the call for secession on the part of oppressed minorities. On this particular point Lenin is confusing. Did he mean that the right of oppressed minorities to self-determination and secession was only a right to be practiced before the arrival of socialism and that under socialism oppressed minorities did not have this right because socialism was more democratic than capitalism? Or, did he mean that oppressed minorities had the right to self-determination and secession under both capitalism and socialism? Also, Lenin never explicitly addressed himself to what he considered to constitute a nation within a nation.

Joseph Stalin, however, did propose criteria for what constituted a nation within a nation.[13] According to Stalin, an oppressed minority made up a nation within a nation if it was "a historically evolved, stable community arising on the foundation of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture."[14] It is only when all of these characteristics are present, Stalin held, that a nation within a nation exists. If any of the characteristics are missing then the oppressed minority constituted only a national minority, not a nation, and therefore did not have the right to demand secession.

Whether Chicanos constitute a nation within a nation in accordance with Stalin's definition centers around the criteria "community of economic life." It is unclear as to what Stalin meant by this phrase. If he meant that oppressed minorities should have their own economic system, Chicanos do not constitute a nation within a nation. On the other hand, if he meant that an oppressed minority should, more or less,

participate at the same level in the economic system, then Chicanos do indeed make up a nation within a nation.

If Chicanos see themselves as an oppressed nation then their role in a socialist movement would be to work for the right of self-determination up to and including the right to secede even if it meant setting up a "Brown capitalist" state.[15] It is at this point that important ideological decisions need to be made by Chicanos who accept Marxism. If the right to self-determination includes even the right to set up "Brown Capitalism," is this what Chicanos want? For a Marxist the answer is clearly No. In light of this, then would Chicanos want to break away from a socialist U.S. and set up a separate socialist state? Further, what kind of relationship would a Chicano socialist state have with México? What if México wanted her land back? If Chicanos do not want to break away to set up a separate socialist state, then how much self-determination can Chicanos expect in a socialist society that is still a society dominated by Anglos. Will socialism mean the end of racism and racial oppression? The argument that the roots of racism are found in the capitalist mode of production implies that it will. While this may be true, it says nothing about race consciousness which in historical sequences precedes racism.[16] Will the socialist mode of production also do away with race consciousness? If not, then the possibility of differentiation and oppression on the basis of race will always be in the background.

One final point needs to be made concerning the role of Chicanos in a socialist movement. This deals with the organizational tactics to be used, especially in the urban areas. Contemporary Marxian organizational theory maintains that in order to achieve the socialist society people have to be organized at the point of production where alienation is experienced the most and where the capitalist system can be sabotaged and stopped. The dilemma this poses for praxis-oriented Chicano Marxists is that Chicanos are purported to be a community oriented people. This implies that Chicano organizers should be organizing in the community and not at the point of production. To organize at the point of production, for example, is to raise issues concerning who makes the decisions in regards to production. To organize in the community, on the other hand, is to raise questions concerning community control over community institutions such as neighborhood centers, churches and schools. While the two strategies are not mutually exclusive one does not necessarily imply the other. Also for practical purposes the most effective place for Chicanos to organize needs to be settled in favor of one strategy or the other.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Perhaps if an oppressed colored race would have existed in the Europe of Marx and Engels their analysis of capitalist society would have been modified and there would not exist today the tendency on the part of Marxists to treat racism as an epiphenomenal variable.

Further the difficulty encountered in trying to incorporate race as a basis for exploitation into Marxist thought may be indicating that Marxism is not the analytical scheme needed by Chicanos to accurately assess their reality.

On the other hand Chicano membership in the non-owning class of a capitalist U.S. leads one to accept Marxism and to consider the socialist alternative as an avenue for the alleviation of Chicano oppression.

The idea of a separate Chicano nation organized on socialist principles is appealing. Many Anglo Marxists oppose this idea on the gratuitous assumption that socialism in the U.S. automatically implies racial equality. The Chicano experience in Anglo-America, however, leaves more than enough room for doubt that this indeed would occur. Also, many Anglo Marxists are not psychologically prepared to deal with the implications of racism and the problems involved in forming coalitions with Chicanos in order to achieve the socialist society in the U.S.

When Chicanos are approached with the idea of a separate Chicano nation organized on socialist principles the reaction has been that it is unrealistic. This view implies that the existing arrangement of U.S. society is natural or inevitable and not susceptible to fundamental change or re-ordering. This static view is unfortunate for it further clouds the already obscure goals of the Chicano movement. More importantly, it denies the reality of socialism being on the agenda for the U.S.' future and, consequently, it fails to consider the status of the Chicano people in a socialist society.

NOTES

*The author wishes to express his appreciation to Lindolfo Martinez of the University of Houston, for his suggestions and comments on this paper.

1. For two excellent examples see Carlos Blanco, "Unidad del trabajo y la vida--Cinco de Mayo, 1971," *Aztlán--Chicano Journal of the Social Sciences and the Arts* (Spring 1971) and Tomás Almaguer, "Historical Notes on Chicano Oppression: The Dialectics of Racial and Class Domination in North America," *Aztlán--Chicano Journal of the Social Sciences and the Arts* (Spring/Fall 1974).

2. Examples are the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Revolutionary Union (RU), October League (OL), Youth Against War and Racism (YAWF) and the Communist League (CL).

3. Oliver C. Cox, *Caste, Class, and Race* (New York: Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1964). Also see Robert Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1972).

4. Op. cit., Almaguer.

5. Michael Reich, "The Economics of Racism," in David M. Gordon, ed., *Problems in Political Economy* (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1971).

6. Gary Becker, *The Economics of Discrimination* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

7. V. I. Lenin, *National Liberation, Socialism and Imperialism* (New York: International Publishers, Inc., 1968), p. 7.

8. Tony Thomas, "In Defense of Black Nationalism" in Tony Thomas, ed., *Black Liberation and Socialism* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1974). Also see "Liberalism, Marxism and Black Political Power," in James Boggs, *Racism and the Class struggle* (New York: Modern Reader Paperback, 1970).

9. Examples of where the two stage theory of revolution has worked are China and Cuba. Examples of where it has failed are Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, and Indonesia.

10. Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

11. Several writers have seriously questioned whether or not the working class has indeed lost its revolutionary potential. See Ernest Mandel, "Workers and Permanent Revolution," and Stanley Aronevitz, "Does the United States Have a New Working Class?" both in George Fischer, ed., *The Revival of American Socialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971). Also see Jack Woodis, *New Theories of Revolution* (New York: International Publishers, 1972).

12. V. I. Lenin, op. cit.

13. Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and The National and Colonial Question* (Moscow: Co-Operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., 1935).

14. Ibid., p. 8.

15. Lenin and Stalin both held that the principle of self-determination and secession should be supported even if it meant the creation of a new capitalist nation.

16. For a good discussion on this point see Hannah Arendt, *Imperialism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1951), Chapter 2, "Race-Thinking Before Racism."

TEJANO MUSIC AS AN EXPRESSION OF CULTURAL NATIONALISM

JOSE R. REYNA

Folklore
Texas A. & I. University

In previous papers, I have discussed the historical development of Tejano music from the nineteenth century to the present, pointing out that there have evolved two types of groups.[1] The oldest of these groups, the "conjunto," consisting of the accordion as a lead instrument, with the guitar, bass and drums providing the rhythm, reached maturity in the late 1940's and early 1950's. The other type of combination--the "banda" or "orquesta"--began in the 1940's as an imitation of the Anglo swing band, but by the 1950's they had developed their own sound, which they maintain today. These two types of groups--the "conjunto" and the band--have evolved as distinctly Chicano/Tejano types of combos even though they may perform U.S. or Mexican tunes as well as Chicano tunes with regard to lyrics.

The purpose of this paper is to point out that Tejano music has long served as a strong source of identity and pride for the Tejano, and that it was survived, indeed flourished, for this reason. In other words, the musical features which characterize the styles as Tejano music, i.e., instrumentation and orchestration, have significance beyond the mere aesthetic value.

It is common knowledge that modern nations use all of the formal institutions of society--political, economic, schooling, mass media of communication--to promote all of the aspects of their culture as well as to nurture nascent forms and to foment autoctonous creative expression. Chicanos, not having a nation in the political sense, which would then provide access to all

of the other institutions, have had to forge a culture in an unauspicious way to say the least. Chicano music in Texas has certainly developed in this manner to a great extent. That is, it emerged and developed as an integral--and distinctive--part of Chicano culture, not due to the beneficence or magnanimity of the Anglo, but due rather to oversight. Corky Gonzáles says, in his epic poem, "I Am Joaquín":

> "They frowned upon our way of life
> and took what they could use.
> Our Art
> Our Literature
> Our Music, they ignored
> so they left the real things of value . . . ,"[2]

In Texas it is not "mariachi music" but conjunto and big band music that are "the heart and soul of the people of the earth."[3]

Even though we have been denied access to most institutions, and the right to exercise our culture in most instances, for decades now Chicanos have used one instrument of communication --radio--to disseminate, promote and foment one aspect of our culture--our music. It must be pointed out again that it has been a difficult struggle. Radio stations have had a tendency to hire Mexican-born and Mexican-educated announcers, primarily because our language is considered unacceptable for broadcasting. As a result of this practice, the programming has been Mexican oriented--i.e., Spanish language stations broadcast principally Mexican music, played by Mexican groups (mariachi, tríos, Mexican orchestras and bands). When conjunto music was played, it was "norteño" rather than Tejano, a practice still common among the Mexican-born announcers, as if our conjuntos were also unfit for broadcasting.

In spite of the adversity, Tejano music was developing in the "cantinas," "plataformas" and "salones de baile" throughout South Texas. In order to preserve and transmit this tradition, Chicanos themselves undertook the task of establishing recording companies, among them Ideal, Falcón, Bego, Zarape, Buena Suerte and, more recently, Unicos and Freddie and others.

In the last 10 to 15 years radio stations in the region have had to adapt to the reality of Tejano music and there has been a marked increase in programming of Chicano music. In fact, many are playing Tejano music almost exclusively--in Kingsville, Falfurrias, Alice, Mathis, Pearsall, Harlingen, Corpus Christi, San Antonio, San Marcos and other cities--and some have even "condescended" to hire Chicanos as announcers and programmers.[4]

In short, Tejano music has come into its own, and this has been due to the Chicano's own efforts in promoting this aspect of his culture. It should be noted in passing that this conscious and successful effort to promote our culture predates the efforts of our institutional Chicano Movement, although,

as we shall see later, the musician is doing his part within the current Movement also.

It is also important to note that the influence of Tejano music is presently being felt outside of Chicano culture, and it is only fitting that México should be the greatest beneficiary of Chicano "cultural imperialism." Tejano influence in México has come in large part due to the fact that Tejano music is broadcast (by "Radio Free Aztlán") all along the Texas-México border creating, perhaps inadvertently at first, a following on the Mexican side which is having a clearly perceptible influence in that country.

The influence of Tejano music in México has manifested itself in several ways. For example, although I have not made a detailed study of Mexican "norteño" music to compare it with conjuntos Tejanos, I do know that Mexican conjuntos that succeed in the U.S., such as Los Bravos del Norte, come closer to the conjunto Tejano sound than the typical conjunto norteño does. While this could simply mean that those conjuntos are adapting in order to succeed financially (which they are) by catering to Tejanos, it is necessary to understand that their success in the U.S. has catapulted them into even greater success in México, not only in recording but also in movies. This must be attributed to the status of the conjuntos Tejanos, for not until the Tejanos--musicians, recording companies, promoters, etc.--gave greater impetus to the conjunto did Mexicans begin to use the accordion and the bajo sexto within the mariachi, the most prestigious Mexican music group. Before that time, the conjunto was relegated to an inferior status in Mexican popular music and would not have been considered worthy of being combined with the mariachi.

Concurrently with the importation of contemporary Tejano music, we have also seen the importation of Tejano musicians by México. Several top accordionists, such as Oskar Hernández, have recorded with mariachis from México. But these are a select few; if it were not for the fact that Tejano groups command very high prices, we would have seen a veritable flood of Tejano groups into México. Those groups that have toured México--Freddie Martínez and Joe Bravo, for example--have had tremendous receptions everywhere they have played, so much so that one of Freddie's albums is entitled "El Embajador Tejano." In the absence of economic opportunities for Tejano groups in México, several Chicano band leaders--Carlos Guzmán, Freddie Martínez and Sunny Ozuna--have been enticed individually to México by the film industries.[5]

The Tejano big bands present a peculiar situation with regard to Tejano influence in México because while the conjunto norteño and the conjunto Tejano are not identical, there are similarities that can lead the uninitiated to believe that they are identical. In the case of the band, however, there is nothing like the Tejano band in Mexican tradition, although I have heard imitations (which we also find in Nuevo México and

California). Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that this tradition could be reproduced in México in the near future, primarily because of the financial considerations. The cost of equipment required by these bands--amps, speakers, organs, P.A. systems--as well as transportation--buses, vans, station wagons, trailers--are prohibitive in the first place. All of these things are necessary in order for a big band to succeed.

Secondly, Mexican musicians have neither the kind nor the quality of musical training that Chicanos--who constitute the backbone of music of every type and at every level throughout South Texas--have, and which has led to the development of our Tejano music tradition. The closest thing to a Tejano big band in México are bands such as La Sonora Santanera, but any comparison would be gratuitous.

It should be obvious, then, that the Tejano has emphasized this aspect of Chicano culture--the music--and that he has endeavored--successfully, I might add--to foment, cultivate, even export his music.

There is a need to emphasize the fact that the pride in, and emphasis upon, Tejano music, which has always been present in Texas, is also consciously being coordinated by the musicians themselves with the larger and more recent Movement in a number of ways. First, the names of groups have reflected Chicanismo: Little Joe and the Latinaires changed their name to *La Familia* in recognition of that aspect of our culture and possibly as a rejection of the "Latin" label. While the Latin Breed uses the term "Latin" they also use Breed (i.e., "raza" in Spanish). Other groups are *La Raza de Houston, La Herencia, The Mexican Revolution, La Patria, La Onda Chicana, Los Chicanos, La Connexión (sic) Mexicana,* and *Tortilla Factory.*

It is obvious that they are consciously promoting Chicanismo and their involvement in the Movement goes beyond the mere name, which could otherwise be interpreted as opportunism. For example, all of the top groups--big bands and conjuntos--have played countless benefits for the Raza Unida Campus Club at Texas A & I and for many Raza Unida rallies and other functions throughout the region. (They also give you the Raza handshake.)

Finally, they have also made use of our music tradition in another, more direct way, to promote Chicanismo so that one can accurately state that the spirit of the Movement has influenced lyrical expression at the popular level, especially in tunes such as "Soy Chicano," "Yo Soy Chicano," "Chicanita," and "Chicano from Mercedes," all of which are worthy lyrical compositions, yet different from typical Movimiento songs.

Thus, in conclusion, we can say briefly that Tejano music has been developing for many years as a distinct instrumental type, that Chicanos have been aware of this and that they have consciously and conscientiously endeavored to promote this feature of the culture through recording, broadcasting and, more recently, by expanding the market to other parts of the United

States and México. It is, in short, the best example of Chicano cultural nationalism.

NOTES

1. José R. Reyna, "The Development of Chicano Music in Texas," a paper presented before the Texas Folklore Society, April 1973; "Chicano Sounds in Texas," a paper presented before the American Folklore Society, November 1973. For a review of a paper read at the University of Texas in October 1971, see Alma Canales, "Música Chicana," *Magazín*, I (December 1971), pp. 14-15; see also, "Festival of American Folklore," *Chicano Times*, IV, No. 48 (July 19-Aug. 2, 1974), 16 and 15.
2. Rodolfo "Corky" Gonzáles, *I Am Joaquín* (1967), p. 17.
3. Ibid.
4. They have also "discovered" a great deal of "hidden talent" in Chicano announcers and musicians as well as a lucrative commercial resource.
5. A recent Mexican film, "La Muerte de Pancho Villa," included appearances by Freddie Martínez and Sunny Ozuna.

LANGUAGE AS AN EXPRESSION OF IDEOLOGY: A CRITIQUE OF A NEO-MARXIST VIEW

RAYMOND A. ROCCO

Political Science
Associate Director, Chicano Studies Center
University of California, Los Angeles

The role of language in human experience has been a central concern of most of the major thinkers in the history of Western thought. However, it is only recently that language has been examined in terms of its relation to the various dimensions of societal organization. But it can hardly be said that this concern has had a great impact on either social and political thinkers or social scientists in general, at least in the United States and in Great Britain. Rather, those who do concern themselves with language are influenced much more by the general orientation of what is known as the "ordinary-language analysis" school, rooted in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. This concern is primarily philosophical, emphasizing that linguistic analysis and conceptual clarification are the key elements in understanding human action. While this orientation is not antithetical to approaches which assume a more structural or institutional point of departure, it has not led to any major contributions in the analysis of the structure of power. Thus, with a few exceptions, the role of language and communication has not been concerned of as primarily political nor linked to the structural dimensions of power.

In a recent book treating the United States, entitled *The Politics of Communication* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), Claus Mueller attempts to rectify this situation by placing his general discussion of the political role of language, its relationship to the political socialization process,

and how both of these relate to the political structure within the context of the need for the political system to legitimize itself. Although Mueller's conception of legitimacy as an integrating factor does not differ in formal terms from the orthodox views of social scientists such as Talcott Parsons, Seymour Lypset and David Easton, he clearly evaluates this function quite differently. Whereas they see this function as providing for desirable stability, Mueller, while arguing that it provides stability, evaluates this function negatively because he is critical of the contemporary forms of the organization of power particularly in advanced capitalist societies. He argues that we need to study language, socialization, and the communication process as an integral part of the legitimating strategies which are used by the ruling class to maintain their power and the existing mode of domination. Thus, Mueller's work falls within the complex of concerns to which Antonio Armisci, Marcuse, Adorno, Horheimer and recently Jurgen Habermas have addressed themselves and which basically revolve about one question: why has the proletarian revolution which Marx predicted not come about? The general answer is that while the material conditions for a revolution may have existed historically, the level of political consciousness of the masters has not. Let me turn, then, to a review of Mueller's basic argument, and conclude by making some suggestions regarding the relevance of the work to the study of the Chicano within the context of advanced capitalist society.

Mueller contends that the primary problem in advanced capitalist societies is that of establishing and maintaining legitimacy, i.e., of engendering in the masses the belief that the institutions and processes which allocate the basic resources are acceptable and have the right to do so. What this effort requires to establish and maintain legitimacy is that all political systems have a structure of domination, which Mueller defines as "the control of a limited number of individuals over the material resources of society and over the access to positions of political power." Legitimacy, then, is a way of conferring authority on structures of domination, a way of trying to justify the unequal distribution of power, rewards and deprivations. Mueller further argues that this legitimacy process is clearly rooted in the conflicting needs and demands of different groups within the class structure: "By obfuscating the link between a system of domination and the class--or group--specific interests this system serves, any legitimacy rationale has an ideological foundation" (p. 130).

The legitimacy process, therefore, is a major source at the stability of the existing structure of domination. When the legitimacy of the system begins to break down, as Mueller contends has occurred in advanced capitalist societies, its stability is threatened. The elite who control the centers of power must attempt to reestablish legitimacy and ensure that

stability is reinforced. This means, of course, that dissent and demands which question the boundaries of legitimacy must somehow be negated or prevented from surfacing. The reaction can and has often been repression. But a much more effective and efficient means for preventing or diffusing these challenges to the power structure is to absorb them into the system. What Mueller is examining in his work, then, is the proposition that the structure of communication, sociolinguistic factors, and socialization patterns can be used to explain how a political system is capable of absorbing these types of demands and dissent before they become a threat to its stability. Contrary to the classical Marxist argument, Mueller argues that it is the middle and upper-middle classes, not the working class which are the source of these challenges. Again, the concern is one that continues to probe the problem of why the proletarian revolution has not materialized and why it appears that it is in fact the working class that is most supportive of the status quo.

Mueller is suggesting that the answer lies in the relationship between language, socialization patterns and political consciousness. Mueller is not arguing that it is not the working class which is most oppressed or has the most cause for revolting but is instead attempting to account for why it has not.

In his attempt to demonstrate the dynamics underlying the integration of the working class into the supportive structure of society, Mueller develops a model of what he calls distorted communication, which "designates all forms of restructured and prejudicial communication that by their nature inhibit a full discussion of problems, issues, and ideas that have public relevance" (p. 19). Three basic forms of distorted communication are identified: directed, arrested, and constrained. The first, directed communication, results when governmental policy is directed at structuring language and communication. It is the direct attempt to influence the use of language and interpretational schemes by means of overt governmental intervention in the mass media and the schooling system. Examples of this type of control, Mueller argues, can be found in fascist Germany under Hitler. The second type, arrested communication, refers "to the limited capacity of individuals and groups to engage in political communication because of the nature of their linguistic environment (a restricted speech code) and not because of any apparent political intervention" (p. 19). Constrained communication "denotes successful attempts by private and governmental groups to structure and limit public communication in order that their interests prevail" (p. 19). It is with the latter two forms that Mueller is primarily concerned, devoting separate lengthy chapters to an analysis of each. It is the chapter on arrested communication, where he investigates the political function of linguistic codes and socialization patterns, however, that contains the basic argument.

The basic concern in the analysis of arrested communication is an attempt to relate language, linguistic ability, and socialization patterns to class structure. Mueller adapts Basil Bernstein's distinction between an "elaborated" language code and a "restricted" code. The restricted code designates a basic language form which reflects primarily descriptive thinking patterns and a greatly diminished ability to engage in abstract reasoning and analysis. It is distinguished by a high degree of predictability and repetitiveness, with a very low level of verbal alternatives available to the speaker. "This mode of speech is marked by grammatical simplicity, uniform vocabulary, short and often redundant sentences, a scarcity of adjectives and adverbs, repetitive use of conjunctions, and comparatively little verbal differentiation or symbolism. The capacity to formulate generalizations is therefore restricted" (p. 56). The elaborated language code, on the other hand, allows for analytic perception and discrimination and for widely varied expression of meaning. In comparison to the qualities of the restricted code, the elaborated code has such features as more precise use of grammar and syntax, higher complexity of sentence structure and of qualifying conjunctions, relative clauses and prepositions, careful use of adjectives and adverbs. The restricted code, Mueller argues, leads to arrested communication since the resources available for conceiving of and expressing ideas are underdeveloped. The individual or group characterized by a restricted code will find it extremely difficult to perceive perceptual and cognitive alternatives to that supplied by the code and therefore their ability to generalize and to use an abstract mode of understanding will be limited. The political significance of this, Mueller suggests, is that they will be unable to exceed cognitively those social relationships from which the code develops. Those who rely on an elaborated code can make use of its analytic function and have a great potential for perceiving distinctions and grasping generalizations. Mueller attempts to demonstrate that these different linguistic codes are rooted in the class structure. These codes, which are "separated by lexical, syntactic, and conceptual boundaries--reinforce the social structure by shaping the speaker's personal and social identity" (p. 58). The argument is that most of the factors which underlie "the acquisition of a restricted code are a product of socioeconomic deprivation characterized of lower-class groups" (p. 59). The conclusion is that the reliance of the working class on a restricted language code prevents them from developing or accepting an analysis of the roots of their exploitation, which would require the ability to conceptualize abstractly and make generalizations and which Mueller argues is the first step in transcending their social context.

In addition to his review of empirical studies which attempt to identify the variables which link language to class, Mueller

also reviews the general literature on political socialization which has established that the lower class pattern of socialization is characterized by rigid role structures, a high degree of conformity, authoritarian value structures, etc. Mueller argues that in most cases the restricted language code co-exists with this particular socialization pattern, whereas the elaborated language code seems to co-exist with much more flexible role structures and socialization strategies. This simply reinforces, Mueller contends, the impact of the restricted code on the working class. Their ability to analyze their situation and to offer resistance and/or alternatives to the given legitimacy rationale is thus severely constrained and in all likelihood, the existing structure of domination in which the working class occupies a subordinate position, is accepted by them.

Marx, of course, initially formulated the basic parameters of the problem to which Mueller has addressed himself. Marx argued that a radical critique of capitalist society had to precede the revolution and in developing his position, he stated, the classic formulation of the relationship between theory (or analysis) and practice which he referred to as "praxis." In his "critique of Hegels' *Philosophy of Right*," Marx stated:

> It is clear that the arm of criticism cannot replace the criticism of arms. Material force can only be overthrown by material force; but theory itself becomes a material force when it has seized the masses. Theory is capable of seizing the masses when it demonstrates *ad hominem*, and it demonstrates *ad hominem* as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp things by the root. But for man the root is man himself.

It is when the masses (and in this case, this clearly means the working class) come to understand their condition in terms of the Marxist analysis of the structure of domination, complete with the approximate material conditions of existence, that the proletarian revolution is possible. Anything that prevents the development of this political consciousness, thus also prevents the working class from realizing its revolutionary potential. It is clear, then, that Mueller's argument seeks to shed light on this issue. But whereas Marx believed that the false consciousness of the working class could be overcome, Mueller concludes that it is extremely unlikely that this can come about. Rather, he contends that the middle and upper-middle class are more likely to provide, understand, and accept the radical critique of capitalism advanced by Marxism. But what Mueller fails to ask is if they are more likely to do so, is there any real reason to expect that they will?

Since the majority of Chicanos are in the working class, Mueller's analysis should obviously be of interest to those who are concerned with the potential for basic change that exists in the Chicano community. In addition to this, the fact that an analysis of language is central to Mueller's argument makes it seem clearer that it should be examined since the Chicano community is still largely bilingual. Now the apparent implication of the central proposition which runs through the analysis is that since Chicanos fit into the category of the working-class, then Mueller's analysis of language codes and socialization patterns should apply to this group. In other words, one should expect that the Chicano's language code be restricted rather than elaborated, and that the socialization process be characterized by inflexible role structures and values. It is fair to say that Mueller would expect this to be the case. However, Mueller seriously overlooks some of the implications of his own argument that those groups that have available alternative language codes and set of symbols are much more likely to provide the basic challenge to the system's legitimacy. By virtue of having a bilingual structure, the Chicano community has a readily available alternative code and thus it seems that Mueller would be forced by the logic of his argument, to conclude that a group which should not, according to his analysis, be a potential catalyst to social change possesses the most crucial characteristic (again, according to Mueller) for challenging the status quo. Mueller apparently believes he has adequately addressed the issue by virtually dismissing the role of minority groups in the process of social and political change in one sentence.

> But the political status and the economic position of these (minority) groups in the process of production are marginal and render them secondary in an analysis of system stability (p. 6).

This may or may not be the case, but Mueller must certainly be faulted for mismissing the whole issue of minority dissent in such a casual way especially since it is his stated objective to analyze how such dissent is absorbed into the system.

Another aspect which Mueller has overlooked and needs some elaboration is the fact that the language of the "middle-class" norm (or the elaborated code) in many cases will not reflect the actual analytic ability which is claimed to be a corresponding characteristic but rather will simply reflect the learning of a language "fashion" or style. This is more an element of form than content and indicates that the relation between the theory Mueller adopts and the reality he tries to account for is a tenuous one. What this means for those who are studying the Chicano is that the straight application of the type of approach found in Mueller's analysis to that

population would already bias the types of findings that would result. As already pointed out, what would more than likely be concluded is that Chicanos rely on a restricted code, that the language they use reflects an "impoverished" environment. To be sure this would warm the heart of the liberal (and even some "progressive") "educators." What would be overlooked, however, is exactly the relation between the Chicano's sound economic and political reality and the language relied on to interpret and understand it, the relationship which is ostensibly the prime focus. The use of Mueller's framework is quite likely to increase the probability that the researcher will depend on the woefully inadequate and for the most part distorted "ethnographic" material on the Chicano for the data to fill out the image they adopt of Chicano reality, and consequently distort the nature of the relationship between that "reality" and the language used to comprehend and express it. At least it has to be considered that the "impoverished" Chicano environment that may be seen by the researcher is in fact simply a "different" environment, requiring no less, and perhaps in some instances greater, analytic and expressive abilities. The work of Labov on Black-children and language variability stands as one of the few contributions that suspends the presupposition of the minority culture's inferiority and concludes that given their own environment and context, the differences in linguistic ability between Blacks and Anglos is not decisive at all.

It should be emphasized again that the assumption made here is that any serious study of the Chicano *must* deal with the issue of *and* role of language as the mediating factor between the Chicano's objective conditions of existence and the subjective perception and understanding of those conditions. While Mueller does not, in my opinion, provide an adequate framework for doing this, he nevertheless does stress the crucial point that without an appropriate perception and awareness at the subjective level of the nature and roots of their deprivation, oppressed groups such as Chicanos will not develop into the catalyst and, eventually, agents of social change necessary to overcome these conditions.

THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF CHICANO NATIONALISM, CLASS AND COMMUNITY IN THE MAKING OF AZTLAN: 1800-1920

PETER CIRILO SALAZAR

History
University of California, Los Angeles

To ascertain origins is a difficult process. In considering the social origins of Chicano nationalism, the difficulty is compounded by the unique circumstances surrounding its development. Although Chicano nationalism appears to be most conspicuous by its absence during the nineteenth century, it is significant to view both the forces working for and against it during this period in order to understand the background for effective Chicano nationalism today. Consideration of Chicano nationalism must begin with the observation that it is an on-going phenomenon. It is a process which began with the first permanent settlement in the rugged northern marches of New Spain. Over time, it was forged in the common struggle against outsiders and in the attending growth of a collective sense of pride and identity among social groups, or classes, which made up the community.

It is against this backdrop that Chicano nationalism must be understood. The major focus of this exploratory essay is to establish a framework for further examination of the social origins of Chicano nationalism. The primary investigative tools, class and community, as developed here are but a fragment of an interrelated and complex set of concepts. By suggesting new lines of research, this initial inquiry may generate further insights which can be developed into working hypotheses that can undergo more thorough investigation.

Consideration of two variables, class and community, allows the historian to place the development of commonly held Chicano

attitudes and values in their proper perspective. They pose the key question of what Chicano group holds the attitudes or values, what attitudes or values are held, and how the possession of these attitudes or values affects the relationship among social groups within the Chicano community. Before going on to further investigate this hypothesis, a suitable working definition of nationalism must be established.

ON EUROPEAN AND THIRD WORLD NATIONALISM

The relevance of nationalism in any discussion is dependent upon the particular definition given it by the historian. A brief overview of the European experience and a short critique of one of the more sophisticated third world theories, by Anthony D. Smith, will be helpful in providing a comparative framework for assessing the utility value of nationalism and developing a model applicable to Chicano history.

What some writers call the "core doctrine of nationalism" grew out of the forces unleashed by eighteenth century rational thought and the Industrial Revolution. In this sense, nationalism was based on the principle that men naturally grouped themselves into nations in order to optimize their potential as producers and consumers. According to this theory, each nation had its own peculiar character, or General Will, which was expressed through the instruments of the State. Collective loyalty to this entity overshadowed all other loyalties; the fundamental prerequisite for global harmony and commerce, was the strengthening of the nation-state under the nationalist motto: liberty, equality, fraternity. Viewed uncritically, the notions of liberty, equality and fraternity, appear to be highly abstract and philosophical principles. When unwittingly separated from their social and economic nexus, they resemble disembodied intellectual metaphors. Linked to the social groups which give them birth, however, they become sound and practical alternatives to the problems facing a society undergoing rapid change.

By tracing these notions back to the formation of new commercially minded groups among the landed upper classes, town dwellers, and peasantry caught up in the changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution, an insight into the social origins of nationalism is achieved. As the market potential for agricultural and manufactured commodities expanded with the growth of the population and cities, these formative groups sought to minimize internal restrictions on commerce and industry, and to overcome regional and class conflicts by embracing the cohesive and shared values of liberty, equality, fraternity.

For the industrializing bourgeoisie and commercially oriented landed upper class, the primary concern, however, was liberty--political and economic freedom from the feudal restrictions of the *Ancien Régime*. For the hard-pressed peasant and urban proletariat, on the other hand, the first consideration was not

liberty but equality supported by economic rights. This principle was predicated on the thesis that political forms of liberty were meaningless and useless to men who were starving.

Liberty and equality, although shared by all to some degree, were distinct expressions of two antithetical social groups within the national community. The cohesive function of fraternity temporarily worked to resolve this dilemma by stressing the unifying values of a common culture and homeland. It was not until the late nineteenth century, subsequent to the democraphic expansion of the working classes which threatened to undermine the hegemony of the middle classes, that bourgeois nationalism began to falter. Working classes took up the banners of international socialism and the alarmed middle and upper classes took up the banners of national socialism--a merging of fascism and "integral" nationalism producing a nationalism movement seeking to turn back the clock and restructure society along authoritarian, corporativist, and totalitarian lines.

Turning from a discussion of the European experience to an examination of third world nationalism, Anthony D. Smith has tentatively suggested a model based on diffusion to underdeveloped countries of western scientific and technological knowledge. This finds nationalism's origins in the displacement and uprooting of key interest groups who experience the shock of status loss and cultural alienation due to the process of westernization.

The intelligentsia, a cross-class group in contact with western ideas begin the process. Progressive ideas are diffused to the intelligentsia from the outside. Because they are among the first to perceive their current situation through a new perspective, Smith argues that they tend to become the vanguard of nationalism and modernization among their people. They develop conflicting relationships toward the West: they resent foreign dominance yet they admire western institutions, values, spirit, and benefits. A crisis grows out of conflicting traditional and progressive sources of authority, and in an attempt to resolve this dilemma, the intelligentsia is faced with three alternatives: (1) denial of the new values; (2) assimilation of the new values and thus, integration into the common system, i.e., acceptance of "world citizenship"; or (3) synthesis of the new value system with traditional attitudes and beliefs.

Smith sees nationalists adopting the third alternative and attacking both traditional and modern values alike in an attempt to provide a unifying theme to the disintegrating strains of modernization. Nationalism, through the mechanism of communication and empathy provides the ideological framework for mobilizing all sectors of society without forfeiting the group's unique cultural and historical heritage.

Limited to a discussion of nationalism as ideology, this concept excludes consideration of commonly held attitudes and values and their relationship to the social classes which hold them. Smith consigns these subjective elements to the concept of national sentiment. National sentiment, from this point of view, does not necessarily indicate the existence of nationalism. In considering the social origins of Chicano nationalism Smith's hypothesis can be misleading.

An analysis restricting nationalism to an ideological movement initiated and led by an elite group of westernized intellectuals has a low utility value in assessing the social problem of Chicano nationalism. Any serious evaluation of the social origins of Chicano nationalism must begin by assessing the relationship between attitudes and social classes in the community. Students and the intelligentsia do not constitute a social class. Moreover, the premise of diffusion raises more questions than it answers. A more fruitful avenue for analysis can be found in considering the social function of Chicano nationalism.

THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF NATIONALISM

Perhaps the most useful definitions of nationalism have been developed by K. H. Silvert and Karl Deutsch. Silvert has viewed nationalism as a social value, a set of common attitudes and values, shared to a certain degree by all members of the community. Deutsch has carried this line of inquiry even further. According to his definition, nationalism "essentially consists in wide complementarity of social communication. It consists in the ability to communicate more effectively and over a wider range of subjects with members of one large group than with outsiders." These two viewpoints are useful because they suggest the social function of nationalism. As shared attitudes and values, nationalism is not restricted to ideology and movements; it becomes a cohesive social force working to protect the community from outside threats and to resolve intergroup strife without completely dissolving class conflict.

A theory of nationalism must account for the unique circumstances surrounding the development of Chicano nationalism. From a preliminary review of the general literature on Chicano history, nationalism as a social value appears to have the greatest potential for meeting this prerequisite. Utilizing this definition, some of the basic elements of Chicano nationalism, the way in which nationalist attitudes are produced, can be distinguished.

To begin with, Chicano nationalism is not an aggressive or expansive force but has as its rationale the promotion of social cohesion and unity among members of the community; it is not an all exclusive end-in-itself. Thus, other values and interests,

such as regional, religious, family, class, are not terminated but continue to function within a nationalist framework.

Chicano attitudes have also been produced by the biological fusion of originally antagonistic groups--indio, mestizo, mulatto. Mestizaje has tended to create pride in a common ethnic background. Also, innovations in transportation, which have helped to break down regional barriers to communication, and the development of mass communications media, have stimulated the rise of nationalism. Continuing immigration, internal and external, between the Mexican Republic and Aztlán has been a significant element in reinforcing Chicano culture and quickening the growth of a sense of national community.

Chicano nationalism has also been characterized by conflict. From its inception, the community has struggled against depredations by hostile nomads, control by Mexican centralists, and pressure by Anglo expansionists. Since 1848, Chicanos have constituted an oppressed national minority without direct access to the instruments of power. Any effective nationalist appeal from Chicano cultural heroes, or social bandits, as well as any anti-social act, organized or spontaneous, which sought to express common Chicano goals, has been repressed, termed a criminal act, and stripped of nationalist meaning by Anglo police, judiciary, and mass media.

Through decades of collective struggle, the commonly held principles of self-determination, economic development and cultural autonomy have emerged as significant Chicano nationalist values. The social function of Chicano nationalism, raises the questions as to which group or class holds these principles and how their possession affects class relationships within the Chicano community. Variants of Chicano nationalism develop according to the stress different groups place on these shared concepts.

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

In order to assess the central hypothesis of this paper, the formation of nationalist attitudes among classes in the Chicano community, three interrelated factors must be considered: (1) the regional economy, (2) the nature of the landed upper class, and (3) the work force and small landed class.

(1) In the process of production, men work not only upon raw materials and the instruments of labor, e.g., land or machines, but also upon one another. In order to produce, they enter into social relations with one another and only within these relations does the production of wealth take place. Changes in the social relations of production bring about changes in the distribution of wealth and, subsequently, in the orientation of human attitudes and values. Ownership of land is central to this process; land ownership is equated with power and prestige. With control of the land goes control

of whatever is on it, whether people, animals, or commodities. Whatever wealth is extracted by the workforce goes to those who own the land.

An important consideration in the development of regional economies, is whether or not a landed upper class has turned from subsistance production to commercial production for the market, and the form that this commercialization has taken in each region. If the transition to production for the market is made under a repressive system of labor, the landed upper class is likely to need a state with a powerful repressive apparatus and thus one which imposes a whole climate of political and social conditions unfavorable to human freedom. The brutalizing consequences of this relationship is especially severe in those economies where the workers belong to a different nation.

(2) The second factor, concerning the composition and commercial inclinations of a landed upper class, is important in determining the social origins of nationalism. Four variables must be considered here. (a) The first is the response of the landed upper class to the requirements of production for the market. It may be weak or strong depending on the market and the availability of transportation facilities. The needs of the local towns provide the first markets. With the development of new innovations in sea and surface transportation, the stronger demands of the world market come to bear.

(b) Relations with the town dwellers is the second variable. The strength or weakness of a town bourgeoisie is decisive. A coalition between landed and urban elites can play an important role in quickening or repressing the growth of nationalist attitudes. This possibility becomes more apparent when the last two variables are considered. These are (c) the relationships between the landed upper class and the government, and (d) relationships of the landed upper class with the small landowning class and the rural and urban work force. In the turn to commercial production, the landed upper class may devise a new social arrangement to squeeze the economic surplus out of the lower sectors. As pointed out above, this system can become part of an institutional complex of repression leading to the need for political maintenance and police methods to maintain stability.

(3) The third and final factor in considering the formation of Chicano nationalist attitudes, the small landed and rural/urban working classes, can be examined by taking a look at three variables which have a direct impact on the growth of nationalist attitudes. These are (a) the character of the links between the landed upper classes and the lower sectors; (b) property and class divisions within the lower sectors; and (c) the degree of solidarity and cohesiveness among them.

The first variable has already been touched on and needs little further discussion. The second and third are interrelated and provide an insight into the growth of nationalist

attitudes. For example, in the late nineteenth century, in Nuevo Méjico, the means by which a vigorous but small landed class struggled to free itself from the grip of a repressive landed upper class had ramifications far beyond the immediate problem at hand. These struggles coincided with the interests of Chicano urban workers who were undergoing rapid changes brought on by the economic affects of the encroaching Anglo community and their railroads. At a crucial point in time, the interests of the lower sectors came together to provide a degree of solidarity and cohesion which helped to promote the growth of Chicano nationalism.

SUMMARY

In assessing the social origins of Chicano nationalism, this exploratory essay has suggested an approach utilizing two interrelated hypotheses. The first is predicated on the social function of nationalism. General information substantiated by numerous historians and scholars will be examined to determine the validity of nationalism as a social value which becomes a cohesive force to protect the Chicano community from outside threats, and to resolve intergroup strife without completely dissolving class conflict. The key question raised here is that of which Chicano class holds the attitudes or values, what attitudes or values are held, and how their possession affects the relationship among social groups and classes within the Chicano community.

The second hypothesis will lend support to the first by providing a means for ascertaining the actual changes in the regional economy and in the social relations of production. By methodically examining the relationship between the landed upper classes and the lower sectors, a fruitful and useful investigation can be made into the social origins of Chicano nationalism.

APPENDICES

I. National Caucus of Chicano Social Scientists, May 18-20, 1973 Conference. Suggested Agenda by the Steering Committee.
II. National Caucus of Chicano Social Scientists Newsletter, Vol. I, No. 1 (Summer 1973).
III. National Association of Chicano Social Scientists Newsletter, Vol. I, No. 2 (Winter 1973).
IV. National Association of Chicano Social Scientists Newsletter, Vol. I, No. 3 (Spring 1974).
V. Program, Second Annual Conference of the Chicano Social Science Association, University of California, Irvine. May 10-13, 1974.
VI. National Chicano Social Science Association Newsletter, Austin, Texas (Spring 1975).
VII. National Chicano Social Science Association, Annual Conference, April 11-12, 1975, Joe C. Thompson Center, Austin, Texas.
VIII. Reprints from *El Mirlo Canta de Noticatlán: Carta Sobre Estudios Chicanos*.
   A. Volume 2, No. 8 (Abril 1975) "NACSS Conference (part 1)"
   B. Volume 2, No. 9 (Mayo 1975) "NACSS Conference (part 2)"
IX. Foco Contacts for the Year 1975.
X. Resource Guide in Chicano Studies.

APPENDIX I

NATIONAL CAUCUS OF CHICANO SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
MAY 18-20, 1973 CONFERENCE

Suggested Agenda by the Steering Committee

Saturday 9-12 noon Plenary Session
1) Purpose of the Organization
2) Structure of the Organization
a) membership
b) officers and duties
c) elections and terms of office

12:00-12:45 Lunch at El Conquistador

1:00-4:30 Plenary Session continued
3) First Annual Meeting: What? Where? When?
4) Committees of the Organization; Signups for Committees and Selection of Chairmen

5:00-6:00 Dinner at El Conquistador

6:00-8:00 Selection of Acting Officers of the Organization; Naming the Organization

9:00-???? Pachanga Aztlanteca under the stars, casa Rendon

Sunday (6:30 & 8:00 a.m.: Masses at Immaculate Conception, 811-6th St.)
8-12 noon Breakfast meetings of all Committees

12 noon End of Conference: CHECKOUT BY 1:00 AT REGISTRATION DESK--VERY IMPORTANT!

Participants in Conference
May 18, 19, 20

Arturo Pacheco
(Philosophy, education)
Assistant Professor of Educ.
School of Education
Stanford University
Stanford, Ca. 94305

Reynaldo Macías
Chicano Studies
(emphasis: history, educ. language)
Instructor (piece work)
Aztlan Publications
UCLA-Campbell Hall 3128
405 Hilgard Ave.
L.A. 90024

Tomás Almaguer
Sociology Grad. Student
Sociology Dept.
University of California
Berkeley, Ca.

Frank Lucero
History
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, Colo. 80521

Terri Lucero
Pre-School Education
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, Colo. 80521

Alberto Morales Bocanegra
Chicano Studies Major
University of Calif.,
Berkeley, Ca.

Virginia Cabias
Sociology-Grad. student
Department of Sociology
University of California
Davis, Ca. 95616

Anthony Dodge
Psychology-Grad. Student
Highlands University
Psychology Dept.

Arnold N. Muñoz, Ph.D.
Educational Administration
Director: Special Edu. Services
224 East Hall
University of Calif., Davis
Davis, Ca. 95616

Carlos Muñoz
Political Science
Assistant Prof. of Political Science & Comparative Culture
Program in Comparative Culture
Univ. of Calif.
Irvine, Ca. 92664

David Kahn
Anthropology
Grad. Student-Calif. State L.A.

Ruben Treviso
Psychology
Cal. State Univ., Los Angeles
Educational Participation in Communities
Adm. #118
5151 State University Drive
Los Angeles, Ca.

Nina Genera
Sociology-M.A.
Social Psychology program for Ph.D.
Counselor, Chicano Studies Dept.
3406 Dwinelle
University of California
Berkeley, Ca. 94720

Gabino Rendón, Sociology, Ph.D.
Chairman, Dept. of Behavioral Sciences
New Mexico Highlands University
Las Vegas, New Mexico 87701

Victor A. Baez
Assistant Professor
Social Work, Colorado State Uni.
Ft. Collins, Colo. 80521

Henry Pacheco
Graduate Student-Spanish
UMAS Student Center
Colorado State University

Ray Burrola
Director, Chicano Studies
Chicano History
Colorado State Univ.
Fort Collins, Colo. 80521

Richard Valdez Siggins
Grad. Student-History
Cal. State L.A.
Administrative Assistant
Chicano Pride Program

Rosario Solíz Novales
Sociology/Psychology-Undergrad. Student
New Mexico Highlands Uni.
Las Vegas, New Mexico 87701

Fernando D. Vazquez
Sociología
U.C. Berkeley 94720
Scientific Analysis Corp.

Theresa Aragón de Shepro
Political Science-Asst. Prof.
Vice Provost for Special Pro.
Director, Urban & Regional
Affairs Division
University of Washington
Seattle, Wn. 98195

Mario Barrera
Political Science
Asst. Prof., Uni. of Calif.
San Diego, Calif. 92037

José B. Cuellar
Anthropology, MA
Research Fellow
Andrus Gerontology Center
University of So. California
Los Angeles, Ca.
Chicano Studies Center
Claremont Colleges
Claremont, Ca. 91711

Velia García Hancock, M.S.W.
(Social Welfare)
Lecturer, Chicano Studies &
School of Criminology
also: grad. student-Anthropology
U.C.B., Chicano Studies,
3412 Dwinelle Hall
University of Calif., Berkeley

Lea Ybarra
Sociology-Univ. of Calif., Berk.
Asst. Prof.-La Raza Studies
Cal. State Univ., Fresno
Fresno, Calif.

Rodolfo O. de la Garza, Ph.D.
Asst. Prof. Political Science
University of Texas, El Paso
El Paso, Texas

Carlos F. Hidalgo
Assoc. Prof. Economics
New Mexico Highlands University
Las Vegas, New Mexico 87701

Salvador Sánchez
Business Administration (MBA Stanford)
Asst. to President for Chicano Affairs, Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305

Hisauro Garza
Dept. Sociology
Univ. of California
Berkeley, California

Carina Ramírez
Anthropology; Linguistics; Folklore Instructor; Director of Chicano Studies Program
Chicano Studies, P.O. Box 224, UTEP
El Paso, Texas

Arnoldo Beltrán
Stanford University
Economics-Senior
Bldg. 1, Room 1-B
Stanford University,
Stanford, Calif. 94305

David Sena
Sociology Instructor
Pomona College
Claremont, Calif. 91711

Hector Homero Galicia
Education: Chicano Fellows
Stanford University
Stanford, Calif.

Juan José Peña
New Mexico Highlands Uni.
Las Vegas, New Mexico

Guillermo Lux
(Historian, NMHU Director of
Ethnic Studies)
Assistant Academic Dean
Office of Academic Affairs
Nex Mexico Highlands Univ.
Las Vegas, New Mexico

Teodoro A. Martínez
History (Graduate student)
New Mexico Highlands Univ.

APPENDIX II

NATIONAL CAUCUS OF CHICANO SOCIAL SCIENTISTS NEWSLETTER
Vol. I, No. 1 (Summer 1973)

This is the first issue of the Newsletter of the National Caucus of Chicano Social Scientists. Its purpose is to serve as a communication mechanism among Chicano social scientists. This issue is devoted to reporting in summary form the proceedings of the first national conference of the Caucus held at New Mexico Highlands University, Las Vegas, New Mexico, on May 18, 19, and 20, 1973.

BACKGROUND OF THE CAUCUS

It is estimated that there are approximately seventy (70) practicing Chicano social scientists in the United States, i.e. those with a Ph.D. in the various disciplines of the social sciences teaching at the college and university level and/or actively involved in research. Since 1969/70 a number of Chicano caucuses have been formed along disciplinary lines by Chicano scholars active in the various professional associations of the social sciences, e.g. the Chicano political science caucus, La Junta de Sociologos Chicanos, etc. The objectives of those caucuses have been largely limited to "bread and butter issues" of faculty recruitment and graduate student entrance into the various professions. In the final analysis their objectives have been to open the doors for Chicanos and to promote the welfare of both faculty and students.

At the annual meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association held in San Antonio, Texas, in March, 1972, representatives of the various existing Chicano caucuses formed the National Caucus of Chicano Social Scientists. A Steering Committee for the Caucus was appointed comprised of representatives from the various existing Chicano disciplinary organizations for the purpose of planning the first national meeting of the Caucus. The Steering Committee was chaired by Jaime Sena

Rivera. It was decided in San Sntonio that the purpose of the Las Vegas conference was to begin organizing a more formal organization to replace the ad hoc National Caucus.

THE LAS VEGAS CONFERENCE

The conference was attended by approximately fifty Chicano social scientists. Although the conference was national in scope, the majority of those attending were from Southwestern area colleges and universities. It was assumed that a truly national representation was not possible due to difficulties in securing travel funds. The various disciplines were fairly equitably represented. Most of the delegates were faculty and graduate students and several undergraduate students also participated. The thrust of the conference discussions focused on the nature and direction of Chicano social science, and the structure and purpose of the proposed Association. There were several key themes which had general consensus among the delegates. These themes reflected dissatisfaction with traditional social science and concern for the question of the role of the Chicano social scientist.

THEMES OF THE CONFERENCE: A NEW DIRECTION FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE

(1) Social science research by Chicanos must be much more problem-oriented than traditional social science has been. Chicano research should aim to delineate the social problems of La Raza and actively propose solutions. Analysis should not be abstracted or disembodied from such pressing social concerns. Social science scholarship cannot be justified for its own sake: it must be a committed scholarship that can contribute to Chicano liberation.

(2) Social science research projects should be interdisciplinary in nature. Only by pooling our intellectual resources can we deal with the whole range of factors that affect the social situation of Chicanos. The traditional disciplinary orientation (economics, sociology, psychology, etc.) has served to fragment our research in a highly artificial manner, and obscures the interconnections among variables that operate to maintain the oppression of our people.

(3) Social science as practiced by Chicanos should break down the existing barriers between research and action. Research and action should exist in a dialectical relationship, i.e. research generates information that can lead to more effective problem-solving action; action in turn produces information that modifies and advances theoretical understanding. In order to bridge the gap between theory and action, Chicano social scientists must develop close ties with community action groups.

(4) Chicano social science must be highly critical, in the double sense of rigorous analysis and a trenchant critique of American institutions. The working of these institutions have perpetuated the unfavorable condition of the Chicano. Liberation from these conditions will require a radical transformation of existing institutions, and it should be a primary task of our scholarship to prepare the ground for such transformation.

(5) Chicanos must be careful not to unduly limit the scope of our investigations. We must study the Chicano community but within the context of those dominant institutional relationships that affect Chicanos. Our levels of investigation must include the local, the regional, and the national, as well as the international dimension which currently plays such an important role in American society. One pressing item requiring intensive research has to do with the relationship between class, race, and culture in determining the Chicano's historical experience.

THE PURPOSES OF A CHICANO SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

Participants at the conference mentioned a wide variety of purposes which could be served by a Chicano Social Science Association. Among these are:

1. Establishing communication among Chicano scholars across geographical and disciplinary boundaries.
2. Encouraging the development of new social theories and models, in keeping with the direction outlined above.
3. Facilitating the recruitment of Chicanos into all levels of social science institutions.
4. Acting to increase the flow of funds to research undertaken by Chicanos, particularly as that research contributes to the goals and direction of the Association.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE PROPOSED ASSOCIATION

Some of the liveliest discussion at the meeting concerned the structure of the Association. During these discussions a decision emerged to break with the traditional form of organization of professional associations and to attempt an innovative structure more in keeping with the philosophy and direction of a new social science as laid out at the Las Vegas conference.

In keeping with the interdisciplinary orientation, it was decided to abandon the idea of membership via disciplinary organizations (the various caucuses, etc.). Rather, membership in the national organization will be based on participation in interdisciplinary local or sub-regional collective research

units. In keeping with their action orientation, these units will be referred to as focos.

The focos are envisioned as small enough to allow regular interaction among its members, since such interaction is seen as essential in maintaining a high level of interest and participation. A high level of participation, in turn, is necessary if such organizations are to develop and implement vigorous projects combining action and research at the local level.

The foco is thus seen as the real driving force of the association, and the center of activity for its members. The foco is to be the source of initiative and the locus of power. The local research/action projects developed by the focos should correspond to local conditions and to the interests of its members, integrating existing research wherever possible. Hopefully there will be a great diversity among the projects undertaken, with the various focos learning from the experiences and activities of others. Eventually there should develop direct working relationships among adjoining focos, based on overlapping interests.

The internal structure of the foco is left for each foco to determine, in keeping with the general tone and direction of the Association. It may be that within each foco there will be a number of sub-groups or task forces organized around common interests.

At the national level, there is to be a coordinating committee composed of delegates from the focos. The purpose of this group is to act as an information link among the focos, as by seeing to the publication of a regular newsletter; to make arrangements for national conferences; and to act as a general coordinating body. It is not seen as a locus of power or major initiative in the association, but as a channel for the energies of the focos.

An annual national conference will be part of the association. Presentations at this annual meeting are to be initiated by the various focos, and will reflect the activities and research of their members.

CONCLUSION

The Las Vegas Conference concluded with the election of a Provisional Coordinating Committee which replaces the Caucus Steering Committee. Those elected were as follows: Tomas Almaguer--UC Berkeley, Mario Barrera--UC San Diego, Ray Burrola --Colorado State University, Rodolfo de la Garza--UT at El Paso, Guillermo Lux--New Mexico Highlands University, Geralda Vialpando--UC San Diego, Carlos Munoz--UC Irvine, Teresa Aragon de Shepro--University of Washington. This committee has been charged with the task of coordinating the activities of the proposed National Association and the arrangement of its next national meeting. It was also agreed that a Newsletter would be developed and circulated nationally by the committee. A

number of initial focos were designated at the conference. Any interested person should call or write the "contact persons" closest to his/her foco area. The contact persons were delegated the responsibility of recruitment of students, faculty, and interested community persons into their respective focos. Additional focos should be organized whenever feasible. This is perhaps the most crucial task that must be performed for unless local focos are operative the Association will have difficulty getting off the ground. The contact persons are as follows:

Las Vegas-Northern New Mexico
Guillermo Lux
Department of History
Highlands University
Las Vegas, New Mexico 87701

Northern Colorado
Ray Burrola
Director, Chicano Studies
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, Colorado

Southern California
Jose Cuellar
Andrus Gerontology Center
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California

Mario Barrera
Department of Political Science
University of California
La Jolla, California 92037

Carlos Munoz
Program in Comparative Culture
University of California
Irvine, California 92664

Northern California
Tomas Almaguer
Department of Sociology
University of California
Berkeley, California

Arturo Pacheco
School of Education
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305

Texas (El Paso Area)
Rodolfo de la Garza
Department of Political Science
University of Texas
El Paso, Texas 79968

Pacific Northwest Area
Teresa de Shepro
Department of Political Science
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington

TOWARD A CHICANO SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION: PROBLEMS & PROSPECTS

Prior to the formal establishment of the Association there are some basic questions that need to be clarified which revolve around the definition of role and the scope and objectives of the proposed organization. Only if concerned Chicano social scientists commit themselves to organization from the bottom (foco level) up can we hope to create a viable Association. It was agreed that only through the process of foco organization can those central and basic questions be clarified and a strong foundation laid for the proposed Association.

It must be noted that "established" Chicano social scientists were conspicuous by their absence at the conference. With the exception of two persons (both on the faculty of the host institution) there were no tenured or senior faculty in attendance. The apparent lack of interest on the part of "established" scholars presents a problem to the organization of a proposed Association. Without their participation it will be difficult to generate support at various levels important to the funding and establishment of a viable Association. We can only conjecture as to their reasons for not participating in the Las Vegas conference. Perhaps they are so well established in existing traditional professional associations that they perceive a Chicano Association as irrelevant to their careers. Whatever the reasons for their absence the Caucus should encourage and welcome their participation in the future.

CONCLUDING NOTE

Items for publication in the Newsletter should be addressed to Carlos Munoz, Program in Comparative Culture, University of California, Irvine, California 92664. Everyone is urged to respond to this issue of the Newsletter and to submit their ideas regarding the proposed Association and most importantly on the agenda for the next national meeting. Everyone is urged to communicate with Chicano social scientists throughout the country, obtain names, and addresses so that they may receive

our communication. Most importantly, we should encourage them to organize a foco wherever they exist in sufficient numbers to make it operative. The Newsletter will be published whenever sufficient items are received to warrant publication. UC Irvine can serve as a central contact point for the Newsletter, but responsibility for succeeding issues should circulate among various focos. If you have urgent questions or wish to dissiminate info that cannot wait until publication of the Newsletter, please feel free to communicate with any member of the Coordinating Committee.

This issue of the Newsletter was put together by the following members of the National Coordinating Committee: Mario Barrera, Geralda Vialpando, Carlos Munoz.

We extend un fuerte abrazo a nuestros compañeros y compañeras que participaron y especialmente a los que hiceron posible la conferencia.

The warm hospitality extended to us in New Mexico made the conferencia meaningful not only intellectually but more importantly because we had the opportunity for old compañeros to see each other again.

The next Newsletter will announce the place and time of the first coordinating meeting as well as the recommended dates and place for the next annual meeting of the Association.

APPENDIX III

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHICANO SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
NEWSLETTER, Vol. I, No. 2 (Winter 1973)

NOTICE: At the meeting of November 17, 1973, at University of California, Irvine the members of the steering Committee present, unanimously voted to change the name of the organization from "National Caucus of Chicano Social Scientists" to "National Association of Chicano Social Scientists" (NACSS).

The following five (5) members of the Streeting Committee were present:

1. Carlos Muñoz, (Acting Chairman and Treasurer) University of California, Irvine
2. Mario Barrera, University of California, San Diego
3. Tomás Almaguer, University of California, Berkeley
4. Geralda Vialpando, University of California, San Diego
5. Ray Burrola, Colorado State University

Other members present were:

1. Fernando Vasquez, University of California, Berkeley
2. Gil Gonzalez, University of California, Irvine
3. Dan Moreno, University of California, Irvine
4. Victor Baez, Colorado State University

This second issue of the Newsletter is authored by Victor Baez and Ray Burrola and printed through the Office of Chicano Studies at Colorado State University. The Newsletter is mainly devoted to a report of the Steering Committee meeting at U.C., Irvine, on November 17, 1973. The agenda for this meeting was:

1. The foco idea
2. Formalization of structure
3. Location, date, and structure of next meeting.

FOCO IDEA

One of the major topics of discussion was the foco idea. There was a reaffirmation of the fact that the organization should be structured around the focos. In fact, it was made clear that the organization as conceived in the Las Vegas meeting cannot exist apart from the focos. Unfortunately, it became clear also that most focos are not working. On the other hand, it was mentioned that there are many people now working on various projects which are in fact identical to the foco concept.

As a result of this discussion, there was some further elaboration of the foco concept. There was some consensus that membership in the organization was through the focos. The foco, in turn, is a local group that is engaged in research (analysis) and action around some aspect touching of the life of the Chicano community. These focos then make up the National Association of Chicano Social Scientists.

This idea has obvious implications for the structure of the organization and the kind of general conference being planned. It also suggests that the biggest task for the organization is the stimulation of foco activity. It was agreed therefore that the next general meeting be planned with this in mind and that its purpose be to stimulate foco activity. This could be done by presentations of the activities of the focos underway at that time and also by the presentation of ideas that could stimulate other participants to initiate foco activities.

ORGANIZATION

Discussion concerning the formalization of the organization's structure was centered around the idea of incorporation. Fernando Vasquez, the representative of the Chicano Planning Council, is willing to provide the legal leg work for incorporation. It was decided, however, not to incorporate until more input is received from the membership. If there is any need for a legally incorporated body, the Chicano Planning Council is willing to serve as the medium for the Association.

NEXT MEETING

It was decided that the meeting in early December, as proposed in Las Vegas, would have to be cancelled. The main reason was that the Steering Committee felt that it was premature since there was little planning and coordination of the meeting place, date, and structure. It was agreed that the Steering Committee would meet again on February 2, 1974, at the University of California, Berkeley with Tomas Almaguer as host. If there is anyone interested, or are in the area, they are welcomed to attend. Additional information can be acquired by

contacting Tomás Almaguer in the Department of Sociology at UC, Berkeley. The membership meeting was tentatively set for May 3 and 4 or April 19 and 20. Please let Carlos Muñoz know your preference as early as possible.

After some discussion, several places were mentioned as possibilities; there were: (1) University of California at Los Angeles, (2) University of Texas at El Paso, (3) Santa Barbara/Casa de la Raza, (4) University of Arizona. UCLA was mentioned since it was centrally located in California and has good facilities available. Also, it would be easy for out-of-state representatives to fly directly to Los Angeles and then a very short drive to UCLA campus. Rodolfo de la Garza, offered the services of the Cross-Cultural Southwest Ethnic Study Center at UTEP for the December meeting. In view of the facts that the meeting was postponed and that there was some question about the nature of the offer made by the Cross-Cultural Southwest Ethnic Study Center, it was decided that further clarification was necessary.

La Casa de la Raza was introduced as a possibility since it did have facilities, and possible financial assistance. The University of Arizona was a possibility since it is centrally located in the Southwest and it might stimulate possible interest in the association outside of California. The final selection of the site will be made by the Steering Committee in February. The points that will be considered on the site will be:

1. financial assistance for key members
2. facilities available
3. central location

There was a lot of discussion concerning the structure of the forthcoming conference. It was decided that following the decision made in Las Vegas, the conference should reflect the nature of the association which calls for social science research and action. This research should be more problem-oriented then traditional social science research and should be interdisciplinary in nature and should break down the existing barriers between research and action. It should also be highly critical and should study the Chicano Community within the context of dominant institutional relationships.

A number of concrete suggestions were made. First of all, the workshops should be organized around foco activities that promote ongoing analysis and action. It was also suggested that workshops could be based around research presently being done, e.g. (1) economic factors involving integration of the Southwest into the U.S., (2) the examination of occupational structures and changes in the Chicano workforce, (3) political scientists and historians could design a workshop on ideology, and (4) some workshops could be organized by individuals to summarize or to report on their recent research activities

that tie together research and action. Such as the current work done by Ernesto Galaraza in Alviso and Union City.

REPORT

Carlos Muñoz reported that the Association had a total of $125.00 left out of $350.00 in the Banco. The monies came from honorariums given separately to Carlos Muñoz (UC, Irvine), Carina Ramirez (UTEP), Mario Barrera (UC, San Diego), and Ray Burrola (CSU) for their part in the written evaluation of New Mexico Highlands University's (Las Vegas) Chicano Studies Program. Once Carlos Muñoz received the monies he paid an outstanding bill of $225.00 the Association incurred at the Las Vegas Conference.

APPENDIX IV

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHICANO SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
NEWSLETTER, Vol. I, No. 3 (Spring 1974)

The Coordinating Committee of the Association met on March 2, 1974, at the UC Berkeley campus to finalize plans for the second annual conference of the Association to be held at the University of California, Irvine campus, on May 11 and 12, 1974. The program for the conference will consist of one day devoted to workshops and one day to the presentation of foco reports and general organizational discussion.

STRUCTURE OF THE CONFERENCE

The conference has been structured in accordance with the recommendations of the two active focos in the Association (Southern and Northern California). On Saturday, May 11th, there will be four workshops as follows:

(1) Action Research I - Community Control
(2) Action Research II - Chicano Alternative Institutions
(3) Working Class Analysis and the Chicano
(4) Internationalism and the Border

Coordinators for workshop 1 are Mario Barrera and Geralda Vialpando; Arturo Pacheco and Danny Moreno will coordinate workshop 2; Carlos Munoz will coordinate the third workshop; Guillermo Flores and Victor Nelson Cisneros the fourth. Each workshop will consist of three working papers. The coordinators are responsible for getting commitments from Chicano and Chicana scholars engaged in research in the general area of the workshop themes. Each person presenting a working paper will be asked to submit a one page abstract of their paper to the coordinator of the workshop by at least two weeks prior to the conference. The Coordinators will be responsible for writing a summary of the workshops for publication in a future Association newsletter.

The second day of the meeting, Sunday, May 12th, will be devoted to the presentation and open discussion of foco reports. In addition, organizational questions, e.g. present and future structure of the Association, will be considered in a concluding general meeting. The general meeting will provide an opportunity for input from members-at-large, i.e. those who presently do not belong to a foco, and from those interested in becoming part of the Association. The theme of the general meeting will be the Association's progress to date and the development of priorities for its future direction.

Flyers announcing the conference of the Association have been prepared and mailed out by the host Southern California foco. The conference program will also be prepared by the host foco and will be distributed during the conference registration period on May 11th. Those planning to attend the conference are urged to arrive Friday evening since the workshops will begin at 10:00 A.M. Lack of funds and resources has made it impossible to provide free housing or food. However, the conference organizers are attempting to provide for some type of overnight arrangements with Chicano students living in the campus dorms. Specific details will be stated in the flyer.

Those who wish additional information about the conference may contact Carlos Munoz at (714) 833-5893 or Danny Moreno at (714) 833-5898. For specific information about workshops, etc., please contact the person who is coordinator of the particular workshop. Workshop coordinators and their telephone numbers are:

Mario Barrera, UC San Diego (Dept. of History, ext. 1763 or Third World Studies, ext. 2817)
Geralda Vialpando, same as above
Carlos Munoz, UC Irvine (Program in Comparative Culture 714 833-5893, messages at 833-7137)
Danny Moreno, UC Irvine (714 833-5898)
Arturo Pacheco, Stanford University (School of Education)
Guillermo Flores, Stanford (415 965-0164)
Victor Nelson Cisneros, UCLA (Chicano Studies Center, 213 825-2642)

JOB OPENING ANNOUNCEMENT

Department of Anthropology, University of New Mexico. Rank: Assistant Professor, Ph.D. required, salary negotiable. Expertise in political and economic anthropology, cultural ecology, and quantitative methods of data analysis. Contact Professor Karl Schwerin.

This issue of the newsletter prepared by Tomas Almaguer and Roberto Palacio of the Northern California foco.

APPENDIX V

PROGRAM, SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE CHICANO SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE, MAY 10-13, 1974

Friday Evening, May 10

8:00-10:30 Pre-Conference Program
Room: Humanities Hall 178
Slide show . . . Chilean coup . . . Alejandro Stuart Songs of Chilean struggle . . .
Patricio Calderon Photographic exhibit . . . Chilean murals

Saturday Morning, May 11

9:00-10:00 Registration
Place: Humanities Hall and Quad Area, UC Irvine

10:00-12:30 Panel I. *Action Research: Community Control*
Room: Humanities Hall 178
Coordinators: Geralda Vialpando (UC San Diego), Mario Barrera (UC San Diego)
Papers:
- Armando Navarro (UC Riverside) "La Raza Unida Party in Cristal"
- Hisauro Garza (UC Berkeley) "Cristal City, Texas: A Study in Decolonization"
- Robert Aguallo (UC Davis) and Adaljiza Sosa Riddell (UC Davis) "Political Change, Local Elites and Local Policy: The Case of Parlier"

Panel II. *Action Research: Alternative Institutions*

Room: Humanities Hall 161
Coordinators: Daniel Moreno (UC Irvine), Art Pacheco (Stanford)
Papers:
Gilbert Gonzales (UC Irvine) "Limits and Determinants of Alternative Institutions"
Tomas Atencio (Academia de la Nueva Raza) (To be announced)
Teresa Jimenez

Saturday Afternoon, May 11

12:30-1:30 Lunch

1:30-3:30 Panel III. *Working Class Analysis and the Chicano*
Room: Humanities Hall 178
Coordinator: Carlos Muñoz (UC Irvine)
Papers:
Ricardo Romo (UC San Diego) "Mexican Workers in Los Angeles, 1917-1930: A Study in Mobility"
Victor Nelson Cisneros (UCLS) "The Participation of Chicanos in the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers of America, 1937-1950"
Laura Arroyo (UCLA) "The Chicana Worker"
Rosalinda Gonzales (UC Irvine) "The Development of a Correct Analysis on the Situation of Working Class Women, Particularly Chicanas"
Comments: Juan Gomez-Quiñones (UCLA)

3:30-5:30 Panel IV. *Internationalism and the Border*
Room: Humanities Hall 161
Coordinators: Guillermo Flores (Stanford) Victor Nelson Cisneros (UCLA)
Papers:
Raul Fernandez (UC Irvine) (To be announced)
Comments: Guillermo Flores

Saturday Evening, May 11

5:30 Dinner

8:00 Teatro de las Chicanas presents Bertolt Brecht's "The Mother"
Room: Humanities Hall 178

Sunday Morning, May 12

10:00-12:00 Reports from the focos
Room: Humanities Hall 161
Southern California:
Reynaldo Macías (UCLA)
Luis Arroyo (UCLA)
Northern California:
Tomás Almaguer (UC Berkeley)
Roberto Palacio (UC Berkeley)
Northern Colorado:
Ray Burrola (Colorado State University)

Sunday Afternoon, May 12

1:00-5:00 General business meeting for the Association
Coordinators: Tomás Almaguer and Mario Barrera
Tentative agenda items:
1. Evaluation of the first year of operation of the Association; selection of new Coordinating Committee.
2. Financing of the Association.
3. Research direction and priorities.
4. Arrangements for next conference and future newsletters.
5. Relations between the Association and other organizations.

1973-74 COORDINATING COMMITTEE

Teresa Aragon de Shepro (University of Washington)
Carlos Muñoz (UC Irvine)
Geralda Vialpando (UC San Diego)
Guillermo Lux (Highlands University)
Rodolfo de la Garza (University of Texas at El Paso)
Ray Burrola (Colorado State University)
Mario Barrera (UC San Diego)
Tomás Almaguer (UC Berkeley)

COMPILED ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS PRESENTED

CRYSTAL CITY, TEXAS: A STUDY IN DECOLONIZATION

HISAURO A. GARZA

This paper attempts to examine a Chicano political revolt (takeover) in a small south Texas town in light of decolonization. It differentiates between *social change* and *decolonization* by specifying the distinguishing elements. The thrust of the analysis for the specification of elements considered as contributive/functional for decolonization centers in the changes which have occurred in post-revolt Crystal City.

Procedurally, the paper briefly discusses *colonialism* and posits the use of decolonization as the heuristically logical opposite. It then moves to a discussion of the constraints and barriers encountered in decolonization efforts. In this vein, it discusses briefly the function of *structures of dependency* in impeding absolute decolonization. Logically, then, it postulates that decolonization analysis must be sensitive to the particular colonized reality of the subject of study. Within this line of reasoning, it recommends that this sensitivity be preferred to the application of static, ideal-typical models of decolonization.

Besides examining certain structural/orientational changes as being indicative of decolonization, the analysis deals with the dimension of *awareness-creation* and *conscientization* of the town's Chicanos.

POLITICAL CHANGE, LOCAL ELITES, AND LOCAL POLICY: THE CASE OF PARLIER, CALIFORNIA

ROBERT AGUALLO, JR.
ADALJIZA SOSA RIDDELL

In April, 1972, Chicanos took political control of Parlier, a small rural town in the Central Valley of California, by electing an all-Chicano city council. Although Parlier is 85% Chicano, this was the first time in Parlier's 51-year existence that Chicanos were elected to the city council. Subsequently a Chicano police chief and city clerk were appointed.

The Chicano take-over of the city council was preceded by a year and a half of intense political activity, directed and encouraged by the Parlier Fact-Finding Committee, an organi-

zation formed by interested Chicanos who had met initially to discuss Chicano concerns over the appointment of a new police chief. This concern arose when the incumbent city council passed over a veteran Chicano officer in order to appoint a relative newcomer who had previously had to leave the Parlier police force because of an alleged beating of a Mexican American youth. The political process that began then led to a recall petition, a local boycott, a second recall petition, a regular city council election, and then a recall election. Throughout this period there were accusations hurled at the Chicano committee, arson attempts, shootings, the arrest of the Mayor, and the general polarization of the townspeople.

The case of Parlier presents us with an opportunity to study the process of political change. In the last two years there has been a rise in the level of interest and attendance at the council meetings currently being conducted bilingually, and a change in policy orientation. Parlier also has the distinction of being the first California town to be run by Chicanos. Parlier also provides an interesting combination of types of community participation and activism which led to the transfer of community mobilization, boycotts, and confrontation politics.

Parlier is also interesting for what it can tell us about the prospects for Chicano political activity. Events in Parlier represent a recognition by Chicanos that local politics affects them in very adverse ways and that the low-key, low-interest, and low-visibility of local politics presents a unique opportunity for political activism in their own political language. The local level is a useful vehicle for political change and such change is occurring in Parlier because of two conditions: (1) the different value orientations of the participants, in theory, from those of the people in power, and (2) the tactics utilized by the challengers to the status quo which politicized the challengers and their supporters. Finally, Parlier's political takeover *is* Chicano politics, as distinct from the political behavior of Spanish surname individuals, and the participation of Chicanos in systemic politics. The key elements defining the situation as Chicano politics are: (1) the participation of Chicanos from the community and from different economic strata, (2) confrontation of the existing system which was alien to the Chicano condition, and (3) a definite value orientation toward concern for Chicanos and their needs, translatable into policy decisions.

The first Chicano city council in Parlier came to power in a unique manner and has governed differently from its predecessors. Parlier is important because there are many other towns with similar conditions in California.

LIMITS AND DETERMINANTS OF ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS

GILBERT GONZALES

Alternative Education implies educational reform. There can be no fundamental change in the educational process of the United States without a fundamental change in the nature of the society. The existing educational institutions are creations of the existing society. Alternative models are only alternatives: they exist harmoniously within the social order.

The question is not whether social change can come from alternative institutions (since social change creates educational change), but how to change the fundamental basis for the existing educational system. The question relates to the importance of comprehending the sociological basis for education. Unless one understands the nature of the society, one cannot understand the limits of alternative institutions.

GEOGRAPHICAL AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS: ALTERNATIVE CHICANO RESEARCH

TERESA JIMENEZ

The Northwest Chicano experience has been kept isolated for too long. The conditions facing Chicanos in the Northwest are basically rural in nature, but fast becoming an urban situation.

***Film Presentation--Chicanos de Seattle

Factors that have led to the de-isolation of Chicanos will be explored as well as the need for the development of mutual communication between Northwest and Southwest Chicanos.

In view of the vast possibilities of computer technology, can Chicanos in fact utilize the field of computers for development as a resource agent?

***Systems Explained

Projection: Initialize the uses of computer systems for the maintenance of documentation. (Example: Medical histories of Chicano populations as a form of social control. Service delivery vs. social control.)

MEXICAN WORKERS IN LOS ANGELES: 1917-1928

RICARDO ROMO

In this study the author utilizes quantitative methods to determine occupational and spatial mobility among Mexican workers in Los Angeles over the period 1917-1928. The occupation of Mexican workers in Los Angeles are compared to that of white workers in Los Angeles and Boston. The author found that most industries in Los Angeles employed Mexican workers, although in some industries such as the building trades and transportation, one found the larger share. Marriage records were used as a technique of determining the occupations of Mexicanos over the years 1917, 1923 and 1928. Other traditional sources were also reviewed and the findings compared.

Next the author used city directories to trace the occupations of the Mexican workers selected from the marriage record sample. In comparing the occupational mobility for Mexican workers with whites in Los Angeles and Boston, the author found upward occupational mobility among first, second, and third generation Mexicanos almost non-existent. This unusually low rate of occupational movement among Mexican workers over a ten-year period, the author suggests, may be attributable to several factors. Racism is given as the single most important reason for the occupational differences among Mexican and white workers measured over a period of a decade. Mexicans were denied entrance into many industries and unions, and in industries where they were welcomed, they were assigned the lowest positions. Thus Mexican workers not only started at the bottom of the occupational ladder, but over a period of time, they remained at the bottom.

The study also examines the degree of spatial mobility of Mexican workers compared to white workers in Los Angeles, Boston, and Omaha. No other group studied in the United States has exhibited a higher rate of geographic mobility during the twentieth century. The first generation Mexican workers were found to have the least ties to the Mexican community during the 1920's. The majority of the Mexicanos, first, second, and third generation, in fact, were more apt to have left the community within a period of ten years than to remain. Mexicans, it appears, were far from "trapped" in their communities; if anything, they moved in and out at a higher rate than white workers during the same period.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MARXIST ANALYSIS ON THE SITUATION OF WORKING CLASS WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES: PARTICULARLY CHICANAS

ROSALINDA M. GONZALEZ

For Chicanos, and for the other oppressed peoples of the U.S., there are two questions of vital importance: one is the question of the liberation of the oppressed classes; the other is the question of the liberation of women, and of central concern is how these two questions relate to each other and are affected by each other.

The role of the researcher within this context will be determined by the particular framework she or he is operating from. The three major frameworks which have attempted to answer questions about the nature of society in general and U.S. society in particular have been the Social Sciences, Dialectical and Historical Materialism, and Feminism.

The Social Sciences and Feminism, because of their social base and because of their premises, are incapable of correctly analyzing the nature of society and the determinant forces within society which create oppressed classes and oppressor classes. They are therefore incapable of providing any guide for the liberation of people.

Dialectical and Historical Materialism, precisely because of its social base and its correct premises, is the only theory which provides the basis for concretely and accurately determining the fundamental forces in society, for historically understanding the oppression of people, and for providing a scientific guide to action for the liberation of all oppressed peoples.

With this general background, my presentation intends to briefly examine the social base, the origins and the premises of each of the above frameworks, and then proceed to a discussion of dialectical and historical materialism applied to the question of the situation of working class women in the United States, particularly Chicanas.

APPENDIX VI

NATIONAL CHICANO SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER
AUSTIN, TEXAS (Spring 1975)

With apologies to all for our tardiness we place before you the latest issue of the National Chicano Social Science Newsletter. This issue incorporates material from previous newsletters and summaries written by participants in the 1974 National Conference held at the University of California at Irvine.

BACKGROUND OF THE ASSOCIATION

For those unfamiliar with the Association we are reprinting the following excerpts from the first association newsletter.

At the annual meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association held in San Antonio, Texas, in March, 1972, representatives of the various existing Chicano caucuses formed the National Caucus of Chicano Social Scientists. A Steering Committee for the Caucus was appointed comprised of representatives from the various existing Chicano disciplinary organizations for the purpose of planning the first national meeting of the Caucus. The Steering Committee was chaired by Jaime Sena Rivera. It was decided in San Antonio that the purpose of the Las Vegas conference was to begin organizing a more formal organization to replace the ad hoc National Caucus.

The Las Vegas Conference

The Conference was attended by approximately fifty Chicano social scientists. Although the conference was national in scope, the majority of those attending were from Southwestern area colleges and universities. It was assumed that a truly national representation was not possible due to difficulties in securing travel funds. The various disciplines were fairly

equitably represented. Most of the delegates were faculty and graduate students and several undergraduate students also participated. The thrust of the conference discussions focused on the nature and direction of Chicano social science, and the structure and purpose of the proposed Association. There were several key themes which had general consensus among the delegates. These themes reflected dissatisfaction with traditional social science and concern for the question of the role of the Chicano social scientist.

The Purposes of a Chicano Social Science Association

Participants at the conference mentioned a wide variety of purposes which could be served by a Chicano Science Association. Among these are:

1. Establishing communication among Chicano scholars across geographical and disciplinary boundaries.
2. Encouraging the development of new social theories and models, in keeping with the direction outlined above.
3. Facilitating the recruitment of Chicanos into all levels of social science institutions.
4. Acting to increase the flow of funds to research undertaken by Chicanos particularly as that research contributes to the goals and direction of the Association.

The Structure of the Proposed Association

Some of the liveliest discussion at the meeting concerned the structure of the Association. During these discussions a decision emerged to break with the traditional form of organization of professional associations and to attempt an innovative structure more in keeping with the philosophy and direction of a new social science as laid out at the Las Vegas conference.

In keeping with the interdisciplinary orientation, it was decided to abandon the idea of membership via disciplinary organizations (the various caucuses, etc.). Rather, membership in the national organization will be based on participation in interdisciplinary local or sub-regional collective research units. In keeping with their action orientation, these units will be referred to as *focos*.

The focos are envisioned as small enough to allow regular interaction among its members, since such interaction is seen as essential in maintaining a high level of interest and participation. A high level of participation, in turn, is necessary if such organizations are to develop and implement vigorous projects combining action and research at the local level.

The foco is thus seen as the real driving force of the association, and the center of activity for its members. The foco is to be the source of initiative and the focus of power. The local research/action projects developed by the focos should correspond to local conditions and to the interests of its members, integrating existing research wherever possible. Hopefully there will be a great diversity among the projects undertaken, with the various focos learning from the experiences and activities of others. Eventually there should develop direct working relationships among adjoining focos, based on overlapping interests.

The internal structure of the foco is left for each foco to determine, in keeping with the general tone and direction of the Association. It may be that within each foco there will be a number of sub-groups or task forces organized around common interests.

At the national level, there is to be a coordinating committee composed of delegates from the focos. The purpose of this group is to act as an information link among the focos, as by seeing to the publication of a regular newsletter; to make arrangements for national conferences; and to act as a general coordinating body. It is not seen as a locus of power or major initiative in the association, but as a channel for the energies of the focos.

An annual national conference will be part of the association. Presentations at this annual meeting are to be initiated by the various focos, and will reflect the activities and research of their members.

THE IRVINE CONFERENCE

On May 10, 1974 some one hundred persons gathered at the University of California for the second annual conference. The different focos organized panels and workshops on topics of central concern to Chicano social scientists. At the time of this writing we do not have all of the expected abstracts of panels and papers. Nevertheless we would like to present those that were made available to us.

Report on Panel I. Action Research: Community Control

This panel began at 11 a.m. and ended at 1 p.m. There were about forty people in attendance. There had been three presentations scheduled, but because of a late cancellation only two papers were given.

The moderators, Geralda Master and Mario Barrera, began the panel with a brief introduction. They explained the format for the panel and introduced participants, and gave some background on the concepts of action research and community control.

The first paper was given by Hisauro Garza of UC Berkeley. Since abstracts of the papers are appended to this report, we will not attempt to outline them here. Briefly, Hisauro analyzed the political takeover of Crystal City, Texas, from a colonial perspective, and attempted to assess to what extent the takeover and subsequent events there could be described as a process of decolonization.

The second paper was given by Robert Aguallo and Adalijiza Sosa Riddell of UC Davis. They described the political takeover by Chicanos of Parlier, California in 1972, and analyzed it as a case of study of political change. They were concerned to determine whether taking over institutions had in fact resulted in a change in the policies vis-a-vis Chicanos which those institutions were following.

A question and answer and general discussion period followed the presentations, and several important topics were brought up at this time. There were some questions about the concept of decolonization and whether it had been defined sufficiently clearly to be used as a concept to guide research. There was also a discussion of the limitations of Chicano community control, with the opinion being expressed by some that political control in these towns was circumscribed by the lack of economic control on the part of Chicanos. Another topic that came up had to do with whether the struggle for community control could be related to the class struggle. One fear that was expressed in this connection was that the attempt to create a political vehicle out of the entire Chicano community without regard to class could lead to the creation of a new Chicano elite to replace the old Anglo elite, thus modifying but not basically challenging the underlying structure of exploitation based on class.

Finally, there was a good discussion on the relationship of these research projects to further political action. The question was raised as to whether the results of the studies would be diffused to the affected communities and to other communities where they might have an impact on the political process.

On the whole, our feeling was that the panel was useful and that it stimulated discussion of several key issues of Chicano research and political action. Within the given time period, two papers were certainly enough--three would have allowed little time for discussion.

Report of Workshop II. Alternative Institutions

This workshop addressed itself to following sets of questions: How viable are efforts at establishing alternative institutions; are they in fact alternative; what new bodies of knowledge reflecting our cultural experience can we utilize in expanding our learning processes; to what extent can modern technology be controlled and utilized as a resource for

community needs; can we change its direction from social control to service delivery?

Gilbert Gonzales from U.C. Irvine addressing himself to the question of alternative education developed the thesis that alternative models of education are only alternatives since they exist harmoniously within the social order. The real task is understanding the sociological function of education in broader society. He proposed that fundamental social change will be the agent of educational change and that alternative institutions must be viewed from within that context.

Tomás Atencio from La Academia de la Nueva Raza in New Mexico examined the assumptions of our educational system as learning and knowledge transferred from an active end of the system to be deposited at the receiving end of the conduit. He proposed this to be in fact a "cycle of ignorance." He proposes instead a philosophy of dialectical tension involving deliberate action following thought and reflection akin in respects to the educational philosophy of Paulo Freire. He cites oral history, folklore, art and personal history as a basis for a new synthesis of knowledge that can break through dehumanizing institutions and provide a well-spring of learning based on our own experience. This process is aimed at directing change in social, political and economic structures.

Teresa Jimenez of Washington presented an analysis of the possibilities of computer technology as used and developed in the Northwest by Chicano communities. She projected the uses of computer systems especially for medical maintenance and documentation and suggested possible uses in other areas by Chicano researchers. The question of how this information can be used, by whom, and for what purposes was explored. Especially the area of social control of communities vs. delivery of needed community services.

Report on Workshop III. Working Class Analysis and the Chicano

Four working papers were presented in this workshop. The first was by Ricardo Romo on "Mexican Workers in Los Angeles, 1917-1930: A Study in Mobility" (see Abstract below). The second by Victor Nelson Cisneros on "The Participation of Chicanos in the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers of America, 1937-1950," followed by Laura Arroyo, "The Chicana Worker." The last presentation was by Rosalinda M. Gonzalez on "The Development of a Correct Analysis on the Situation of Working Class Women in the United States, Particularly Chicanas" (see Abstract below). Brief commentary was provided by Juan Gómez-Quiñones. Although all presentations touched on some aspect of the general topic of the workshop, each offered an important contribution to the developing dialogue on the question of why working class analysis is important to the proper interpretation of the Chicano Experience.

On the basis of his study, Ricardo Romo concluded that the United States is not an open society since mobility for Chicano workers was found to be highly restricted. According to Romo, white ethnics in Boston during the historical period had better entry level jobs than second or third generation Mexican workers in Los Angeles. The thesis which undergirded Romo's study is that racism is the most important factor in understanding the economic exploitation of Chicano workers. On the basis of his case study of the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers of America (UCAPAWA), Victor Nelson Cisneros' conclusions paralleled those of Romo's. According to Cisneros, Chicanos in the UCAPAWA during the period of 1937-1950 were largely victimized by Anglo-union leadership.

The third presentation by Laura Arroyo touched on what is rapidly becoming another important question in the Chicano movement: the woman question. On the basis of a quantitative analysis of the female workforce in the United States based on 1970 census data, Arroyo's findings indicated Chicanas are the most exploited workers in the service and other industries. The presentation by Rosalinda Gonzalez also touched on the woman question. According to Gonzalez, the situation of Chicano workers cannot be properly interpreted unless it is done within the context of dialectical and historical materialism. As the only working paper from a Marxist perspective it made possible a stimulating dialogue amongst both the members of the workshop and those in the audience.

In conclusion, the workshop was successful and productive in that the presentations in collective terms raised research questions of serious import to the Chicano struggle. As a whole, the working papers are indicative of the kind of critical research young Chicano and Chicana scholars are pursuing which is aimed at advancing the level of consciousness and understanding of the nature of Chicano oppression in the United States.

Report on Panel IV. Internationalism and the Border

Because of conflicts of schedule among potential participants, only one paper was given at this panel. Victor Nelson Cisneros and Guillermo Flores moderated and offered brief comments on the paper.

Raul Fernandez of U.C. Irvine presented the paper on the Border Industrialization Program along the U.S.-Mexican border. According to him, the program was ostensibly designed to solve the problems of unemployment on the Mexican side of the border. Basically, the program involved making use of U.S. tariff schedules to industrialize the border on the Mexican side. The program did not achieve its goals of significantly reducing existing unemployment. According to Fernandez, the Border Industrialization Program represents one aspect of an attempt

by American business to make the Mexican economy more dependent on the American economy.

Victor Nelson Cisneros made the point that most studies of the Border Industrialization Program have looked only at the impact on Mexican workers and have not dealt with the effects of the program on the Chicanos in the U.S.

There was a discussion period after the presentation, but the participants seemed to have some difficulty in focusing in on the topic of the session. The panel would have been strengthened through the presentation of additional material on the topic of internationalism and the border.

On the last day of the conference some of the participants came together as a whole to discuss the association and its plans for the future. The following is a report of that session.

Report on the Sunday Session

The morning and afternoon sessions were run together because of time pressures. There were about 25 people present, and the session began around 10:30 a.m.

The first part of the meeting was taken up with reports from the active focos. Reynaldo Macías and Luis Arroyo reported for the Southern California foco. They gave a background on the origins of the foco. Its roots go back to a study that was done on the incorporation of East Los Angeles as a city, which led the study's participants to think in terms of organizing projects that combined research and action. The 1973 CSSA conference in Las Vegas, New Mexico gave further impetus to such organizing, and a group of people was brought together at UCLA to discuss a research project centered on Los Angeles County. This group, which included participants from San Diego and Irvine as well as L.A., eventually became the Southern California foco. It includes faculty and students from several disciplines and three U.C. campuses. Its activities for 1974 consisted of (1) presentations on their work-in-progress by the members of the foco, so that all would become familiar with the work and approach of each, and (2) organizing the 1974 annual conference of the Association. The agenda for the rest of 1974 is to continue searching for common themes, and if possible to define one or more collective activities in which the members would participate.

Tomás Almaguer reported for the Northern California foco. The foco there consists so far of graduate students in the Sociology Department of UC Berkeley, but they plan to expand their scope. Up to now the foco has been used as a forum for the members to present and examine their work, and they are now reaching the stage of defining concrete cooperative projects. At this point Ron de la Cruz and Nina Genera described a project that they are elaborating in the Bay Area. It involves the creation of an alternative community project for

young Chicanos and Chicanas involving delinquency, and is based on the premise that existing institutions do more harm than good. The chief problems which Ron and Nina are addressing at this point are those of combining theory and practice and of finding resources to carry out their project without being coopted by established institutions.

Ray Burrola reported on Association activities in northern Colorado and on his attempts to build a foco there. He has concentrated on disseminating information, and during the last year an Institute on Oral History and Folklore was held at Colorado State University and co-sponsored by the Association. The Institute was also used as a vehicle for exploring the possibility of coalescing a foco in that area. Some 25 people attended, and there was some hesitancy expressed on the basis of people already being overcommitted in their present activities. Ray plans to continue his efforts there, and wants to establish a long-term oral history and folklore project that could serve as one expression of Association activities in northern Colorado.

The second part of the meeting was devoted to a general evaluation of the progress of the Association and of the conference. With regard to the conference, the opinion was expressed that the papers should be more formally prepared and that there should be a prepared commentary. There was a feeling that the panel topics were good in that they closely related research activities to concrete social problems and political action rather than being abstracted from their social context. Some people also felt that more time should be allowed in the panels for discussion and that there should be some mechanism for interrelating the topics covered and for arriving at conclusions and future directions based on the presentations.

The delegation from the University of Texas at Austin volunteered to host the 1975 annual conference, a suggestion which was approved with enthusiasm.

With regards to the newsletter of the Association, the opinion was expressed that it should be used to report on the projects which the various focos had undertaken, as a way of informing the rest of the Association members. It was felt that we should continue the practice of having the newsletters put out by the focos on a revolving basis.

Guillermo Flores led a discussion on research directions and priorities, indicating his feelings on these matters. He listed as priorities research projects on the class struggle as it affects Chicanos and as it relates to nationalism, and on the political economy of the Southwest. He suggested that the latter topic should be placed in historical perspective going back to before the Mexican-American War, and that it should include how Chicanos have organized historically in response to the changing conditions of their oppression. José Limón emphasized in this connection the need to study the

conceptual and cultural dimension of the Chicano experience, and to relate cultural factors to the structural dimensions which Guillermo described. Thus he felt that high priority should be given to the study of how the Chicano cultural system has reacted to changing structural conditions as a means of defense against oppression.

A discussion followed on the financing of the Association. One proposal that was discussed was that of attempting to secure funds from the Ford Foundation to support the activities of the Association in the coming year, and particularly the 1975 conference. This proposal was eventually tabled after some reservations were expressed that accepting funds from the Ford Foundation might be cooptative. The incoming Coordinating Committee was charged with exploring alternative means of generating resources for the Association.

A new coordinating committee was chosen for the coming year. Its members are:

Ray Burrola, Colorado State University
Hisauro Garza, Berkeley
Danny Moreno, Irvine
Tobias Duran, New Mexico
Pedro Castillo, Yale
David Montejano, Berkeley
Nina Genera, Berkeley
Laura Arroyo, UCLA
Rey Macías, UCLA
José Limón, Texas
Belinda Herrera, Texas

The current regional focos and their contact persons are:

Northern Colorado
Ray Burrola
Director, Chicano Studies
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, Colorado

Southern California
Rey Macías
Aztlán Publications
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, California

Mario Barrera
Department of Political Science
University of California
La Jolla, California

Carlos Muñoz
Program in Comparative Culture
University of California
Irvine, California

Northern California
Tomás Almaguer
Department of Sociology
University of California
Berkeley, California

Guillermo Flores
Dept. of Political Science
Stanford University
Stanford, California

Pacific Northwest Area
Teresa de Shepro
Department of Political Science
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington

Texas
Belinda Herrera
Center for Mexican-American Studies
University of Texas
Austin, Texas

THE AUSTIN MEETINGS, APRIL 11-12, 1975

The University of Texas at Austin Foco is preparing for the third annual conference which is now scheduled for April 11-12, 1975. It will be held at the Joe C. Thompson Conference Center on the University of Texas campus and is being co-sponsored by the Center for Mexican-American Studies. We have allowed for enough rooms and time to accommodate a large number of panels. (Each panel is being allowed a maximum of two hours.) As agreed during last year's conference, it is our expectation that each individual foco is putting together its own panel. We would like to publish the entire program for the conference including panel titles, individual paper titles and readers in the next newsletter which will appear at the of February. We are asking each individual foco to send us a full description of its panel by no later than February 21, 1975. We are also especially asking any individuals who may wish to organize an independent panel on some aspect of the social sciences and the Chicano to also send us their proposed panel program by the February 21st deadline.

With this newsletter we are also sending you reservation forms for the Villa Capri Motel which is within easy walking distance of the conference site. We encourage you to take advantage of this facility since it will make our task of coordination that much easier. It should be clearly understood that each participant is responsible for his/her own expenses for the conference.

PUBLICATIONS

At the last national meeting it was agreed that the papers presented at future conferences should be finished pieces rather than working papers. We need to emphasize this point, because we have distinct hopes of publishing the conference proceedings. During the conference the coordinating committee will meet to formalize this procedure.

Should there be any problems or questions please contact:

José Limón
Armando Gutierrez
Belinda Herrera

APPENDIX VII (Unedited for changes in program)

NATIONAL CHICANO SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
ANNUAL CONFERENCE
APRIL 11-12, 1975, Joe C. Thompson Conference Center, Austin, Texas

PROGRAM

April 11th

4:00-6:00 p.m. Preliminary Meeting of the Association
Art Building 4

6:00-7:00 p.m. Dinner

7:00-11:00 p.m. I. Combined panel: The Political Situation in the Southwest and Its Implications for Chicanos JCT 2-102

Chairpersons: Hisauro Garza and Armando Gutiérrez

Commentator: José Angel Gutiérrez

Papers:

1. Tatcho Mendiola, Ideological Trends in the Chicano Movement.
2. José Cobas, Non-Rationality and Political Leftism: Chicanos in Crystal City.
3. Evie Chapa, Chicanas in Politics.
4. Carlos Muñoz, The Chicano Movement: A Framework for Analysis.
5. Hisauro Garza, Parlier, Cal.: An Analysis of a Chicano Political Revolt.
6. David Montejano, The Politicization of a Lumpenproletariat: A Case Study.

April 12th

9-10:45 A.M. II. Chicano Nationalism: Inquiries into Its Origins and Development. JCT 2-110

Chairperson: Luis Arroyo
Commentator: Juan Gómez-Q.
Papers:

1. Cirilo Salazar, The Social Origins of Chicano Nationalism, Class, and Community in the Making of AZTLAN, 1800-1920.
2. Victor Nelson-C., Social Change and Nationalism: South Texas and the Plan de San Diego, 1890-1917.
3. Fred Cervantes, Chicanos as a Post Colonial Minority.

11-12:45 A.M. III. Chicano Social History JCT 2-122

Chairperson: Gilberto Hinojosa
Papers:

1. Andrés Tijerina, Rise of Liberal Federalism in Coahuila and Texas, 1824-1834.
2. Emilio Zamora, El Plan de San Diego; Its Origin and Development: An Historical Perspective.
3. Ray Burrola, Casimiro Barela, The Perpetual Senator of Colorado: 1876-1912.

11-12:45 A.M. IV. Chicano Sociolinguistics: Approaches and Problems in the Study of Chicano Language and Speech JCT 2-120

Chairperson: Reynaldo Macías
Commentator: Same
Papers:

1. Raymond Castro, Untangling the Bi-Lingual Education Act: Patterns of Acculturation and Assimilation in U.S. Language Policy.
2. Ray Rocco, Language as an Expression of Ideology: A View of Neo-Marxist Literature.
3. José Limón, Expressive Speech and its Social Uses in a Texas Chicano Youth Community.

2-3:20 P.M. V. Chicanos in the U.S. Labor Force JCT 2-110
Chairperson: Tomás Almaguer
Commentator: Same
Papers:
1. Albert Camarillo, The Chicano Working Class at Santa Barbara.
2. Mario Barrera, Minority Workers and the Colonial Labor Principle.

2-3:45 P.M. VI. Chicano Folklore: Expressive Responses to Domination. JCT 2-122
Chairperson: Alurista
Commentator: Américo Paredes
Papers:
1. José Reyna, Música Tejana and Cultural Nationalism.
2. José Limón, Agringado Joking in Texas-Mexican Society: Differential Identity and Folkloric Communication.
3. Juan Chavira, Chicano Folk Medicine: An Alternative to the Health System.

3:30-5 P.M. VII. Chicano Communities in the Mid-West JCT 2-110
Chairperson: Miguel Carranza
Commentators: Gilbert Cárdenas, Steve Flores
Papers:
1. Carlos Arce, Chicano Participation in Michigan Higher Education.
2. Albert Mata and Carmen Ayala, Chicano Resettlement in the Midwest: A Steelworker's Perspective.

3:30-5 P.M. VIII. Proyecto de investigación sobre las relaciones de producción en la región bi-nacional fronteriza JCT 2-120
Commentator: Jorge Bustamante

5-6:45 P.M. IX. Chicano Social Science: The Ethics and Politics of Research JCT 2-102
Chairperson: Felipe González
Participants: Carlos Ornelas, Raúl Ramírez Tony Duran, Prof. Rendón, David Montejano, and other Chicano social scientists

8-10 P.M. Final Organizational Meeting JCT 2-102
Chairperson: José E. Limón

APPENDIX VIII

REPRINTS FROM EL MIRLO CANTA DE NOTICATLAN:
CARTA SOBRE ESTUDIOS CHICANOS
VOL. 2, NO. 8 (ABRIL 1975)

A. (Part 1)

NACSS CONFERENCE

The Third Annual Conference of the National Association of Chicano Social Sciences was held at the University of Texas at Austin, on April 11, 12 & 13, 1975. Over 200 persons attended the conference. It was comprised of three sections: A preliminary meeting of the Association; 9 panels, their respective commentaries and discussions, and a final organizational meeting. The panels were composed of Foco members and other Chicano scholars throughout the nation. In this issue of *El Mirlo*. we present a partial summary of the conference. The May issue of *El Mirlo* will finish the summary of the conference.

1. *The Political Situation in the Southwest. Its Implications for Chicanos.* The panel was chaired by Hisauro Garza (UCB, Berkeley Foco) and Armando Gutiérrez (UTA, no Foco). The scope of the presentations varied from a generic Marxist conceptual and analytical approach, and an assessment of its applicability, to the Chicano Movement in "Ideological Trends in the Chicano Movement" by Tatcho Mendiola (U.H., no Foco) to an analysis of Lipsett's Theory on lower classes in "Non-rationality and Political Leftism: Chicanos in Crystal City" by José Cobas (UTA, no Foco). Hisauro Garza analyzed the emergence of political consciousness in "Parlier, Cal.: An Analysis of a Chicano Political Revolt." David Montejano (Yale, no Foco) presented "The Politicization of a Lumpenproletariat, a Case Study. An Analytical Report on Brown Berets in Southern Texas." Two additional papers were scheduled, but not presented. They were: "The Chicano Movement: A Framework for Analysis" by Carlos Muñoz (UCI, So. Cal. Foco) and "Chicanas in

Politics" by Evie Chapa (UTA, no Foco). Muñoz and José Angel Gutiérrez commented on the papers and also addressed themselves to the Chicano question. Due to the great interest in the Chicana question expressed by the audience, a Chicana panel was arranged for Saturday. Papers were read by Evie Chapa and Carmen Carrillo (UCB, Berkeley Foco).

2. *Chicano Nationalism: Inquiries Into Its Origin and Development.* This extremely important subject was presented for the first time this year. Luis Arroyo (UCLA, So. Cal. Foco) the organizer and scheduled Chairperson of the panel was unable to attend. Juan Gómez-Quiñones (UCLA, So. Cal. Foco) chaired and also read Cirilo Salazar's (UCLA, no Foco) paper entitled "The Social Origins of Chicano Nationalism: Class and Community in the Making of Aztlán, 1800-1920," an exploratory overview of Chicano Nationalism. Victor Nelson-Cisneros focused on Nationalism and Cultural conflict in the border area, in "Social Change and Nationalism: South Texas and the Plan de San Diego, 1890-1917." Fred Cervantes (USC, So. Cal. Foco) presented a critique of the internal colonial model, "Chicanos as a Post-Colonial Minority," and proposed an alternative model of post-colonialism. The commentators were Mario Barrera (USCD, So. Cal. Foco) and Tatcho Mendiola. The papers and comments stimulated a lively exchange with the audience which lasted two hours.

3. *Chicano Social History.* This session was shortened due to a time overlap with the Nationalism session. Gilberto Hinojosa (UTA, Texas Foco) was Chairperson. Due to a lack of time, the following papers were summarized: "Rise of Liberal Federalism in Coahuila and Texas, 1824-1834" by Andrés Tijerina (UTA, Texas Foco); "El Plan de San Diego: Its Origin and Development: An Historical Perspective," by Emilio Zamora (UTA, Texas Foco) and "Camimiro Barela, the Perpetual Senator of Colorado: 1876-1912" by Ray Burrola (CSU, Ft. Collins Foco).

4. *Chicano Sociolinguistics: Approaches and Problems in the Study of Chicano Language and Speech.* The panel was chaired by Reynaldo Macías (UCLA, So. Cal. Foco) and included the following papers: Raymond Castro's (Harvard, no Foco) "Untangling the Bi-Lingual Education Act: Patterns of Acculturation and Assimilation in U.S. Language Policy," read by Reynaldo Macías; Raymond Rocco's (UCLA, So. Cal. Foco) "Language as an Expression of Ideology: A View of Neo-Marxist Literature" read by Dan Moreno (UCI, So. Cal. Foco). Rocco's critique of Claus Mueller's *The Politics of Communication: A Study in the Political Sociology of Language Socialization and Legitimation* was particularly incisive. José Limón (UTA, Texas Foco) read a paper on "Expressive Speech and Its Social Uses in a Texas Chicano Youth Community." The paper was based on the UT Austin Chicano Student Community.

5. *Chicanos in the U.S. Labor Force.* Tomás Almaguer (UCB, Berkeley Foco) chaired the session and commented on the papers. The papers were: "The Chicano Working Class at Santa Bárbara" by Alberto Camarillo (Stanford, So. Cal. Foco); "Minority Workers and the Colonial Labor Principle" by Mario Barrera (UCSD, So. Cal. Foco); and "Proyecto de la investigación sobre las relaciones de producción en la región bi-lingual fronteriza" by Jorge Bustamante (Colegio de México, no Foco).

6. *Chicano Folklore: Expressive Responses to Domination.* The panel was organized and chaired by Alurista. The first paper, "Música Tejana and Cultural Nationalism" by José Reyna, focused on broder corridos as a conscious expression of Chicano cultural nationalism. A demonstration of various corridos recorded by Reyna accompanied the presentation. José Limón applied the anthropological-sociological concept of differential identity to the UT Austin and A&I Chicano Student communities, in "Agringado Joking in Texas-Mexican Society: Differential Identity and Folklore Communications." Limón emphasized the utilization of the folkloric genre jokes based on text and performance, by the students as an internally cohesive social response to external domination. Juan Chavira (Pan American, no Foco) gave a visual presentation on curanderismo in Eagle Pass, Texas, entitled "Chicano Folk Medicine: An Alternative to the Health System." He noted the important socio-cultural role curanderos perform within the Chicano Community. According to Chavira, the curandero's homeopathic approach is an invaluable contribution to social medicine. Dr. Américo Paredes (UTA, Texas Foco) commented briefly on all three papers. He emphasized the importance of a holistic approach to folklore.

B. (Part 2)
(Vol. 2, No. 9 (Mayo 1975))

NACSS CONFERENCE

The Third Annual Conference and Business Meeting of the National Association of Chicano Social Science was held at the University of Texas at Austin, on April 11-12, 1975. In this issue of *El Mirlo*, we finish the summary of the conference which appeared in the May issue.

7. *Chicano Communities in the Midwest.* Two papers were presented and discussed in the panel on the Midwest, chaired by Miguel Carranza. Carlos Arce (Univ. of Michigan, Midwest Foco) analyzed schooling problems in "Chicano Participation in Michigan Higher Education." Albert Mata (Univ. of Notre Dame, Midwest Foco) and Carmen Ayala (Midwest Foco) co-authored a paper on "Chicano Resettlement in the Midwest: A Steelworker's Perspective." The paper was based on oral interviews of

industrial workers, some of whom had migrated in the early part of the century. Gilbert Cárdenas (Midwest Foco) and Steve Flores (Midwest Foco) were commentators.

8. *Chicanas.* As previously mentioned, this panel was established in response to participant and audience interest. Lydia Espinoza (Univ. of Notre Dame, Midwest Foco) was selected as the Chairperson. Two papers were delivered, "Chicanas in Politics" by Evie Chapa and Armando Gutiérrez, read by Gutiérrez, and "Raza Mental Health: Perspectivas Femeninas" by Carmen Carrillo. The latter presentation evolved from a survey conducted by students in Psychology, Public Health, and Social Welfare at a San Francisco Bay area Chicana Mental Health Clinic. The ensuing question and answer period centered upon cultural sensitivity in Mental Health problems.

9. *Chicano Social Science: The Ethics and Politics of Research.* The ninth and last panel was chaired by Felipe González (UCB, Berkeley Foco). It was conducted in an informal, round table format, rather than a formal panel in order to maximize discussion. The following topics were discussed: research and its political relevance; covert and overt data collecting; the researcher's role and responsibility to informants; the researcher's responsibility to assess the jurisdiciousness of publishing certain types of information and for which audiences; and the necessity and feasibility of establishing a "Chicano Ethics Committee." A variety of viewpoints on these topics were discussed and debated.

Organizational and Business Meeting. The conference then moved into an extensive business meeting. First order of business were Foco reports: Ray Burrola reported on the Ft. Collins, Colorado Foco; Tomás Almaguer reported for the No. California Foco; Reynaldo Macías reported for the So. California Foco; Belinda Herrera reported on the Central Texas Foco; Homero Galicia, Oscar Martínez, Rodolfo de la Garza and Carina Ramírez reported on the University of Texas, El Paso Foco, and David Montejano reported on organizational activities in the Northeast. Organizational activity this year was highlighted by the establishment of a foco at Stanford and reestablishment of the University of Texas, El Paso Foco.

The activities of the NACSS during the upcoming academic year were then discussed. Particularly important was the discussion on publication of the *Proceedings* of the 3rd Annual Meetings. Requests were made to have members explore institutional sponsorship and/or donation for their publication. The *Proceedings* should be out by end of Summer 1975.

A special thanks was unanimously given to José Limón, Belinda Herrera and Armando Gutierrez for organizing the annual meeting.

Several concrete suggestions were also made and accepted by Chicanos y Chicanas about being more conscious that there be "fair and equally visible" participation of Chicanas on panels as Chairpersons, commentators, and presenters of papers. Focos, the basis of the Association and the foundation of the program organizing for the Annual Meetings were to keep this in mind.

Formal steps were also outlined for declaration of focos and their affiliation with the Association. The minimum criteria is: (1) declaration of foco existence; (2) listing of foco membership and addresses (including a contact person); and (3) a description of interests and projected activities. New focos, it was suggested, should do this through the National Coordinating Committee.

Proposed sites for next year, in order of priority, are University of Texas, El Paso, UCLA, and U.C. Berkeley. UTEP foco will submit their outline of proposed resources to the National Coordinating Committee for final confirmation.

It was also suggested that the Southern Califas foco take responsibility for Newsletter communications for the coming year. (Since then the So. Califas Foco has decided it will contribute association news to *El Mirlo Canta* to meet this responsibility.)

This year it was suggested and accepted that membership dues be established at $5.00 for faculty and $2.00 for students and others. Responsibility for collection and forwarding money to the Coordinating Committee are at the foco level.

The meeting adjourned at 11:30 p.m. and was continued to the next morning. On Sunday the meeting began at 9:30 a.m. and closed at 2:00 p.m. with approximately 25 members present.

Several items were discussed including the NACSS relationship to other Associations and a possible name change. The name change issue was recommended "to Committee" for a position presentation at next year's annual meeting for discussion and decision.

After several alternatives for selection of the Coordinating Committee, the members for Academic Year 1974-75 were unanimously reelected for another year. The new Chairperson of the National Coordinating Committee is Reynaldo Macías (UCLA, Southern Califas Foco). The administrative base for the National Association for Academic Year 1975-76 will be c/o Chicano Studies Center, UCLA, 405 Hilgard Ave., Los Angeles, Ca. 90024, (213) 825-2363. The 3rd Annual Meeting closed at 2:00 p.m.

APPENDIX IX

FOCO CONTACTS--NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHICANO SOCIAL SCIENCE

Midwest FOCO
Albert Mata
Dept. of Sociology
North Eastern Illinois University
Chicago, Illinois

North East FOCO
Pedro Castillo
Dept. of History
Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut

Northern California FOCO
Tomás Almaguer
Chicano Studies Program
University of California
Berkeley, California

Northern Colorado FOCO
Ray Burrola
Director
Chicano Studies Program
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, Colorado

Pacific Northwest FOCO
Theresa Aragon de Shepro
Vice Provost for Special Programs
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington

Southern California FOCO
Juan Gómez-Quiñones
Director
Chicano Studies Center
UCLA

Stanford University FOCO
Alberto Camarillo
Dept. of History
Stanford University
Stanford, California

University of Texas, Austin FOCO
Belinda Herrera
2434 Guadalupe
Austin, Texas

University of Texas, El Paso FOCO
Homero Galicia
Dept. of Political Science
University of Texas
El Paso, Texas